





TULLY'S
OFFICES.
IN

Three Books.

Turned out of

L A T I N
I N T O
E N G L I S H.

By Ro. L'ESTRANGE.

The Second Edition Corrected.

L O N D O N,

Printed for *Henry Brome*, at the Gun in
St. Paul's Church-Yard, 1681.

OFFICES
FOR THE
RECEIPT OF
MONEY

PAID TO
THE
TREASURER
OF THE
CITY OF
NEW YORK

By the
Clerk of the
City of New York

Printed by
St. John's Church, N.Y.

TO THE
READER.

TIS hard, me thinks, that a Man cannot Publish a Book, but he must presently give the World a Reason for't; when yet there's not One Book of Twenty that will bear a Reason; not One Man of a Hundred, perhaps, that is able to Give One; nor One Reason of a Thousand (when they are given) that was the True Reason of Doing it. The True Reason (I say) For there's a great Difference, many times, betwixt a Good Reason, for the doing of a thing, and the True Reason why the thing was done. The Service of God is a very Good Reason for a Man's going to Church; and yet the meeting of a Mistis There; may, perchance, be the True Reason of his Going. And

To the Reader.

so likewise in Other Cases, where we cover our Passions and our Interests under the Semblances of Virtue, and Duty. But however, since Custom; (the Plague of Wise Men, and the Idol of Fools) since Custom (I say) will have it so, that a Man had as good go to Court without his Cravat, as shew himself in Print without a Preface; I shall e'en Content my Self to play the Fool too, in so Much, and in so Good Company. (General Dedications being no Other, than Fashionable Fopperies.) For what can be more Ridiculous; than for a Man to Treat Princes, and Tinkers; Coxcombs; and Philosophers; Men of Honour, and Rascals, promiscuously, all in a Stile?

Now as it is no Easie Matter to give a Good Reason for Writing at all; so it is yet more Difficult to give That Reason in an Epistle; which, at best, stands in need of another very good Reason, for its own support. But Prefaces, at the Ordinary rate of
Pre-

To the Reader.

Prefaces, are wholly Inexcusable; Only an Idle Deal of Fiddle-Faddle betwixt the Writer and the Reader; made worke, by Care, and Peins; and Digested, out of Vulgar and Pedantique Common-Places, into one Mass of Putrid and Elaborate Folly. This Liberty of Prefacing against Prefaces, may seem a little Unreasonable; but Common Scriblers are allow'd the Priviledges of Common Strumpets. One of the Frankest Prostitutes that ever I knew since I was born, had These Words the ofteneft in her Mouth: Lord! (says she) to see the Impudence of some Women!

To come now to the Reasons that induced me to the Translating of This Little Book; I shall Begin with the Excellency of the Work it Self; which has ever been Esteemed, both for the Method, and Matter of it, as one of the most Exact Pieces of the Kind that ever was written, and the most Instructive of Human Life. In so much

To the Reader.

that Cicero himself valud himself upon
This Tract of Morals, as his Master-
piece; and accordingly recommended the
Study of it to his Beloved Son, under
That Illustrious Character. Second-
ly, as it was Composed in a Loose, and
Troublesome Age, so was it accom-
modated also to the Circumstances of
Those Times; for the asserting of the
Force, and Efficacy of Virtue against
the utmost Rigour, and Iniquity of
Fortune. Upon which Consideration
likewise, I have now turn'd it into English,
with a regard to a Place, and Season,
that extremely needs it. I do not speak
This, as if at any time it would have
been Superfluous; but that Desperate
Diseases require the most Powerful Re-
medies.

To give you the Sum of it in a few
Words; It is a Manual of Precepts for
the Government of our Selves, in all the
Offices, Actions, and Conditions of Hu-
man Life; and tending, not only to the
Comfort of Men in Society, but to the
Con-

To the Reader.

Conducting of Particulars also, into a State of Felicity, and Virtue. It is a Lesson that serves us from the very Cradle, to the Grave. It teaches us what we Ow to Mankind; to our Country; to our Parents; to our Friends; to our Selves; what we are to do as Children; what, as Men; what, as Citizens: It sets, and it keeps us Right in all the Duties of Prudence, Moderation, Resolution, and Justice. It Forms our Manners; Purges our Affections; enlightens our Understandings; and leads us, through the Knowledge, and the Love of Virtue, to the Practice, and Habit of it.

This Treatise of Offices, I find to be one of the Commonest School-Books that we have; and as it is the Best of Books; so it is apply'd to the Best of Purposes; that is to say, to the Training up of Youth, in the Study and Exercise of Virtue. The Foundations of an Honorable, and a Blessed Life, are laid in the very Cradle; and we suck in the

To the Reader.

*the Tincture of Generous, or Per-
verse Inclinations, even with our
Mothers Milk: Insomuch that we may
date the greater part of our greatest Mis-
carriages, from the Errors, and Infe-
licities of our First Institution, and E-
ducation. But tho', upon the whole
matter, I do highly approve of the Usage
of This Book in Schools, I must con-
fess yet, with Submission, that I am not
at all satisfy'd in the ordinary way of
using it. For the cutting of it out into
Particles, here and there a Chop,
makes it a Lesson, to the Boys, rather
of Syntax, than Morality; beside the
prejudice that it suffers under the Trivial
name of a School-Book; and the dil-
gust which naturally continues with us,
even when we are Men, for that which
we were whipt for, when we were Boys.*

*Now the Matter of this Book being so
Excellent; and truly the Latin of it
hardly Ciceronian; it should be our
bus'ness rather to inculcate the Doctrine
than*

To the Reader.

than the Stile; and yet in such manner too, that the One may be Attended, without Neglecting the Other. And This may be effected to the Common Benefit of the Scholar, in Both Kinds; by, First, Reading, and Expounding These Offices, Whole to him, in English, before he be put to Hack, and Puzzle upon them by Snaps in the Original; the One Facilitating, and Preparing him for the Other. Let him be, First, and in his Mother-Tongue, instructed in the Principles of Moral Duties; and he shall then with the more Ease, Profit, and Delight, take the same Notions down in Latin, and Digest them. Whereas in beginning with the Latin, the Pupil has little more to do, than to bring together the Nominative Case and the Verb, without either Understanding, or Heeding the main Scope, and Intent of the Book.

I might here entertain the Reader with Twenty Stories of the Interruptions I have met with, in the Course of This Transla-

To the Reader.

Translation; how it has been only the
Work of Broken Hours; and I might
plead These Distractions in excuse of
all its Inequalities, and Defects. But
such as it is, Plain, and Simple, I
do here present it to the Publique, with-
out either Vanity, or Complement:
and, I hope, without giving unto any sort
of Reader any Just Cause of Com-
plaint. For He that does not like it,
may let it alone; and there's no Hurt
done.

TULLY'S

TULLY's OFFICES.

The First BOOK.

ALTHOUGH, after Twelve Months spent in the School of *Cratippus*, and That at *Athens* too, you cannot (my Son *Marcus*) but be abundantly instructed in the Precepts and Institutions of Philosophy, by reason of the Great Authority of the *Master*, as well as of the *Place*; the One, for *Erudition*, the Other for *Example*: I am yet of Opinion, that you shall do well, nevertheless, to take the same Course in *Your* studies, that I have done in *Mine*, and to mingle your *Latin* with your *Greek*; as a Method which I have ever found very much Conducing to the Business, both of an *Orator*, and of a *Philosopher*: Beside that it will give you the Command, indifferently, of Both Languages. In this Particular, I am perswaded that I have done my Countrey-men no small Service; and that not only those who have no Skill at all in *Greek*, but even the Learned Themselves will acknowledge, that I have in some sort Contributed to the Advantage, both of their *Eloquence*, and *Judgment*.
Where-

Is a great advantage, Good Institution, and Good Example.

Greek, and Latin, Rhetorick, and Philosophy, do well together.

Cicero
half a Peripatetique

Abetter O-
rator; than
Philoso-
pher.

None of
the Greeks
Excellent
in Both
Kinds.

Wherefore, as you have the greatest Philosopher of this Age for your Master, you shall also Learn of him as long as you please; and so long, certainly, you ought to desire to learn, as you find your self the Better for it. Upon the Reading of my Writings, you will see a great deal in them of the *Peripatetique*, (for I am a Follower of *Socrates*, and of *Plato* both.) As to the Matter it self, you are at liberty to use your Own Judgment; but yet the Acquainting of your self with my Style, will undoubtedly be of some Use toward the Improvement of your *Latin Tongue*. And let me not in This be thought arrogant neither; For, allowing my self the meanest of many *Philosophers*, I have yet some Right, me thinks, after an Age spent upon This Study, to value my self upon all the Parts of an *Orator*; as *Propriety*, *Perspicuity*, and the *Flowers*, and *Ornaments of Well-speaking*. Wherefore I must Earnestly recommend unto you the Perusal, not only of my *Orations*, but likewise of my *Philosophical Discourses*, which are now swell'd almost to the Bulk of the Other: and that you will read them with Intention and Care: for tho' there may be, in the Other, a greater Force, and Dignity, yet This smooth, and temperate Mixture is not to be neglected. Among the *Greeks*, I have not found any Man that has Successfully apply'd himself to the Language of the *Bar*, and to this gentle way of *Argumentation*, both at once; unless I should reckon *Demetrius Phaleranus* for one: who was indeed a *subtle Disputant*, no very powerful *Orator*; but then such a Vein of Sweetness with him, that a Body might imagine *Theophrastus* had been his Tutor. For my own part I have labour'd in Both These

Kinds;

Kinds; and with what Effect, let the World judge. *Plato*, I believe, would have made a *Ready*, and a *Weighty* Pleader, if he had bent his Mind to't: And *Demosthenes*, a *Queint*, and a *Polite* Philosopher, if he would but have treated of, and stuck to what he had from *Plato*. And This was the Case also, of *Aristotle*, and *Isocrates*; they were both of them fond of their Own-Way, and slighted one another.

BUT being resolved to Write somewhat to you at present, and more, hereafter; I have made it my Choice to begin upon that Subject, which I look upon to be most accommodate to your Age, and best becoming the Authority of a Parent. There are many Profitable, and Important Points in Philology, which have been accurately, and copiously handled by divers Learned Men: But that which I take to be of the Greatest Latitude, falls under the Head of Offices, or Duties betwixt Man and Man; whereof we have many Precepts and Traditions transmitted to us from our Forefathers: For there is no Condition of Life, either Publick, or Private; from Courts of Justice, to Particular Families; either Solitary, or in Society; but there is still a place for Humane Duty: And it is the Well, or Ill discharging of This Office, that makes our Character in the World, either Glorious, or Shameful. And this is the Common Theme too of all Philosophers; for who shall dare to Usurp that Sacred Name, that never prescrib'd Rules for the Government of Life? But there are some Doctrines yet, that render these Offices wholly vain and Useless; upon a Mistake concerning the Ends of Good, and

His Reasons for the Choice of This Subject.

He taxes the Epicureans.

Nothing
desirable
for it self
but Virtue.

and of *Wicked men*: For whosoever fancies any possibility of separating the *Supreme Good*, from *Virtue*, that Man can never be either a *Friend*, or a *Just*, or a *Generous Person*, upon *That Foundation*. (That is to say, so long as he agrees with himself, and without attending to the Dictate of a better Nature.) Can any man be *Brave*, that makes *Pain* the worst of *Evils*? or *Temperate*, that makes *Pleasure* the *Sovereign Good*? This is so clear, that it is not worth a Dispute; beside that I have expressly discours'd upon it in another place. The Patrons of these Positions must Contradict themselves; if they will pretend, in any sort, to intermeddle in This matter: For there can be no Sound, Stable, and Natural Principle of Duty erected upon any other Foundation, than This; That *Virtue is Only, or, at least, Chiefly desirable, for its proper self*. Wherefore the *Stoicks*, *Academicks*, and *Peripateticks*, were much in the Right, in This Particular; as the Whimsies of *Aristo*, *Pyrrho*, and *Herillus*, are long since out of Doors: Not but that They had as much Right as Other People, to a Freedom of *Debate*, if they had but left us in a State, or Capacity of *Election*; without Cutting off the very Means of any Correspondence at all with *Humane Duties*. Therefore at This Time, and in This Question, I shall follow the *Stoicks*; not as an *Expositor*, but (after my Usual Custom) I shall draw as much Water at their Well as I think fit, and then make use of it according to my own Discretion.

BEING in this Book to treat of the Offices or Duties of Mankind, it will be proper, in the First place, to define what is intended by the Word

Word Office; (a thing omitted by Panatius, which I wonder at:) For all Reasonable Propositions ought to be introduced by a Definition; for the better understanding of the Point in Debate. *All disputes should begin with a Definition.*

OF Duties, or Offices, there are Two Kinds; A Division the One respects the Ends of good men; the Other of Offices. consists in certain Rules, and Precepts to be apply'd to the Use, and Conduct of Humane Life. Under the Former, are These Questions: Whether all Offices be perfect or not? Whether one Office be Greater, or Less than Another? And What Offices are found to be of the same Sort, and Degree? But those Offices which are deliver'd to us by Precept, tho' they have a regard also to the Life of Good Men, yet it does not so much appear; because they seem to be rather a Provision for the Ordering of Life in Society. These are the Offices which we shall Discourse of in this Book. There is also another Division of Offices; some are call'd Middle, and Imperfect, others Perfect; We may call the Latter, a Right, (according to the Greek word *Καλὸς Δυνα*) and the Other, a Common Office, (*Καθῆκον*) defining That to be Perfect which they call Right, and That to be a Middle Office, when a Man may give a Reasonable Account for the doing of it.

IT is Natural to Deliberate, before we Resolve; and Panatius reduces the subject matter of Deliberation into Three General Heads. The First Question is, Whether the thing deliberated upon, be Good, or Evil? Wherein several Men are many times of several Opinions. The Second Enquiry or Consult refers to the Ease, Pleasure, or Convenience of Life; as Estate, *Deliberation according to Panatius, under three Heads.*

Cicero
makes five.

for the purpose ; *Wealth*, or *Power* ; by which we are enabled to be helpful, both to our selves, and our Friends : Whether the Matter in debate be *convenient*, or *not* ? And this Question is carry'd by the Appearance of *Profit*, The *Third* Point of *Deliberation*, lies in a Case, where the *Honest* and the *Profitable* come in *Competition*. For when *Utility* drives *One* way, and *Virtue* invites us *Another*, there follows a *Distraction* of *Mind*, and a dubious *Anxiety* of *Thought*. It is a great failing to leave out anything in a *Division* ; and yet there are *Two* things omitted in This. For the question is not only Whether a thing be *Honest*, or *not*, but where there are *Two* things *Honest*, before us, which is the *Honestest* ? and of *Two* *Profitables*, whether is the more *Profitable* ? So that his *three* *Branches* must be extended to *Five* : *First*, the *Concurrence* of *Two* *Good Things* ; *Secondly*, that of *Two* *Profitables* ; and *Lastly*, *Both* of them in *Comparison*. Of which in Order.

Self-love is
Natural.

ALL Living Creatures are Originally mov'd by a Natural Instinct, toward the means of *Self-preservation* : As the *Defence* of their *Lives*, and *Bodies* ; the *Avoidance* of things hurtful to them ; the *search*, and *provision* of all *Necessaries* for Life ; as *Food*, *Shelter*, and the like. It is likewise Common to them All, the Appetite of Propagating and Continuing their *Kind* ; with a certain Care, and *Tenderness* for their *Issue*.

The Difference
betwixt In-
stinct and
Reason.

Now betwixt a *Man*, and a *Brute*, there is eminently this Difference. The *One* is carry'd on by *sense*, and to That only which is *present* ; with little or no regard to what is either *past*, or to *come* : whereas the *Other*, by the Benefit of
Reason,

Reason, sees the *Consequences* of Things; their *Rise*, and their *Progress*; and couples together, *Causes* and *Effects*; compares *Resemblances* of *Times*, *Actions* and *Events*; tacks the *Present*, to the *Future*; and so taking in his whole *Life* at a *View*, he prepares all things for the *Use*, and *Comfort* of it.

It is by force of the same *Reason*, that *Nature* makes one Man a *Friend* to another; that she moves us to the *Love* of *Communication*, and *Society*; that she implants in us a particular *Affection* to our *Children*, and dictates to us the *Necessity* of *Communities*, and *Councils*. This is it that puts us upon providing for *Food*, and *Clothing*; and not for our selves alone, but for our *Wives*, our *Children*, our *Friends*, and for all those that are under our *Protection*. This Impression raises great *Thoughts* in us; and fits us for *Action*: but there is nothing so *Appropriate*, and *Peculiar* to *Mankind*, as the *Love*, and *Faculty* of *Tracing* out the *Truth*. Inasmuch, that we are no sooner at *Liberty* from *Common Cares*, and *Business*, but our *Heads* are presently at work upon something to be either *seen*, or *heard*, or *understood*; accounting upon the knowledge of things *wonderful*, and *hidden*, as a *necessary Ingredient* into a *Happy*, and a *Virtuous Life*. From whence may be drawn this *Conclusion*, That *whatsoever* is *True*, *Simple*, and *Sincere*, is *most congruous* to the *Nature* of *Man*. This love of *Truth* is accompany'd with a desire of *Rule*; so that a *Generous* and *Well-qualified Mind*, will never be brought into *Subjection*, unless either for *Learning*, or *Instruction* sake; or in *Submission* to a *Just*, and *Lawful Governour*, for the *Common Good*. This *Elevation* begets a

The Seeds of Justice.

Liberalist.

Prudence.

Magnanimity.

*Modesty
and Temperance.*

Contempt of Fortune, and a Dignity of Spirit; And it is no small matter neither, the power of Reasonable Nature even in This respect; that *Man alone* understands *Order*; the Bounds of *Decency*, in *Words*, and *Actions*, and the Terms of *Moderation*: That *only Man* is affected with the *Beauty*, the *Gracefulness*, and the *Symmetry* of *Visible Objects*. Now if *Nature*, and *Reason*, take such Care to convey the *Images*, even of *Sensible Things*, from the *Eye*, to the *Mind*; how much a greater Value must she set upon the *Grace*, and *Constancy* of our *Manners*; and the keeping such a guard upon all our *Words*, and *Deeds*, that no *Unmanly* thing, not a loose *Syllable*, or *Thought* escape us? This is the Composition of that *Honesty* we look for, which is never the less Venerable, for being little Esteem'd: For without any approbation from *abroad*, the whole earth cannot yet hinder it from being praise-worthy in its own Nature. Oh! my Son, *Marcus*, we may fashion to our selves some faint *Idea* of *Virtue* or *Wisdom*; but if it could be presented to our *Eyes* in its *Genuine Lustre*, how should we be transported (says *Plato*) with the Love of it?

*The Four
Cardinal
Virtues,
and the sub-
ject-matter
of each.*

T H E R E is not any Virtue whatsoever but arises from *One*, or *Other*, of these four Heads; and consists either, First, in the search, and perception of the *Truth*; or, Secondly, in the Conservation of *Humane Society*; giving every man his *due*; and keeping faith in all *Promises*, and *Contracts*; or, Thirdly, in the *Greatness*, and *Force*, of a *Brave*, and *Invincible Courage*; or, Fourthly, in the *Order*, and *Measure* of all our *Words*, and *Actions*; according to the Rules of *Modesty*, and *Temperance*. NOW

NOW though these four Virtues may be Com-
 plicate, and Link together, there are yet certain
 distinct Duties, that issue severally from each of
 them: As the Scrutiny and Bolting out of a
 Truth; from Prudence, which is a Faculty par-
 ticularly appertaining to That Virtue: For he
 that makes the best judgment of the Truth of
 Things; he that most readily finds the way to't;
 and gives the best account of the Reason of it,
 we conclude him, without all dispute, to be the
 wisest Man. So that effectually, the proper Sub-
 ject of This Virtue, is Truth: But the Business
 of the Other three Virtues, is, To procure and
 maintain Necessaries, for the Commodity of
 Life; the upholding of Communities, and Socie-
 ty; and to show the Dignity of the Mind, as
 well in the Communicating of our Fortunes, as in
 the Acquiring of them; and more yet (if there
 shall be occasion) in the despising of them. But
 Order, Constancy, Moderation, and the like, re-
 quire something of Action, in concurrence with
 the Operations of the Mind: And he that would
 acquit himself in the Course of his Life, with Re-
 putation and a good Grace, must observe Order,
 and Measure.

Distinct
 Duties in a
 Complica-
 tion of
 Virtue.

Prudence
 searches the
 Truth of
 Things.

Justice
 shows itself
 in Society.

Fortitude
 in the Con-
 tempt of
 difficulties.
 Tempe-
 rance in
 Order and
 Measure.
 A decorum
 in the Con-
 gruity of
 all.

OF these Four Parts, into which we have di-
 vided the Nature, and the Power of Virtue; that
 which concerns the disquisition of Truth holds
 most affinity with the Soul of Man. We are all of
 us, both drawn, and led to a desire of Knowledge;
 and every man values himself upon being wiser
 than his Neighbor; but on the other side, to Fail,
 to Wander, to be Ignorant, and to be deceived, we
 look upon as a wretched, and a reproachful thing.

Prudence is
 a Natural
 Virtue.

Have a
care of two
mistakes.
Credulity,
and

Curiosity.

IN the pursuit of this most Natural Virtue, we must take heed of *Two Mistakes*: First, the taking up of Things upon *Trust*; and flattering our selves, that we *know more*, than effectually we *do*. He that would keep clear of this Rock, (as every man should endeavour it) must diligently attend his Business, and allow himself time to consider of it. The *Other* is the bestowing of more *Pains* and *Study* upon things that are *obscure*, *hard*, and *superfluous*, than the Matter is *worth*: whereas by avoiding these Errors, and employing the same application upon profitable Knowledge, and the study of Virtue, a Man gains to himself deserved Commendation. We have heard of *Cajus Sulpitius*, for his *Astrology*; of *Sextus Pompeius*, for his *Geometry*; and of other persons eminent for *Logique*; and *Civil Law*; which Sciences are all of them exercised in the Investigation of *Truth*; and yet for a man to divert himself, by these Studies, from *Common Offices*, and *Business*, is against the *Nature of Humane Duty*. For the Excellency of virtue lies in *Action*; but yet not without Intervals; for we must Work, and Rest, by Turns. Not that the *Mind* is ever *Idle*; but still in a Constant Agitation of *Thought*, even when the *Body* is most at *Repose*: and all the *Motions* of it are apply'd either to the *deliberating*, and advising upon things *Honest*, and tending to a *good* and *happy life*; or upon the Acquiring of *Wisdom*, and *Knowledge*. And so much for *Prudence*, which is the *first Fountain of Virtue*.

Justice and
Liberality.

OF the *Other Three Virtues*, we find That to be of the largest extent, which directs the Ordering

The First Book.

11

dering of Men in Society : and in a kind of Community of Life. Of This, there are *Two parts* ; *Justice*, which is the more *Glorious Virtue*, and entitles us to the very Name, and Character, of *Good men* ; and *Beneficence*, which we may otherwise call *Liberality*, or *Bounty*. The first Duty of *Justice* is *This* ; *That we hurt no man*, The duties of Justice, unless provoked to it by an *Injury*, and in our *Own Defence*. We are then to distinguish betwixt things *Common*, and *Particular* ; and to use them accordingly : Not that any thing is *Private* The bounds of it by the Civil Law. in its *Own Nature* ; but as it becomes so, either by *Ancient possession*, as appropriated by the first *Occupant*, or by *Conquest*, upon the right of *Arms* ; or else by *Law*, *Agreement*, *Condition*, or *Lot*. From hence comes the *Field Arpinas*, to be called *Arpinatium*, and *Tusculanum*, to be called the *Field of the Tusculanes* ; and in like manner is it of *Private Possessions*. Now since *Custom* and *Usage*, have rendred many things *Private*, which *Nature* made *Common* ; let every man quietly enjoy his *Lot* ; and be reputed an *Enemy* to the *Publique*, if he attempt any thing beyond it. But because (as *Plato* says singularly well) *we are not born for our selves alone, but for our Country, our Parents, and our Friends* : and with the *Stoiques*, that the *Earth*, and all the *Productions* of it, were Created for the Use of *Man* ; and *Man* only for *Mans sake* begotten ; that one might be helpful to another : What can we do better than to follow, where *Nature* is our *Guide*. To lay *Common Benefits* in *Common* ; and by an *Intercourse* of *Good Offices*, as *Giving*, and *Receiving* ; by *Arts*, *Industry*, and all our *Faculties*, to Incorporate *Mankind* into One *Society*.

A forced
Etymolo-
gy of Fi-
des.

THE Foundation of *Justice*, is *Faith*; That is to say, a *Firmness*, and *Truth* in our *Words*, *Promises*, and *Contracts*. The *Stoiques*, that are great *Etymologists*, will have *Fides* to be as much as *Fiat*. And that it is therefore called *Faith*, *quia fit quod dictum est*; because that which is said, is done. This may seem to be far fetch'd; but however we have taken the *Freedom* to apply it.

Two sorts
of injustice.

The injuri-
ous Aggres-
sor.

And the
Defenter.

An injury
out of fear.

Avarice.

Magnifi-
cence.

Ambition.

THERE are Two sorts of *Injustice*: One is the *Immediate* doing of an *Injury*; and the *Other* is, the *not protecting*, or *defending* the *Injur'd person*; for so much as in us lies. For he that *Injuriously* offers *Violence* to any man, either in his *Rage*, or any other *Passion* whatsoever, may be taken to be in some degree, constructively, a *Murderer*; and he that does not his best, to *save* his *Neighbor* from *harm*, and to *keep off* the *Blow*, is as well to *blame* (tho' not so much) as the *Defenter* of his *Parents*, his *Friends*, his *Country*, or his *Companions*. Now there are many *Injuries* done us upon *Set purpose* to *hurt* us, which arise yet from *Fear*; as when he that *watches* to do another man *mischief*, does it upon *prevention*, for *fear* the *Other* should *hurt* him. But the *greater Part* of *Injuries* are done with a *design* to compass something we have a *mind* to: wherein *Avarice* has a very great share. As to the *Matter* of *Riches*, they are *desir'd*, partly for our *Necessities*, and partly for our *Pleasures*. The *desire* of *Money* in *great Minds*, is to make an *Interest* by it; and to get into our *Power*, the *means* of *obliging*. It was the saying of *Craesus*, that *He that would be Uppermost in a Commonwealth, could never have money enough, till he was able*

The First Book.

able to maintain an Army at his own Charge. There is a pleasure also, in a Splendid, and Magnificent Appearance; Rich Furniture; and Men take delight to live in Reputation, Glory, and Plenty; which begets an insatiable Thirst of Money to maintain it. And yet we are not forbidden to advance, or encrease our Fortunes; provided it be done without wrong to Another; and by Fair means. But men are apt to forget the Rules, and Measures of Justice, when they come once to be transported with the desire of Empire, High Places, and Titles. It goes a great way, that saying of Ennius. *There is no Faith, or Fellowship in Empire.* 'Tis a hard matter to preserve Friendship, and Agreement, in a Case where there are many Competitors, and but one can succeed: which manifestly appeared in that Tempest which C. Caesar lately brought upon the Government: who confounded Heaven and Earth, and overturn'd all Laws Divine, and Humane, for the compassing of that Power which he vainly propounded to get wholly to himself. And great pity it is, that this inordinate desire of Honor, Dominion, Power, and Glory, does for the most part infest the most Famous Wits, and the largest Minds: so that an Error in this Case, is the more to be avoided.

Luxury.

NOW in all Injuries, there is a great difference betwixt that which is done upon the Sudden, and in Hot Blood (which is Commonly but Short, and Transient) and that which is done upon fore thought, and Council, for those in a heat, are much lighter than those upon preparation, and this shall suffice of Injuries, offer'd, or done.

Difference of injuries.

NOW

Injuries of
Omission;
and the
Causes of
them.
Expence.
Fear.
Sloth;
Bus'ness.

NOW why do we not *Protect*, and *Defend* the *Oppressed*, but abandon our *Duties*; there may be several Reasons. We are not willing to be at the *Charge*, or *Trouble*: we are loth to make *Enemies*; or it may be, we are *negligent*, *lazy*, *suggish*, taken up with *particular Studies*: or hinder'd by *Bus'ness*, and This makes us leave those expos'd to Ruine, whom it is our Duty to preserve. Wherefore we must take heed, not to rest upon that which *Plato* observes of the *Philosophers*: as if the *studying* and *endeavouring* to find out the *Truth*, the *vilifying* and *despising* of the things that most Men vehemently *desire*, and *quarrel about*, entitled them presently to the Character of *Honest Men*: Not considering, that while they are so *just* on the *One side*, as to *wrong no Body, themselves*: they are yet so *unjust*, on the *Other*, as to leave *Other people* to do it: And so rather than quit their *Studies*, they forsake their *Duties*, and their *Friends*, whom they ought to defend. And therefore (says he) they would have nothing to do with the *Community* it self, if they were not compell'd by Force: A thing which ought rather to be done, by *Good Will*, and by *Choice*. For it is not the *Quality* of the *Act*, let it be never so *right*, but the *Intention* of it, that makes the *Virtue*. There are some, that either for *saving* of their *Own stake*, or out of an *Averseness* even to dealing with *Mankind*, cry, *Let every Man look to his Own Bus'ness; I meddle with no Body*: And all this, to get the Reputation of *Harmless people*. These Men, while they *shun One Injustice*, they fall into *Another*. For he that contributes neither *Study*, *Labor*, nor *Fortune*, to the *Publique*, is a *Deser-*
ter

ter of the Community. Now these Two sorts of Injuries being laid down, together with the Causes of them; and having stated, beforehand the Bounds of Justice, it will be no hard matter to assign unto every Person, and Occasion, its proper Duty, if we be not over partial to our selves: but in another bodies Case, it is quite Another matter: Although Terence's Chremes will have every Individual to be concern'd in the Common Interest of Mankind: But yet being more sensible, and quicker sighted in our Own Concerns, than for the Good, or Evil that befalls others; (which we look upon as more Remote) we pass upon the One, and the Other, (tho' in the very same Case) a quite Different Judgment. It is good advice therefore, to forbear coming to a Resolution, where we doubt whether the thing be good or bad. For the Right is as Clear as the Sun; but a wavering implies the deliberation of an Injustice.

Do nothing with doubt-
ing.

BUT it often falls out, that the same thing which at one time would become a Man of Honour, and Justice, would at another time not only vary, but prove the Clear Contrary. As the delivering up of a Trust to a Mad man; or keeping promise with him: nay in matters of Faith, and Truth, it is just, in some Cases to deny; and in others, not to keep Touch; for all must refer to those Fundamentals of Justice already propounded. As First, to wrong no Man; and secondly, in all Cases to consult the Common Good. So that the Duty is not always the same; but changes with the Occasion. Suppose such a Promise or Contract past, as if it were performed, would manifestly tend to the damage, either of

Faith is not
always to
be kept.

The Duty
changes
with the
Occasion.

Of Two
Evils the
Less.

of the Party promising, or of the person to whom the Promise was pass'd to have it perform'd. If *Neptune* (as it is in the *Fable*) had not made good his Promise to *Theseus*, his Son *Hippolytus* had been sav'd. The Story goes, that of *Three wishes*, the *Last* was in his *Passion* the destruction of *Hippolytus*: and the *Grant* of that request, cast him into Inconsolable Sorrows. So that neither are we to keep those Promises that are unprofitable to the Promised: or more hurtful to the Promiser, than advantageous to the Other. Of Two Evils, we are to chuse the Less: As if I promise to plead any mans Cause, and in the *Interim*, my Son falls dangerously Ill; it is no Breach of Faith, or Duty in me, not to appear, but rather the contrary: and it were yet worse, in him to whom the Promise was made, to complain of such a disappointment. And now in matters where a man is under Violence, or over-aw'd by Fear, or outwitted, and over-reach'd by Fraud, every body knows that Those promises are not Binding: many of them being discharg'd in Form, by the *Prators Court*: and some by the very Law it self.

Injuries of
Fraud and
Cavil.

THERE are several Injuries, that are meerly matter of Cavil, and only advantages taken, by a Crafty and malicious Interpretation of the Law. From whence comes that saying, *Extreme Right, is Extreme wrong*. The Proverb is now worn Threed-bare. Of This Sort, there have been many practices, even upon a Publique Score: One agreed upon a Truce with the Enemy for 30 days, and afterward made Incursions upon him, and destroyed his Country by night: because the Cessation was for days,
not

not *nights*. Neither can I justify our Countryman, if it be true : *Q. Fabius Labeo* (or somebody else (for I have it only upon *Hearsay*) was by the Senate Constituted *Arbitrator* of the *Boundaries* of *Nola* and *Naples*. When he came to the place, he took the Commissioners apart, and advised them in private, not to do any thing greedily, or to press too much ; but rather to abate of their Pretensions, than to demand more : and prevailed so far upon them, that there was a good space of ground left betwixt them ; so that when they had marked out their Bounds, according to Agreement, that which was left in the middle, was adjudg'd to the *Romans*. This was rather a *Cheat* than a *Judgment* ; and this Indirect, and Crafty way of Imposing, should be avoided in all Cases. There are certain *Duties* to be observ'd also, even to those that do us the greatest *wrong* ; for there must be a *Meane* in the very *Punishment*, and *Revenge* : and I do not know, whether it may be sufficient, for the *Aggressor* barely to *Repent* of his Injury, without some *Penalty* over and above : both for his *Own Amendment*, and the *Terror*, and *Example* of *Others*.

THE Laws of *War*, among all Nations, *The Rules*
should be strictly and Punctually observ'd. For *of War*.
since there are but *Two ways* of *Contending*, the
One, by *Dispute*, the *Other*, by *Force* ; the *One*,
Humane, and the *Other Brutal* : we must of ne-
cessity have recourse to the *Latter*, where the
former will not take place. Wherefore the end *The End of*
of *War* is to secure our selves from *Violence*, in a *War*.
state of *Peace* : and in case of *Victory*, we *The Roman*
should preserve those that behaved them- *Generosity*
selves *to their*
Enemies.

selves with *Honor*, and *Generosity* in the *Action* of the *War*: As our Ancestors receiv'd into the very *Priviledges* of the *City*, the *Tusculans*, the *Æqui*, the *Volsi*, the *Sabines*, the *Hernici*: but *Carthage*, and *Numantia*, they wholly ras'd. I could wish they had spar'd *Corinth*: but they had a respect, I suppose, to the strength, and scituation of the Place, and so destroy'd it: that for the future it might not, some time or other, prove an Encouragement to a Revolt. In my Opinion, *Peace* should be always consulted, where it may be had without *Treachery*: and if my advice had been hearkned to in This matter, we might yet at this day, have had some sort of a *Republique*, though not the Best; whereas now we have just none at all. We should provide likewise, not only for those that are *Overcome* in the *Field*, but for those also that threw down their Arms, and cast themselves upon the Faith of the General. Nay I would have an Enemy receiv'd, even after the *Battery* is begun, and the *Breach* made, In which point, we have been so scrupulously Just, that according to the Custom of our Predecessors, those that took Cities, or Nations, conquer'd in War, into the *Roman Allegiance*, were made *Patrons*, and *Protectors* of what they took. And the Rights of *War* are set forth with exact solemnity in the Provisions of the *Facial Law*; wherein we are given to understand that no *War* can be *Just*, and *Warrantable*, unless it be grounded upon some matter of *Claim*, or denounced beforehand, by *Proclamation*. *Pompilius* (the General) held a Province: and a Son of *Cato's* lifted himself a Soldier under his Command. *Pompilius*, finding it convenient to discharge one *Legion*, *Cato's*

Son

And to
those that
yielded.

Upon what
Terms to
undertake
a War.

A Consci-
entious in-
stance.

Son serving in *That Legion*, was also dismiss'd ; but he continuing still in the Army, out of a love of action, his Father wrote a Letter to *Pom-pilius*, Requesting him, that if his Son continu'd with him in Arms, he would give him the Military Oath, over again, because his former Sacrament being dissolv'd, he could not otherwise justify his putting himself into the Quarrel. Such was the Reverence they bare, even to the Conscience of making War ! There is extant, an Epistle of *Marcus Cato* the Elder, to his Son *Marcus*, when he was a Soldier in *Macedonia*, in the *Persian War*. Wherein he tells his Son, that he heard the Consul had dismiss'd him ; and charges him not to engage in any Combat, as a thing unlawful for him, that was no longer a Soldier to fight an Enemy. It is remarkable, the changing of the word *perduellis* (a publique Enemy) into *Hostis* ; to sweeten the Foulness of the Thing, by the softness of the Term. For *Hostis* (with our Forefathers) was as much as *Peregrinus*, (a Stranger) as appears by the *Twelve Tables*. *Aut status dies cum Hoste*. And then, *Adversus Hostem Aeterna Auctoritas*. What can be Gentler, than to Treat an Enemy in this easie Language ? Although *Custom*, I must confess, has made it harsher, by transferring the signification of it, from That of a Stranger, to the proper Denomination of one that bears Arms against us. Nay in the Case of a War for Honor, or Dominion, there must yet be the same Causes, and Grounds beforementioned, to make it Just : but still all Contests of This kind must give fairer Quarter : for (as in ordinary differences) we distinguish betwixt an Enemy and a Rival ; our Title, and Dignity lies at Stake in the One Case ;

but

but our *Life* and *Reputation*, in the other. The War we had with the *Celtiberi*, and the *Cimbri* (the *Spaniards*, and *Danes*) was a War of *Enmity*: and the question was not, who should *Govern*, but who should *Live*. With the *Latines*, the *Sabines*, the *Samnites*, the *Carthaginians*: and with *Pyrrhus*, the quarrel was *Empire*. The *Carthaginians* were *perfidious*; *Hannibal* was *cruel*; but the Rest more *Honourable*. It was a *Glorious Declaration*, that of *Pyrrhus*, about the discharge of some *Prisoners*, as we find it in *Ennius*.

A Brave
Resolution
of Pyrrhus.

*Let Mercenaries Truck, and Treat for Gold;
Honour's a thing not to be Bought or Sold.
Courage and Steel must end this Glorious
Strife:*

*And in the Case of Victory, or Life,
Fortune's the Judge. We'll take the Chance of
War:*

*And what Brave man soever she shall spare
With Life; depend upon't; I'll set him Free:
Let him but Own the Gift, to the Great Gods,
and Me.*

This was a Royal Speech, and Resolution, and well becoming the Blood of *Æacus*.

Faith must
be kept
with an
Enemy.
A noble ex-
ample of
Regulus.

BUT even in the Case of a private promise: and upon what pinch, or necessity soever; Faith is yet to be kept, even with an Enemy. When *Regulus* was taken Prisoner in the first *Punick War*, and sent to *Rome* to sollicit the exchange of some Prisoners, upon his Oath to return: so soon as ever he came There, he advised the Senate against himself;

himself; and that they should not agree to the *Exchange*. His Friends, and Relations prest him extremely against going back again; but he chose rather to return to the Torture, than to stay and break his Faith to an Enemy. In the *second Punique War*, after the Battel of *Canna*, *Hannibal* sent ten Prisoners to *Rome*, under an Oath of returning; unless they could obtain the Liberty of such and such Prisoners in Exchange. They were no sooner out of the Camp, by *Hannibal's* permission, but one of them found out a shift to evade the Oath: and presently went back under colour of something left behind him, and then returning, went his way, as if the Obligation of the Oath had been discharg'd. And so it was in *Words*, but not in *Effect*: for in all *promises*, the *Intention* is to be consider'd, not the *Letter*. The *Censor* set a Fine during life, upon all their heads that were forsworn: and upon His, among the rest, that invented this *shift*. But the more Generous Instance of *Justice* to an *Enemy*, was that of our Ancestors in the Case of *Pyrrhus*: There was a Fugitive that made a Proposal to the Senate, for the Poysoning and dispatching of *Pyrrhus*: but the *Senate*, and *Fabritius* deliver'd up the Traitor to his Master: Such was the detestation they had for Treachery, that they would not make use of it, tho' to the destruction of a Powerful and an Invading Enemy. And so much for *Military Duties*.

A glorious
piece of
Justice.

The Ro-
mans a ge-
nerous En-
emy.

WE must not forget neither, that toward the meanest of men also, there is a Justice to be observ'd; even in the Condition, and Fortune of Slaves: and it is good Counsel, to advise the using of them as *Hirelings*: and for their *Work*,

of Justice
to infer-
ors.

to allow them their *Reward*. Now there are *Two ways* of doing a man an *Injury*: the one is by *Force*, the other by *Fraud*. The *One* is the quality of the *Fox*, the *Other* of the *Lion*. They are neither of them proper for a *Man*: but yet *Fraud* is the more *Odious* of the *Two*; and of all *Injustices*, *That is the most Abominable*, and *Capital*, which imposes upon us, under the colour of *Kindness* and *Good meaning*: and this shall suffice for *Justice*.

Of Libe-
rality.

How to
Give, How
much, and
to Whom.

TO pursue my purpose, I shall now handle the Point of *Liberality*, or *Bounty*: than which there is nothing more accommodate to the Nature of man: But it falls under many Limitations. It should be our *first Care* to see, that what we *Give*, may not be to the disadvantage of the person we would *oblige*, or of any other body: and that it be not above our *Proportion*. Secondly, that it be suited to the *Dignity* of the *Receiver*, for This is the Foundation of *Justice*, to which all the Circumstances of it are to be referr'd, He that pretends to gratifie any man with that which is rather to his *damage*, than to his *Benefit*, is so far from deserving the Reputation of being *Liberal*, or *Bountiful*, that he is to be accounted as the most pernicious of *Flatterers*. And Those also that Rob one man, to give to another, are guilty of the same *Injustice*, with them, that take *Money* out of their Neighbors Pockets, to put into their Own. There are many people that look big, and set up for men of *Honor*, that yet have this humour of *taking* from one, and *giving* to another; and reckon upon it, as a high piece of *Bounty*, if they can but advance the Fortunes of a *Friend*, upon what

Terms

Terms soever. But This is so far from a *Good Office*, that it is the clear *Contrary*, Let us therefore so govern our Favours, that we may oblige those we love, and yet hurt no body. Shall we call it *Liberality*, in *L. Sylla*, and *C. Caesar*, the Translation of so many Estates from the Right Owners, into the possession of Strangers? There can be no *Liberality* in a Case of *Injustice*. The *Second Caution* is the keeping of our Bounty within *Compass*: and not to give beyond our *Ability*: for they that extend their Kindnesses beyond this Measure, wrong their Relations, by transferring those Bounties to *Strangers*, which they should rather have communicated, or left to their *Friends*. This humour of *Liberality*, is commonly accompanied with a certain *Greediness*, that makes no Scruple of getting any thing, though by *Rapine*, or Injury, so they may but have wherewithal to supply a mistaken Bounty. Nay, there are many that give largely, merely to be *Thought Bountiful*; and This, only upon a Score of Vanity, without any Frankness of Heart; which is rather a flash of *Osensation*, than an act of *Generosity*, and *Virtue*. The *third Caution* is, the making Choice of a worthy Person: wherein we should consider the *Morals* of the Man that we would oblige; his particular disposition towards us; our intercourse with him in a Community, and Society of Life, and the good Offices he hath already done us. It would be well, if we could find a Concurrence of all these: but if not, the more Inducements we have, and the greater they are, the more is their weight.

Whom to Oblige.

Give in Proportion

Consider the intent of the Giver.

The Choice of the Person.

There is no Stoical Perfection. **HOWBEIT**, since we do not live with Men absolutely *Perfect*, either for *Virtue*, or *Wisdom*; but with those that acquit themselves very well, if they can but arrive at some faint resemblances of *Virtue*: let This be also taken into Consideration, that no Man whatsoever is to be neglected, in whom there appears the least sign, or Glimmering of Goodness. But still we are to set the greatest Value upon him, that we find best endow'd with the soft, and gentle Virtues of *Modesty*, *Temperance*, and that *Justice*, of which we have already spoken at large. For a *Bold*, and *Manly Courage*, in a Man that is neither *Good*, nor *Wise*; is commonly more forward, and eager, perhaps, than is *Convenient*. The *Other* are more properly the Virtues of a *Good Man*. And so much for our *Manners*.

How to return Benefits.

TOUCHING the *Good Will* that any Man bears us: it is, *First*, our Duty to do much *Good*, where we are much *Belov'd*: but then we are not to express that Affection, in a Childish Ardour, and Fondness of Passion: but in a Constancy, and Firmness of Mind.

Benefits to be repaid with interest.

IN the Case of an *Antecedent Merit*, where we are not now to *Enter* into an *Obligation*, but to *Acknowledge*, and *Requite* it: there must be a more than Ordinary Care taken. For *Gratitude* is the most *Indispensable* of all Duties. If *Hesiod* bids us, *Restore what we borrow*; if we can, in a *Larger Measure*: what ought we to do in the Case of a *Prior Obligation*? Are we not to imitate *Fruitful Lands*, that still Return more

more than they Receiv'd? We are ready enough to oblige those that we hope to be the better for hereafter. How should we behave our selves then, toward such as we are the Better for already? Since so it is, that there are *two sorts of Liberality*, the *One*, of *Bestowing* a Benefit, and the *Other* of *Returning* it: it is at our Choice, whether we will *Give*, or no: But an Honelt Man is not at Liberty in the point of *Returning* it: provided that it may be done without Injury. And yet we are to distinguish also betwixt *Benefits Receiv'd*: and the *Greater* the *Benefit*, the *Greater* is the *Obligation*. Now the *obligation* is to be valu'd according to the *Mind*, the *Intention*, and *Good Will* of the *Giver*: For many People do many things *rashly*, without either *Judgment*, or *Measure*. They Squander away their Donatives, indifferently upon all; carry'd on by sodain, and impetuous Passions, as if they were driven by the Wind. Now these Benefits are not so much to be esteem'd, as those that are conferr'd with Steadiness, and Consideration. As to the placing of our Bounties, and Returning Acknowledgments, (sup- posing other things to be Equal) it is our Duty to help him *First*, that is most in *Want*; tho' most People do the Contrary. For they are there most Officious, to offer their Service, where they hope for most again; tho' in cases, where their help was not at all needful.

Rash Bounties.

whom to Requite first.

FOR the Preservation of *Society*, and good Correspondence among Men, we should do well to proportion our *Bounties* to our *Relations*: and to give *most* to those that are our *nearest Friends*. But for those principles of Nature,

*Reason and
Speech are
the Bond of
Humane
Society.*

which regard *Communities*, and *Humane Society*, they must be fetch'd higher; as the First thing that we take notice of in the Fellowship of Mankind. *Reason*, and *Speech* are the Bond of it: which, by *Teaching*, *Learning*, *Communicating*, *Disputing*, and *Judging*, accommodate one Man to another, and cement the whole *Body* into a kind of *Natural Community*. Nor is there any thing wherein we are further remov'd from Beasts, than in this Advantage of Society. It is usual for us to speak of *Courage*, and *Boldness*, in *Lions* and *Horses*; but we hear nothing of either *Justice*, *Equity*, or *Goodness* in them: and the business is, that they have neither *Speech*, nor *Reason*. This Society of one Man with another, and of *All*, with *All*: This Society, (I say) *General* and *Particular*, is of a large extent: and herein there must be a Community preserved, of all those things which Nature hath brought forth, for the Common Use of Men: provided always, that such things as are limited by Laws, and Civil Ordinances, may be observed according to the Constitution. As to the rest; they may be reduc'd to the *Greek Proverb*, *Friends have all things in Common*. Now all those things that Men hold in *Community*, are such, as *Ennius* having laid down in One Instance, may be apply'd to Many.

*To put a Wandring Traveller in's Way,
Is but to light One Candle with Another:
I've ne'er the less, for what I Give--*

*Benefits in
Common.*

FROM this One Case we may learn, that whatsoever we may part with to Another, without any Damage to our selves, it is our Duty

to Give, or to Lend Freely, tho' to a Stranger. Of This sort, we reckon many things to be in Common; as *Water from a River, Fire from Fire, Good Counsel to a Man that is in doubt, or distress.* - All these things are profitable to the Receiver, without any loss, or burthen to the Giver. So that we may both use these things our selves, and yet be still contributing of somewhat to the Common good. But in regard that particular persons have not much to Give, and the Number of those that want, is almost Infinite; Common Liberality must have a respect to that End of *Ennius*. We must keep wherewithal to give Light to our selves, that we may have the Means of being bountiful to our own.

TO descend now from *Humane Society* in the *Degrees of Latitude*, of which there are many degrees; *Communities.* there is a nearer Bond yet, betwixt people of the same *Province*, the same *Nation*, and the same *Language*: And it is yet stricter, betwixt Men of the same *City*: For among Citizens, there are many things in Common: As Courts of Justice, *Common Privileges.* Temples, Walks, Ways, Lanes, Customs, Judgments, Suffrages; beside frequent Meetings, and Familiarities, Common Business, Commerce, and Contract. And there is yet a nearer Tye; and That is, the Society of Kindred, which is Contracted into a narrow place, apart from the vast Society of Mankind. It is by Nature, Common to all living Creatures, the appetite of producing the Kind: And the First Society is in *Marriage*, Wedlock; the next, in Children; it comes then *Children*, to a Family, and a Community of all things. *Families.* And this is the Original of a City, and as it were the Seminary of a Commonwealth. The Rela-

Kindred.

Friendship.

Similitude
of manners.Exchange
of Benefits.

tion of Brothers comes next; and after That, of Brothers, and Sisters Children; who, when they are too many for One House, are transplanted into Others, as into Colonies. And then follow Matches, and Alliances, with increase of Kindred: and their Off-spring is the Beginning of a Commonwealth. There is no doubt but Relation of Blood, and the Kindness that arises from it, must necessarily endear Men to one another. For it is a great matter to have the same Pedigree: to exercise the same Religion, and to deposite their Ashes in Common Sepulchres: But of all Associations, there is none so Firm, none so Noble, as when Virtuous Men are link'd together by a Correspondency of Manners; and a Freedom of Conversation. For such is the Charm of That Honesty which we have often spoken of, that the very Encounter of it moves us, tho' in a Stranger, and makes us Friends to the Possessor of it, where-ever we find it. Now tho' all Virtue whatsoever, is, of it self, Amiable, and Attractive; insomuch that we cannot but have an Esteem for those that we find possess'd of it; yet *Justice* and *Liberality* gain upon us in a higher degree. But there is nothing more Lovely, or more Engaging, than a *Conformity*, and *Agreement* of *Good Manners*. For where there are the same Inclinations, the same Desires, and the same Will, the one cannot chuse but be delighted with the other, as with its proper self: and it effects that which *Pythagoras* requires in Friendship: the making *one*, of *many*: And it is a great Obligation that is created by the reciprocation of Benefits, that pass Forward and Backward, in Exchange: which being mutual, and grateful; must needs, upon the *Inter-course*,

course, produce firm and extraordinary Friendship. But when ye shall have lookt over all the Ties in Nature, as far as your Mind, and your Reason can carry you: you will find nothing dearer, no Obligation of greater importance, than that by which we are every one of us Ty'd to the *Commonwealth*. Our *Parents, Children, Kindred, Acquaintance*, are all dear to us; but *our single Country* is more than *all the Rest*: and every honest man is ready to lay down his life for the advantage of that sacred Interest. How execrable then is the barbarous Impiety of those people, that have torn their Country to pieces, by all sorts of Villany: and who not only have been, but are at this instant, conspiring the destruction of it, by a final desolation? But if there should be any dispute, or Comparison, where to pay our duty, in the first place, our *Country* and our *Parents* are the *Principals*; to whose Benefits we are the most *Oblig'd*. Our *Children* and our *Families* are next: as depending upon us alone, without any other Retreat: After *These*, our *Friends* and *Relations*: which are commonly of our own Rank, and Condition. Wherefore we owe the necessary helps of Life to these beforementioned: But for Conversation, Table-Society, Counsels, Exhortations, Consolations, and (upon Occasion) Reproofs: These things are found most amongst Friends: and let me tell you over again: *The pleasantest Friendship is That, which is contracted by a Similitude of Manners.*

Our Duty
to our
Country.

Our Kin-
dred and
Friends.

NOW In the Exercise of all these Duties, we should observe what every man has most need of; and what with our help, he may, and what with-
out

Duties vary with Circumstances.

out our help, he cannot attain: and in some cases there is a respect to be had to *Times*, and *Occasions*, even before *Relations*: There are some Offices that we should rather pay to *one*, than to *another*: as I would sooner help a *Neighbour* in with his *Harvest*, than either a *Brother*, or *Familiar Acquaintance*: but in a *Suit of Law*, I'll defend my *Kinsman*, or my *Friend*, before my *Neighbour*. Wherefore these Circumstances, and the like, should be duly consider'd in all Offices. By Custom, and Exercise, we shall become good Accountants: For it is by *Adding*, and *Substracting*, that we come to know *what Remains*: and consequently, in all Cases, the Bounds, and Limits of our Duty: But as neither Physicians, nor Commanders; nor Orators, tho' never so well instructed in the Rules of their Profession, shall ever be able, without Use, and Practice, to make themselves Eminently famous: to the same end, are the Precepts of Humane Duties deliver'd us; that we should put them in exercise: but yet the difficulty, and condition of the thing does over and above require it. Now in what manner that Virtue is deriv'd, and whence that Duty arises, which falls under the Consideration of *Sociable Rights*, and *Common Justice*; we have almost said enough already.

Magnanimity.

IN the propounding of *Four general Heads*, from whence all Virtues, and Duties flow; That which is done with a Noble, and Exalted Mind; a Mind advanced to the Contempt of Fortune, and Worldly things: that Virtue, I say, ought to be reputed the most Glorious: and therefore that Reproach of *Ennius's* is always at hand upon Occasion:

Young

Young Men, in shew, but Wenches, in your
Hearts :
*While Clælia plays the Brave, and acts your
Parts.*
*You're for Exploits that cost no Sweat, nor
Blond, &c.*

And on the other side, with what Transport
and Rapture do we extol the humor of Brave
and Generous Actions? From hence comes that
Field of the Rhetoricians, upon *Marathon, Sa-
lamis, Plateæ, Thermopila, Leuctra, Stratocles*;
and from hence it is, that our *Cocles, the Decii*,
the two *Scipio's, Marcellus*, and a World of o-
thers, especially the *Romans* themselves, are grown
so famous, for the greatness of their Minds. And
their ambition of Military honour, may appear
in This, that almost all the Statues they have left
us, are dress'd up in Armour.

AND yet that Elevation of Courage which
is seen in Hazzards, and Adventures, unless ac-
companied with Justice, and contending rather
for the Publique, than for it self: That Courage
(I say) is so far from being a virtue, that it is
a Fault, and a brutal Ferity, inconsistent with
the Tendernels of humane nature. Wherefore
the *Stoiques* have well defin'd it, in calling *Con-
rage, a Virtue contending for Equity*. Nor *Courage*
did any man ever gain the Reputation of *True* defined.
Valour, by *Treachery*, or *Malice*. Nothing
can be *Honest*, but what is Just: and therefore
it was notably said of *Plato*. *As that Knowledge*
(says he) *which is divided from Justice, is rather*
Craft, than Wisdom; so That Courage,
which is Bold, and Adventurous, is rather
Temerity, and Fool-hardiness, than Valour: if it
be

*Pertinacy
and Ambi-
tion.*

be carryed on by Passion, or Interest, rather than for a Common Good. Wherefore all Men of Valour, and great Undertakings, should be likewise Men of Goodness, Simplicity, Candor, and Friends of Truth: which are all Inseparable from Justice. But the Mischief is, that this Tumour, and Elation of Mind, breaks out many times into a Pertinacy, and an ambitious desire of Rule. For as Plato has it, the Lacedemonians were Naturally inflam'd with an Ardent desire of Overcoming. So that whosoever has the greatest Soul, is the most addicted to aspiring Thoughts: And to set himself above All; or in Truth rather to stand Alone. It is a very hard matter, for a Man to observe the Tenor of True Equity (which peculiarly belongs to Justice) in the Inordinate Appetite of Superiority, and Dominion. From whence it comes to pass, that such men will not be govern'd, either by Reason, or any Publique, and Lawful Constitution. This humour starts Factions in a Commonwealth, that work by Bribery, and Corruption, to advance their Power, and their Fortunes: whose business it is, rather to make themselves Greater, by Violence, than to keep themselves in a Station of Equality by Justice. But the harder any thing is, the fairer it is: nor is there any Time, or Season, that can dispense a man from Justice. Wherefore Those are Truly Brave, and Magnanimous, that keep off an Injury, not Those that offer it. He that is truly Wise, and Stout, places That Virtue which is most consonant to Nature, in Action, and not in Glory: and in making himself more Considerable than other men, rather than appearing so. No man can be said to be truly Heroique, that depends, for his Reputation,

tion, upon the Opinion of the Multitude. But every man the higher his Stomach is, and the greater his Thirst of Honour, the more easily is he transported to do Unjust things. He stands upon a slippery place : For where is the man, who after all his hazzards, and Travels, does not desire, and expect *Glory*, as a reward of his Adventures ?

YOU shall know a man of *Generosity*, and *True Magnanimity*, chiefly by these two *Marques*. First, he despises *outward things*, upon an Opinion that a man should not admire, wish for, or desire any thing but what is Becoming and Honest ; nor subject himself to any Person, Passion, or Fortune. The *Other* is a disposition of Mind (as is said before) that spurs a man to attempt things *Great* and *Profitable* ; but *difficult*, *laborious*, and *dangerous*, as well in the matter of Life it self, as in other Conveniences that belong to'r. All the *Splendor*, and *Reputation* (and let me say, the *Profit* also) of These two Things rests in the *Latter* : but the *Cause*, and the *Motive* is in the *Former* : For There is the Rise, and Spring of great Resolves, that carry men even above the Consideration of any thing that is below. The thing it self is seen in *Two particulars* : *First* in Judging That only to be *Good* which is *Honest* ; and, *Secondly*, in a *Freedom* of the Mind from all *Perturbations*. For it must be confest to be the part of a Brave and Generous Mind, to look upon Those, as Little Things, which many Account to be Great, and Glorious ; and to Contemn them, upon the Foundation of a firm, and settled Judgment. It is likewise the part of a Constant, and Invincible Mind, so to bear all
sorts

*Contempt
of Money.*

*Affectation
of Glory.*

*A Retired
Life.*

sorts of Calamity, and Affliction, as neither to depart from the Order of Nature, nor to descend below the Dignities of a Wise man. How Incongruous is it for a man that stands the shock of *Danger*, to be broken with *Lust*? or to endure the Fatigue of *Labour*; and then to be overcome with *Pleasure*? This must therefore be avoided; and so must the greedy desire of *Money*. There is not a greater Argument of a Narrow, and Wretched Mind, than to dote upon *Self*: Nothing more humane, and honourable, than to despise it, if we have it not; and to employ it generously, and do good with it, if we have it. And so for the Affectation of *Glory*: We must beware of it (as is said already) for it bars a man of his *Liberty*; which a Brave Man will rather dye, than part with. We should not be solicitous neither for *Power*; which in some Cases, we should not receive, and in others, we should lay down. We must deliver our selves from all disorders of mind; either by *Fear* or *Appetite*; and likewise from all *Sourness*, and *Transport*; either of *delight*, or of *Wrath*: that we may be Calm, and secure: In which State, we shall find both Steadiness, and Credit. There are at this day, and there have been many, that to gain this Repose, have wholly withdrawn themselves from Publique Business: Among these, the noblest, and most eminent of Philosophers; and men truly, of great Severity, and Weight; who could neither endure the People, nor Government: and so retired into Deserts, and Retreats, to live privately with Themselves. And these men, in this Recess, had the same Design with Princes (whose Privilege is to live as they list) that they might want nothing, but enjoy their
Free-

Freedom, without Controll. Wherefore, since both Those that affect Power, and the other Idle people that I speak of, aim at the same thing; and have This in common betwixt them; the One thinks they may Gain their End, if they had but ample Fortunes: and the Other, Theirs, if they can but be content with their Own, and with a Little: They may be Both, (for ought I know) in some measure, in the Right. But it must yet be allow'd, that a Private, and Retir'd Life, is both Easier and Safer: And less Importune, and Troublesome to Others. But the life of Those that apply themselves to Publique business, is more profitable to Mankind: and more conducing to the Acquisition of Honour, and Reputation in the World. Wherefore there is something to be said for those Excellent Wits that dedicate themselves to Letters; without meddling in Publique affairs: and also for such Others, as either for want of Health, or perhaps some more powerful Impediment, have quitted their publique Stations, being well satisfi'd, that others should enjoy the Power and the Credit of the Employment. But for those that have none of this Pretence, to talk of despising Government, and Offices, which most people have in great estimation; I do not only, not approve of them, but take them to be much to blame. Not that I disallow of their Judgment, in the little Consideration they seem to have for Glory; but because they are manifestly afraid of the Labours, Troubles, Repulses, and Displeasures that they are to encounter. For there are many that behave themselves *Unequally in Contrary Cases*: Severe Contemners of *Pleasure*, but they sink under *Pain*; Regardless of *Fame*, but dejected with

with *Scandal*. Nor are they Steady, even in these very cases : But for those that are by nature, fitted and qualified for civil business; I should advise These people to apply themselves to it without delay : and to take some Commission in the Government. For This is Necessary, both as to Publique Administration; and to shew the Greatness of the Mind. And publique Officers, as much perhaps, as Philosophers themselves, (if not more) should be affected with a general disdain of External things, (as I have often said) and stated in an Immoveable Tranquillity, and security of Mind; which will deliver them from all Anxiety for things to come; and establish them in a life of Constancy, and Honour. Now this Point is by so much easier, for a Philosopher to gain, by how much his Life is less expos'd to the Stroke of Fortune : For there are not many things that he stands in need of : beside, that in case of any disaster, his Fall is not so dangerous. It is but reasonable therefore to conclude, that Men in Great and Publique places, are exposed to greater perturbations of Thought, than those that live in privacy and Repose. So that a greater Stock of courage is there necessary, and a Mind at Liberty from Trouble, and care. But for him that puts himself into *Business*; let him first consider the *Honesty* of the Employment : and then, his Own *Abilities*, to go thorough with it. Wherein let him neither rashly despair, out of heartlessness, and sloth: nor be over-confident neither, in the Opinion of himself. But in all matters of Business, a man should diligently prepare himself before he goes about it.

B U T

BUT since most Men take *Military Charges* to be of a greater Consideration than *Civil*, This Opinion should be a little qualifi'd; For 'tis a very Common thing for men to apply themselves to that course of Life, out of an Itch of *Glory*; and this happens most frequently in Men of *large Souls*, and *Abilities*: Especially where the *Genius* lies that way, and the *Disposition* carries them to the Profession of *Arms*. But if we would deal impartially, there have been Greater and more Glorious things done in the *Senate*, than in the *Field*: for although *Themistocles* be worthy of all honour, and his Name, and Memory, more Illustrious than that of *Solon*; *Salamis* being still mentioned as a Memorial of his noble Victory over *Xerxes*, which is still preferr'd before the Counsel of *Solon*, for the Institution of the *Areopagites*. This must not at all give way to That: For the *One* did *once*, deliver, preserve, and help the City; but the *Other* will ever do it. This Council preserves the Laws of *Athens*, and Constitutions of their Ancestors. *Themistocles* cannot say that ever he help'd *Areopagus*, but the other may truly boast of serving *Themistocles*. For *Solon* was the Founder of That Senate which manag'd the War: And so for *Pausanias*, and *Lysander*. It is true, that their Actions, and Conduct, enlarg'd the Territories of the *Lacedemonians*; and yet the Laws of *Licurgus*, are Incomparably to be preferr'd. Nay, and upon That very Consideration, their Armies were both *Readier* and *Bolder*. It was my Opinion, even when I was a Boy, that *Marcus Scannius* was not inferiour to *Caius Marius*; and when I came afterwards into Publique Business;

A Comparison of Military Virtues with Civil.

I lookt upon *Q. Catulus* not one jot below *Cneius Pompeius*. For what signifie *Armies, Abroad*, without *Counsel at home*? Neither did *Africanus* (tho' an Excellent *Man*, as well as a great *Captain*) do the Common-wealth a Nobler Service in the Rasing of *Numantia*, than *Pub. Nasica* (a private *Man*) did at the same time, in cutting off *Tiberius Gracchus*. Now this Instance is not purely *Civil*; but in some respect *Military*, because it was done by a *Violent hand*: But still it was done by a *Civil Council*, and without an *Army*. It was a memorable saying of mine, that is so often cast in my Teeth, by a sort of Malicious, and Envious people.

*Let Swordmen to the Gown give place,
And Crown the Orator with Bayes.*

To pass over other Instances. Did not the *Sword* give place to the *Gown*, when the Commonwealth was under *My Administration*? Never was there a more malicious Conspiracy; and yet by the Influence of our Diligence, and Counsel, how quickly was it crush'd? Insomuch, that the very Arms themselves fell out of the hands of the most Audacious of the Mutineers. When was there ever any Action done in the *Field*, or any Triumph Comparable to it? This Boast, to You, my Son, that are to inherit the honour of my Actions, and to whom I would recommend the Imitation of them; This Boast, to You, (I say) may be allow'd me. Nor is it any more than *Cn. Pompey* (a Man laden with Military honours) ascribed to me in a full Audience. *My Third Triumph* (says he)

he) would have been to little purpose, if Cicero, by preserving the Commonwealth, had not left me a place wherein to Triumph. So that *Domestique*, and *Civil Resolution*, is not Inferiour to *Military*. And it requires more Pain, and Study, to be employ'd upon it. That Virtue without dispute, which we look for from a High, and Illustrious Mind, is acquired by the Force of the Soul, not of the Body. And yet the Body is still to be kept in Exercise; and so affected, as to obey the Dictates of Counsel and Reason, in the dispatch of Business, and in the bearing of Toil. But the *honesty* here in question is wholly plac'd in the Care and Consideration of the Mind: wherein the Men of the *Robe*, in *Civil Administration*, bring no less advantage to the *Publique*, than Those that bear *Arms*: For War is many times, either not begun, or otherwise finish'd, by their Advice: Nay, and some brought on too: as the *Third punique War* of *M. Cato* was: where his Authority prevail'd, even when he was dead. Wherefore the Faculty of *Determining*, is more desirable than that of *Contending*. Always provided that we steer not our Courle rather by an *Aversion* to *War*, than a *Consideration* to *Benefit*. In the Undertaking of a War there should be such a prospect, as if the Only end of it were *Peace*. It is the part of a Valiant and Resolute Man, not to be discomposed in disasters, or to make a bustle, and be put beside himself; but to maintain a presence of Mind, and Judgment, without departing from Reason. As this is the Marque and Effect of a great Courage: so is the other, of an Excellent understanding, to forecast in our Thoughts the Events of things to come: and to weigh before-

hand the Good and the Bad ; and what's to be done when it happens, without being put to the foolish Exclamation of *who would have Thought it ?* These are the Works of an Elevated Soul, that supports it self upon Prudence, and Judgment : but he that rashly thrusts himself into Dangers without fear, or wit : and engages an Enemy hand over head : this is only Brutality, and Outrage : But yet when the time comes, and necessity requires it, let a man fight with his Sword in his hand, and rather lose his Life, than his Honour and Freedom.

Clemency
to the Con-
quer'd.

IN the Case of *Rasing* or *Demolishing* of *Cities* there should be great care taken, that nothing be done either *Headily*, or *Cruelly*. It is the part of a Great man, in Publique Broyles, to punish the *Guilty* ; but still to spare the *Multitude* ; and in all conditions, to adhere to that which is Right, and Honest.

Spare the
multitude.

Courage
with Dis-
cretion.

THERE are some that esteem *Feats of Arms* above *Civil Administrations* : (as is afore-said) and there are Others that think it more estimable, to deal in *Dangerous*, and *Crafty*, than in *Quiet*, and *Considerate Counsels*. We must never in such manner avoid *Dangers*, as to appear *Weak* and *faint-hearted* : And we must likewise have a care, on the other side, not to thrust our selves into *Unnecessary hazards* : which is one of the greatest Follies in the World. Wherefore in difficult cases, we should do like Physicians, that apply *Gentle Remedies* to *Gentle Diseases* : but in cases of *Extremity*, a *desperate disease must have desperate Cure*. None but a Mad man will wish for a Storm in fair Weather. But
it

it is yet the part of a Wise man, to weather it the best he can, if he falls into a Tempest. And the honour is so much the more, if the advantage of the success be greater than the Miscarriage.

ACTIONS are dangerous, partly to the Undertakers, and in part to the Commonwealth. Some run the hazard of their Lives: Some of their Good names; and Others of the Love of the people: Now we should more frankly venture our selves, than the Publique: and more cheerfully expose our selves for Honour, and Reputation, than for other Commodities. Some

*Danger
Publique
and private.*

there are that make no scruple of hazarding their Lives, and Fortunes in the defence of their Country; and yet are so nice and scrupulous in the matter of Reputation: that rather than run any risque of their Honour, they will leave their very Country in danger. As Callicratidas the Lacedemonian General, in the Peloponnesian War; after many glorious Exploits, ruin'd all at last, by not removing the Navy from the Arginusæ, and making his Retreat without giving the Athenians Battel, as he was advis'd to do; to which he made This answer, that if the Lacedemonians lost one Fleet, they might set out another; but that if he quitted his Ground, his Honour was lost for ever. But the Lacedemonians however might have born this Loss, whereas the Other Blow was mortal; when Cleombrotus, for fear of an Ill Report, unadvisedly engaged with Epaminondas, where the whole power of the Lacedemonians was cut off at a Blow. How much better now was the conduct of Q. Fabius Maximus, of whom Ennius,

*A mistake
in point of
Honour.*

*Fabius was slow, but sure, and his Delay
Restor'd the tottering State. Now 'twas his
way.*

*To mind his Bus'ness, not what people said :
He liv'd a Great man, but he's Greater dead.*

This is an Error, of a Quality to be avoided also in civil matters. For there are many that dare not speak their Opinions, tho' for the best; for fear of falling under Evil Tongues.

Plato's ad-
vice to Ma-
gistrates.

THERE are two Precepts of *Plato* to be observ'd by all Men of Authority in the Government. The One is, in some sort to assert and defend the Publique Interest, that all their Actions should refer to That, without any regard to their Own advantage. The Other is, to attend the service of the whole, in such sort, that while they are serving one part, they do not abandon another. It is in the Administration of a *Government*, as in the case of a *Ward*: The *Commission* has a regard to the benefit of those that are deliver'd up in *Charge*: and not those to whom such a charge, or care is *Committed*. But they that provide for One part of the people, and neglect another, bring into a City the most pernicious things in the World; That is to say, *Discord*, and *Sedition*: and when they are split into parties, some side with the people; others with the Nobility: but none mind the Whole. This wrought great Mischiefs among the *Athenians*; and in our *Republique* not only *Sedition*, but the most pestilent *Civil Wars*. A course not to be endur'd by a Sober, and valiant Patriot; or any man that deserves a place in the
Go-

The danger
of Factions

Government : For such a man will apply himself wholly to the care of the *Publique*, without designing either upon *Wealth*, or *Power* to himself; and in such manner defend the whole, that he also provide for every part of it : Neither will he bring any man into *Envy*, or *Hatred*, by *Calumny*, or *Subornation*; but resolutely adhere to *Justice* and *Honesty*; maintaining his Post, in spite of all Opposition; and rather die than desert the aforesaid Duties.

AMBITION or the Thirst of Honour is a *of Ambition.* wretched thing : Of which *Plato* says very well; they that strive who shall be Uppermost in the *Republique*, do as if *Mariners* should contend which should be at the *Helm*. And he tells us further, that we are to account those for Enemies, that take up *Armes* against the *Commonwealth*; and not such as with *Honesty*, and *Judgment* labour to defend it. This was the Controversie betwixt *P. Africanus*, and *Q. Metellus*, without any sort of bitterness.

GIVE no ear to those that take it to be the part of a Brave, and Resolute man, to be violently *Angry* with an *Enemy* : For there is nothing more commendable or better becoming a generous person, than *Clemency* and *Good Nature*. Nay towards a *Free People*, where all are liable to the *Law*, we should joyn a *Facility* with That which we call *height of Courage*, lest if we should accustom our selves to Transports upon Unseasonable Addresses, or shameful Importunities, we should fall into a humour of Morose and unprofitable sourness : Provided that with these soft, and gentle ways, we use

Against Anger.

severity also, where the Publique requires it; for without That, a City can never be kept in order.

*Of Reproof
and Corre-
ction.*

*ALL Reproof, and Correction, let it be without Contumely, as being directed only to the profit of the *Commonwealth*; without regard to the gratifying of his *Passion*, or *Interest* that gives either the *Words*, or the *Blows*. And the punishment likewise should be proportion'd to the *Fault*: For it is unjust that one man should have *Blows*, and another, not so much as a *Check*, for the same transgression. But above all things, *Correction* is not to be given in *Anger*; For a man in *Passion* will never observe the due mean betwixt the two Extremes of too much, and too little: wherein the *Peripatetiques* are much in the Right; if they would not also approve of *Anger* given us by Nature for our Advantage. But I am for the avoiding of it in all Cases; and I could wish that *Magistrates*, like the *Laws* *Themselves*, would never proceed to punish, in *Wrath*, but only in *Equity*.

*Moderati-
on in both
Fortunes.*

LET us also in *Prosperity*, and when we have the World at will, as much as possible, avoid *Pride*; *disgusting* of every thing; and *Arrogance*; for it is the same *Levity* to be Transported either with *Good Fortune*, or with *Bad*: And it is an Excellent Thing to observe an Equal Tenor of Life, and to have still the same humour, and the same countenance; as we find it recorded of *Socrates*, and *C. Lelius*. *Philip* of *Macedon*, was outstript by his Son, in *Glorious Achievements*, and *Military Execution*, but in *Gentleness*, and *Humanity* of manners, *Alexander*

der came short of him : So that the *One* of them was *always Great*, and the *Other* was *many Times Intemperate, and Brutal*. 'Tis good Advice, that bids us, the *Higher* we are, to be the more *Humble*. *Panatius* tells us of *Africanus* (his Disciple, and Familiar Friend) how he was wont to say, that as we put out Horses of Service to Riders, for the Training them, and making them fitter for use, when they are grown Fierce, and Unmenageable, by being chaf'd, and heat by the Action of the Battel ; so should we commit Men, that are Transported with Prosperity, and over-confident in Themselves, to some Guide that should keep them, as it were in the Ring ; or within the bounds of Reason, and good Government, to make them understand the Uncertainty of Humane Affairs, and the changes of Fortune. It is in the height of our Prosperity, that we should chiefly consult our Friends ; and allow them more Authority over us than at other times ; but we must have a Care of Entertaining Flatteries, and of being impos'd upon by Fair words, wherein we are too easie to be Mistaken. For such is the conceit we commonly have of our selves, that we think no Commendation more than we deserve. From This weakness there arise Innumerable Errors. For when we come once to be blown up with Praises, and high Opinions of our selves, we do but serve to make sport for Others, and labour under grievous Mistakes. And so much for this Point.

THEIR Business that Govern Commonwealths, must of necessity be of the greatest moment, and require the largest Souls ; because it has the largest prospect, and concerns most people.

Greatness
of mind in
a private
Life.

people. This is to be given for granted ; and yet it must not be deny'd neither, on the Other side, that great Generosity of Mind has been many times shew'd in a private Life ; either in the search, or attempt of Great Matters ; and the people yet keeping themselves within their own Bounds, or else mingling with Philosophers, and Men in Publique Business ; contenting themselves in their Private Condition : Neither scraping together Estates, by all manner of Ways, nor debarring their Friends from the use of what they had ; but rather dividing with Them, and with the Republique where there was Occasion. Now for *This Estate*, let it be, First, *well gotten*, and neither by *Shameful*, nor by *Odious ways* : Let a man next do *good* with it to as many as he can ; (so they be worthy) let him encrease it, with *Prudence*, *Diligence*, and *Good Husbandry* : and let him rather indulge *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, than *Luxury*, and *Lust*. He that observes These Rules may live Soberly, Splendidly, and Generously ; and no less Candidly, Faithfully and amicably with all Men.

WE are now to speak of the remaining part of Duty ; wherein *Baseness*, and a certain *Gracefulness* of Life, *Temperance*, *Modesty*, the Composure of all *Perturbations* of the Mind, and *Moderation*, are to be consider'd. Here it is that we find that same *Decorum*, or as the *Greeks*, *πρέπον* ; which is of so Excellent a Nature, that it is Inseparable from Virtue. For whatsoever is *Decent*, is likewise *Honest* ; and whatsoever is *Honest*, is *becoming*. But still there is a difference betwixt this same *Honesty*, and *Decorum* ; which may be better understood, than

Honesty
and Deco-
rum.

than explained: For That which *becomes* us, does only *Then* appear, when *Honesty* is gone before.

NOW this *Decorum* does not only appear in the *Virtue* now in question, but also in the Three former. For the Right and Prudent use of Reason, and Speech; the doing of every thing Considerately; the finding out of Truth, and the Defending of it, looks well in Any man; as on the Other side to be deceived, to Mistake, to Slip, to be Impos'd upon, is as misbecoming; as if a man were in a fit of Dotage, or out of his Wits. And so whatsoever is *Just*, is also *Graceful*; and whatsoever is *Unjust*, or *Dishonest*, is likewise *misbecoming*. And the same Rule holds in *Fortitude*: For whatsoever is done *Generously*, and like a Man of *Courage*, cannot but be *Graceful* too, and well-becoming a man; and the *Contrary* as *Reproachful*, and *Misbecoming*. Wherefore the *Decorum* I here speak of, appears likewise in all other *Virtues*; and does in such manner appertain to them, that it lies open; and there needs no *Mystery* to the finding of it out. There is in all *Virtue*, somewhat that is *Graceful*, and only *separable* from *Virtue*, by *Imagination*: As the *Gracefulness*, and *Beauty* of the *Body*, cannot well be separated from *Health*: And so it is with the *Gracefulness* here in question. It is a *Decorum* that is in a manner so confus'd with *Virtue*, that it is Incorporated with it; but in the *Mind* and *Conception*, it may be distinguish'd. And there are of it, *Two Sorts*. The *One* is a certain *General Decorum*, that shines in all *Virtues*; and there is *Another* that is subject to This, or dependent upon it, which re-

A Decorum in Prudence.

And in all Virtues.

A Decorum General and Special.

spects

The Deco-
rum of
the Poets.

spects every *Virtue* in particular. The *Former* is Commonly defined to be a *Decorum* congruous to the Excellency of *Man*, in that which differences *Man*, from Other Living Creatures. But the *Special Decorum*, as dependent upon the General, they define to be a quality so Congruous to *Nature*, that *Moderation* and *Temperance* appear in it, with the very image of a *Generous Soul*. This we may judge to be the *Decorum*, which the Poets observe; whereof we have spoken more in another place. But we are then said to observe the *Strict Decorum* of the Poets, when every *Word*, and *Action* is fitted to the *Dignity*, and *Condition* of the *Person*. As what could be more Improper, and Unseemly than to bring in These just Judges, *Æacus*, and *Minos* with these words in their Mouths, *Let them hate, so they Fear*: Or, *the Father is the Grave of his own Children*. And yet when *Atreus* says it, what Acclamations are there, because the expression Suits with the *Person*! But *Nature* her self, as to us, has given every man his Part, with great Excellency, and advantage over other Living Creatures. So that the Poets will see to the accommodating of all parts to the variety of *Persons*, even the Observing of a *Decorum*, toward the worst of men, as well as the best. But since *Nature* has assign'd us our parts of *Constancy*, *Moderation*, *Temperance*, *Modesty*; and the same *Nature* teaches us not to be wholly careless, how we demean our selves toward one another; it is clear to us, how far that *Decorum* extends, that belongs to every *Virtue*, and every kind of *Honesty*. For as the Beauty of the Body, with an apt disposition of the Parts, proves the Eye; and delights us in the very Correspondence,
Symmetry

Symmetry and apt disposition of the Parts ; so this *Decorum*, that Illustrates Life, gains upon all those we converse with, by the Order, Steadiness, and Moderation of all our Words, and Deeds. Wherefore there should a Certain reverence be used toward all men, both high, and low ; for 'tis the humour of an Arrogant and dissolute Man, not to care what the World says of him. But there's a great difference betwixt *Justice*, and *Modesty*, upon all accounts. It belongs to *Justice* not to *wrong* men ; and to *Modesty*, not to *offend* them : Wherein the Power, and Virtue of a *Decorum*, does most eminently appear. This is enough said, I suppose, to make it understood, what is intended by that which we call a *Decorum*.

The *Decorum* of Order, Steadiness and Moderation.

THE Duty that proceeds from it, is chiefly to preserve our selves in a Conformity to Nature ; A Guide That will never mislead us ; but conduct those that follow her, to all acuteness, and perspicacity of Understanding ; to the best means of Uniting men in Society ; to That which is strong, and manly. But the mighty power of *Gracefulness* is in That part which we are now upon : For not only the Motions of the Body, according to Nature, are to be allow'd, but the Motions of the mind likewise much more.

A *Decorum* in a Conformity to Nature.

THE *Force*, and *Nature*, of the *Mind*, is *Two fold* : One part is plac'd in the *Appetite* ; the *Greeks* call it *ορεξις* ; that carries a man hither and thither : The *Other*, in *Reason*, that teaches us, and explains to us what to do, and what to *avoid*, by which means, our *Appetite* shall be kept obedient to our *Reason*. In all Cases,

From the *Appetite* arise *Perturbations*.

we

we should have a care of Rashness and Negligence; and do nothing but what we can give a fair Account of. This is, in some degree, the Image and Description of Duty; But then we must so order it, that the *Appetite* follow the Dictate of *Reason*, so as neither rashly to overrun it, nor out of *Heaviness*, and *Sloth* to desert it; but keep it quiet, and calm, and free from all *Perturbation*. This will make us Eminent for *Constancy* and *Moderation*: For *Those Appetites* that wander from the *Rule*; and Skip from one thing to another, either by *Coveting*, or *Avoiding*: *Those Appetites*, I say, for want of being govern'd by *Reason*, will without all question pass *Bounds* and *Measure*; for they relinquish and cast off their *Allegiance* to *Reason*, which they ought to obey by the Law of *Nature*: and their Ill Effects are Imprinted, not only upon our *Minds*, but also visibly upon our *Bodies*: As in the Transports of *Wrath*, *Lust*, *Fear*, *Pleasure*; What an Alteration is there of *Countenance*, *Voice*, *Motion*, *Gesture*? from whence we may Collect, how necessary it is to moderate, and govern our Passions; and so to keep our selves upon a Guard, that we do nothing heedlessly, or as it were by Chance, without Care, or Consideration. For man was never made for Levity and Pleasure, but rather for the severity of Grave, and weighty Studies. Not that we are to be debarr'd the Freedom of Froliques, and Divertisements; provided that we use them only as Sleep, and such other ways of Repose; after the discharge of our Serious and more Important Duties. And our very Liberties in Discourse must not be profuse neither, nor Immodest; but only Candid, and Facetious: For

Passion disorders both Mind, and Body.

The Bounds of Mirth.

as we do not allow our Children all sorts of Games; but only such sports as hold some proportion with honest Actions; So in *Raillery* it self, there must be a mixture of *Candour*, as well as *Understanding*.

THERE are two sorts of *Raillery*, or *Mirth*; *Two Sorts of Raillery*, the One is *Course, Petulant, Criminal, and Foul*; the Other, *Cleanly, Gracious, Ingenious, and Facetious*: In which kind, not only *Plautus*, and the *Greek Comedians*, but the Followers of *Socrates*, have written much; and stuffed their Books with a great many of their *sayings*, and *Conceits*: As *Cato's* Collection of *Apothegms*, &c. Now 'tis an easie matter, to distinguish betwixt a *Course*, and a *Cleanly way of jesting*. The One, is a word for a season, only for *Recreation*, and worthy of a man of Honour. The Other, not fit for an *Honest man*; especially where *filthy Things* are deliver'd in as *Unclean Words*.

NAY in our very *Recreations*, we should keep within Compass; and have a Care that we do not lash out into Excesses, and pass the Limits of Modesty, in the Transports of our Pleasures. The Chase of Wild Beasts, and the Military and Manly Exercises that are Practis'd in our Field, or *Campus Martis*: These I reckon to be Honourable pleasures; and we need never want these ways of Diversion. *Honest and manly pleasures.*

BUT whatever we do, it should be always in our Thought, the Excellency of *Humane Nature*, above That of *Brutes*; which are only push'd on by *Violent Appetites to Sensual pleasures*: Whereas the Entertainment of a mans Mind, *The Excellency of Man.*

Brutal
Pleasures.

Mind, is *Learning* and *Meditation*; which is never Idle, but still employ'd either upon Enquiry, or Action; and charmed with a delight that arises from what we hear, or see. Nay the very man himself, that is most addicted to his Pleasures: (if he has but the Soul of a Man in him, and not only the *Name*, without the *Effect* (for such there are) Though he may be overcome by his *Lusts*, he yet stands so right, as to be *asham'd* of, to *conceal*, and to *disguise* his Love of Those pleasures, even for *Modesty* sake; which shews that the *Pleasures* of the *Body*, are not worthy of the *Dignity* of the *Soul*; but rather *Contemptible*, and to be *rejected*. But if any man shall be found to have a great Regard for Pleasures, let him be sure to use them with *Moderation*. In our very *Cloaths*, and *Dyet*, we should still keep an Eye rather to matter of *Health*, and *Strength*, than to the humouring of the *Phanſie*, or *Palate*; and if we shall but duly weigh, and examine the *Dignity*, and *Excellency* of *Nature*; we shall quickly find how shameful a Thing it is to dissolve in a *Luxurious* softness, and *Delicacy*: And how becoming, on the other side, to live *Frugally*, *Temperately*, *Gravely*, and *Soberly*.

Man has
Two Capacities.

A great
Diversity
both in
Minds and
Bodies.

EVERY man must be understood to be invest-
ed with *Two Capacities*; the One *Common* to
Mankind, as endu'd with *Reason*; and in a prefe-
rence to *Beasts*, from whence we do not only de-
rive the *Knowledge* of *Decency*, and *Virtue*; but
the very means of finding out our several *Duties*.
The Other is a *Propriety* that has a respect par-
ticularly to *Individuals*. There is a great differ-
ence in *Bodies*: One man is better for a *Course*,
Ano-

Another for a *Scuffle*; and so in *Beauties*; *One Beauty* is *Imperious*, and *Majestical*; *Another, Charming*. Now there are at least as great *diversities*, and *Varieties* in our *Minds*. *L. Crassus*, and *L. Philippus*, were both of them of a *Nature*, Wonderfully *Gentle*, and *Gracious*; and Both these qualities were yet more *Eminent*; and more *Labour'd* too, in *C. Caesar*, the Son of *Lucius*. There was a strange *Austerity* of *Humour*, in *M. Scaurus*, and *M. Drusus*; and in the same *Time*, and as yet in their *Youth* too. *C. Lelius* was *Gay*, and *Pleasant*; his Friend *Scipio* more *Ambitious*, and *Reserved*. It is reported, that *Socrates*, among the *Greeks*, was a *Gentle* and a *pleasant Companion*; a *Wit* that lay much upon *Innocent Raillery*, and had an *Excellent faculty* of speaking his *Mind*, under an agreeable *Disguise*. *Pythagoras*, on the other side, and *Pericles*, advanc'd themselves, without any *Gayety* of *Humour* at all. Among the *Carthaginians*, *Hannibal*, and among our *Own Commanders*, *L. Maximus* have the *Name* of men extremely *Close*, and *Secret*, *Silent*, *Dissembling*; notably good at *Stratagems*, or setting *Spies* upon an *Enemy*, and disappointing their *Counsels*. Those that the *Greeks* have the greatest esteem of, are *Themistocles* the *Athenian*, and *Jason* the *Pherean*. But above all, they magnifie that profound, and politique *Fetch* of *Solon*: who, for the advantage of the *Commonwealth*, and for his *Own security*, counterfeited himself *Mad*. There are others now, so far from This *Artifice*, that they are *Simple* and *Open*: to the degree of not enduring any thing but what's done above board: They will not suffer any thing that looks like *Treachery*. These men are

the Servants of *Truth*, and the Enemies of *Fraud*. There are others again, that will bear any thing, and crouch to any man, for their own Ends; as *Sylla*, and *M. Crassus*: The *Lacedemonian Lyfander* is said to have been a great Master of his Art in This kind; and yet *Callicratides*, that succeeded him in his Command of the Navy, is reported to have been quite of another humour. And we find diversity as well in the *Stile*, and *Fashion of Speaking*, as in the difference of *Manners*. As you shall see men of great Authority, and Parts, that yet wont themselves to the Phrase and Language of the Common people: As the *Two Catulus's*, Father and Son, and the like *Q. Mutius Mancinus*, which I my self am a Witness of. Nay I have heard old men say, that *P. Scipio of Nafica*, had that way with him; but his Father the clean contrary, and no Grace of Speech in the World. I speak of him that reveng'd the Commonwealth, upon the *Seditious* attempts of *Tiberius Gracchus*. And no more had *Xenocrates*, the severest of Philosophers; and yet Famous and Eminent for that very Sowness. There are a world of *Other dissimilitudes*, both of *Nature*, and *Manners*, which are not yet to be despised. So that every man should do well to stick to that Inclination that nature has given him in particular; provided that it be not Vicious: and by so doing, he shall easily more discover and attain the *Décorum* which we look for in this place.

Nature is
the best
Mistress.

BUT yet we are so to behave our selves, that without opposing *Common Nature*, we follow the *Dictates*, every man of his *Own Genius*; and tho' other things may perhaps be weightier,
and

and better, we are yet to take our Measures according to the bent of our Own Particular. For 'tis in vain to struggle with Nature; or to pursue any thing which we cannot attain. From hence it is, that we must gather the Knowledge of what becomes us. For nothing can be *Graceful*, that lays a *Force* upon *Nature*. In short, there is nothing more *becoming*, in humane life, than an *Equability*, and *Congruity* of our *Actions*: which, if ever we depart from, and pass to the *Affectation* of another mans *Nature*, we lose our *Own*. For as we are to use our Own Native Language, without forcing foreign Words into it (as some people do) and make themselves only ridiculous for their pains) so should we in our *LIVES*, and *Actions*, make our selves all of a piece.

NAY, so sensible is This difference of *Natures*, that one man shall be *honour'd* for *destroying of himself*, and another *condemned* for it, all in the same Case: as it was with *Marcus Cato* that *kill'd himself*, and the Rest that *rendered themselves up to Caesar in Africa*. This might perhaps have turn'd to their reproach, if they had laid violent hands upon themselves: For an action so heroical would have born no proportion with the softness and facility of their Ways and Manners, but rather have introduc'd an *Incongruity* betwixt their *Lives*, and *Deaths*. But for *Cato*, that was a man naturally *Grave*, and *Severe*, (even to a *Miracle*) and hardn'd to it by a long habit of *Constancy*: a man unalterably *Firm* to his *purpose*, and *resolution*: it made for the *dignity* of his *Humour*, and *Character*, rather to *support death* it self, than the *frown* and

The same
thing Good
in one, and
Ill in an-
other.

Let every
man Act his
own Part.

Dominion of a Tyrant. How many miseries did *Ulysses* suffer, in that tedious Ramble of his, enslaving himself to Women, (if a body may give *Circes* and *Calypso* that name) and a Complaisance upon all Occasions to all sorts of people? Nay at his own house, how patiently did he put up the Contempts, and Flouts of the meanest of his Servants there? Whereas *Ajax*, according to the report we have of him, would have born a thousand deaths, rather than those Contumelies. This Contemplation should make every man look into himself, to see what he has of his Own, and to make his best of *That*, without disguising himself, to act the part of *Another*. *That* whichever man has Peculiar to himself, is the thing which best becomes him. Wherefore every man should take a true estimate of what he is, and impartially examine his Abilities, and Defects; What he can do, and what he cannot. That we may be, at least, as wise in our *Lives*, as *Comedians* are upon the *Stage*: who make choice, not so much of the *Best Parts*, or *Plays*, as of the *fittest* for their *disposition*. He that has the strongest Voice, chules the Tragedy of *Epigonus*, or *Medea*: The best Actor prefers *Melippe*, or *Clytemnestra*. *Rutilius* (whom I remember) always acted *Antiope*: and sometimes *Æsopus* play'd *Ajax*. Shall a *Stage-player* now take more care of himself in a *Comedy*, than a *Wise man* in his *Life*? Let every man see in the *first* place, *which way* his *Talent* Lies; and in the *next*, let him endeavour to *improve* it. But if we should be forc'd at any time, by necessity, to play a Part that we were never made for: let it be our Care, Study, and Thought, so to behave our selves, that at least

we

we may not lose our Credit, where we cannot get any. So that the best of this Case will be to avoid Shame, without pretending to get a Reputation, by the forcing of our Nature.

NOW to those two parts already spoken of, that is to say, of *Common Nature*, and *particular Inclination*, there is a *Third*, that is cast upon us either by Time, or Chance, and yet a *Fourth*, which we accommodate according to our own Judgment. For Kingdoms, Empires, Dignities, Honours, Riches, with their Contraries, are all of them in the hand of Fortune, and governed by the Revolution of Times. Now it is wholly at our own Choyce, what part we will Sustain. Wherefore One man takes to *Philosophy*, another to the *Civil Law*, a Third to *Rhetorique*, and a Fourth affects an Excellency rather in *One Virtue* than in *Another*. But for those whose Ancestors were any of them very Famous; They commonly study to get Reputation by treading in Their Steps: as *Q. Mucius* follow'd his Father *Publius* in the *Civil Law*: And *Scipio Africanus* emulated his Father in Feats of Arms. Some again are not content with the honour they derive from their *Predecessors*, unless they add somewhat to it of their Own. As *Africanus* did yet Augment and Illustrate the Honour of his *Military Knowledge* by his *Particular Eloquence*. And so did *Timotheus*, the Son of *Conon*, who being a *Captain* not inferior to his Father, made himself yet greater by the Addition of *Letters* and *Understanding*. But it happens sometimes that the Son declines the Imitation of the Father, and betakes himself rather to some Course, or design of his own; which is a thing often found

Let every man chuse his own Study.

in men of large minds, that are descended from obscure Parents. All these Circumstances must be taken into Consideration, in the question of *This Decorum*.

Some
Course of
Life must
be pitched
upon.

THE First point in Deliberation is This, what it is that we design either to *Be*, or to *do*; and what Course of Life to take to. In this Deliberation, there is great hazard, and difficulty. For it is in our Youth, that we are to resolve, and pitch upon the Condition we propound; at which time, we are least able to judge of it. So that we are commonly engag'd in some certain purpose of Life, before we are able to distinguish betwixt a Better and a Worse. For although (according to the Report of *Prodicus*, out of *Xenophon*) so soon as ever *Hercules* came out of his *Minority* (the time for every man to chuse what course of Life he will Steer) he retir'd into a *Solitude*, and upon the Sight of *Two ways*, the *One* of *Virtue*, and the *Other* of *Pleasure*, he sat a long time considering with himself, which of the *Two ways* he should take: Yet this might do well enough for *Hercules*, that was the Son of *Jupiter*, but not for us, I fear, that commonly follow those men still that we like best; and take up an affection for Their ways, and Studies. And yet for those that are trained up under the Institution of their Parents; they do commonly and insensibly contract an Affection for the Methods and Customs of their Education. Others are carried away by the Stream of Popular practice; esteeming That still to be the Best; that pleases the *most*. And yet some there are, that lead the Course of Life they ought to do; induced thereunto, either by Providence;

a certain Felicity, or Goodness of Nature; a Virtuous Inclination, or some particular advantage of their Institution: But it is a very rare thing to find a Concurrence of Eminent Wit, and Learning; or to find Either of them, with so much Time for deliberation, as is needful for the Election of a profitable Course of Life. In this deliberation, a regard must be had to That which is most proper, and Natural to every particular: For (as is already said) since in whatever we do, we must enquire into every mans particular *Genius*, before we can say what becomes him; so we must be more Careful yet, in the Establishment of our Own Lives, to see that we maintain an Equality in the Main; and that we never differ from our selves, or falter in our Duty.

BUT since *Nature* has the *greatest* power in *This Case*; and *Fortune*, the *next*; we must consult them *Both*; what Course of Life to fix upon; But *Nature*, in the *first place*: For she is much firmer, and more constant; and it is not for *Fortune*, that is *Frail* and *Mortal*, to contend with *Immortal Nature*: Whosoever therefore shall Conform in the Ordering of his Life, to the Inclinations of an uncorrupted Nature, must keep constantly to that Tenour, which is the *Decorum* of Life; unless he find himself mistaken in his Choice. And in that Case (for it is a Case to be put) there must be a Change admitted of Purposes and Manners. And That change will be more easily and commodiously wrought, under the favour of Times and Occasions: But where the Season is not favourable, it must be Introduc'd by Little and Little; as Wise men

Nature and Fortune to be consulted what course of Life to fix upon.

say of Inconvenient, and Ill Grounded Friendships; 'tis better to unstitch than to tear them all to pieces on a sudden. But when we have once alter'd our Course, we must be infinitely Careful to make it appear, that we have done it upon good and weighty Reasons. Now whereas I have, (in what is aforesaid) propounded the Imitation of our Predecessors; let me not be thought to advise an Imitation of them in their Vices: beside that there are many things wherein Nature is not to be Imitated. As the Son of *Africanus the Elder*. (he that adopted the Son of *Paulus Emilius*.) It was not possible for him, by reason of the Craziness of his body to be so like his Father, as the Other was like His. Wherefore if a man be not in Condition to plead at the Bar; to *Harangue* the People in *Publicque Assemblies*, or to lead *Armies*; there are some Duties yet in his power, which he is obliged to perform; as the *Offices* of *Justice*, *Faith*, *Liberality*, *Modesty*, *Temperance*, which Benefits will fairly supply the want of the Other. The best of *Patrimonies* is the *Reputation* of *Great*, and *Virtuous Actions*, and *Ancestors*; and the Son that does not uphold the Renown of his Father, is a Shame, and a Scandal to it.

Let every
man do all
the Good
he can.

NOW in regard that there are several Duties properly belonging to several Ages; and many things that becoming a Young man, would be ridiculous in an Old; we shall say something also under That distinction.

The Duty
of a Young
man.

IT is the duty of a Young man to Reverence his Elders, and to make his Choice of the Best, and most approved among them, for his Directors

Fools and Governours : For the Ignorance, and
 Folly of Youth should be ordered, and instruct-
 ed, by the *prudence and experience* of the *Aged*.
 But above all things, he should be restrained
 from *Loose and Wanton pleasures* : and trained
 up rather in *Laborious exercises* : and in the *Fa-*
tigues, and Toyles, both of Body, and Mind.
 For it makes men *Vigorous, and Industrious,* as
 well in *War, as in Peace* : and even in the Inter-
 vals of *Liberty, and Refreshment,* young Men
 should have a Care of *Intemperance* : and not to
 pass the Bounds of *Modesty* : which will be the
 more Easily attained, if they be often in the Eyes
 of their *Seniors and Tutors.*

*Youth
 should be
 Temperate
 and indu-
 strious.*

WHEN we come to be in *Years,* the labours
 of the body must be abated, and we should en-
 crease those of the *Mind* : but striving still, by
 all means to be serviceable to our Friends, and
 to our Juniors, by our Advice, and Wisdom :
 but principally to the Commonwealth. But above
 all things, have a Care of a Drowsie, a Languish-
 ing, and a Lasie Old Age ; and so likewise of a
 Luxurious : which, as it is reproachful and dis-
 honourable, in this Case it is most of all. But
 if the Intemperance of *Lust* be added to it, the
 Mischief is Double. *First,* the *Infamy* which it
 reflects upon *Age* it self : and *Then,* the *Ill*
Example, in Authorizing young men to be more
 Shameless and wicked.

*The Busi-
 ness of Age
 is Wisdom.*

*Beware of
 Sloth and
 Luxury.*

IT would not be impertinent, here to speak
 something of the Duties of *Magistrates, Private*
Citizens and Strangers. The *Magistrates* part,
 is to consider himself as the *Representative* of the
City : and to uphold the *Honour, and Dignity*
 of

*The Duty
 of a Magi-
 strate.*

*A private
man.*

of it : to observe the *Laws*, and *Customs*, to do *Justice* ; and to remember, that all these things are committed to his *Charge*. It is the part of a *Private man*, to live with his fellow *Citizens*, under one *Common Bond of Legal Duty* ; neither falling so Low, as to make himself despicable, nor too much exalting himself : And never to entertain any Thought, but to the Glory, and Peace of the Commonwealth. This is the man that we esteem, and pronounce to be a worthy Citizen. As to the Duty of a *Stranger* : let him mind his own business, and not intermeddle with Other peoples, but keep himself within his Compass. By these means it will be understood, when it shall come to be diligently examin'd, what is most becoming us, under the several Circumstances of *Persons, Times, and Ages* : But there is nothing so Graceful, as to behave our selves equally, and steadily, in all our Actions, and Counsels.

*The Deco-
rum of the
Body.*

BUT this Gracefulness shews it self in all our Words, and Deeds, nay in the very Motions, and Postures, of the body : and consists principally in Beauty, Order, and a kind of Air, or Agreement suitable to every thing we do. 'Tis a hard matter to express This, but it shall suffice, that it may be easily understood. In the Observation of These three Points, we render our selves Acceptable in our Conversation with all People. And so much for This too.

*The Seeds
of Modesty
are in Na-
ture.*

NATURE has undoubtedly taken great Care in the forming of Mans Body, exposing only Those parts to sight, that are Beautiful, Comely and Agreeable to the Eye : and keeping Those parts

parts conceal'd, and Cover'd, which would give Offence if they were laid open to View: and serve us only for Unclean, and Common Necessities. There is no question, but the Modesty of the Mind conforms it self, in this particular, to the exquisite fabrique of the Body: For whatsoever Nature has conceal'd, all men in their right Wits, do naturally keep out of sight, and as private as possible, in compliance with their very Necessities. Now for Those parts of the body which are of most necessary use to man: we neither call the part, nor the use of it, by the proper name: and that which may be honestly done, (if secretly) we cannot so much as honestly name. Infomuch, that those things cannot be done openly without Impudence: nor so much as mention'd, without Obscenity. Wherefore there's no hearkning to the *Cyniques*, or to the *Old Stoiques*, (which are almost *Cyniques*) that blame and laugh at us, for reckoning those things to be foul, in *Words*; which are not so, in *Truth*. And yet Those things which we all agree to be foul, we can yet call by *Their own names*. As *Theft*, *Consenage*, *Adultery*, are all dishonest in the *Deed*: and yet we use the *Words* without *Scruple*. To beget Children is an honest Action: but it wears a *Course* name. And we find a great deal more to this purpose, against Modesty, in their Disputations. But we are to follow Nature, and to fly whatsoever may offend either the Eye, or the Ear of a Modest man. Nay, in our very Postures, and Gestures: as Walking, Standing, Sitting, Lying: in the very Countenance, the Eye, the Motion of the hands, there must a regard be had still to that which is Becoming. In all This, there are *Two things* we should

The Obscene humour of the Cyniques.

A Decency in Gestures and Postures.

beware

The Modesty of the Romans.

beware of. The *One*, not to do any thing that is *Loose, Nice, and Effeminate*: The *Other*, to void things that look *Harsh, Rough, and Uncivil*. For why should That which becomes an *Ora- tor, or a Comedian, misbecome us*? The Discipline of the *Theatre* has a long time had such a regard to *Modesty*: that no man enters upon the Stage, without *Drawers*, lest some part of the body should come to be discover'd by Chance that ought to be Conceal'd. The *Roman Customs* will not allow Sons, when they are Men grown, so much as to Bath, with their Fathers: Or Sons in Law, with their Wives Parent. In these points of *Virtuous Modesty*, Nature is both our *Mistress* and our *Guide*.

Of Dignity and Gracefulness.

Affectation is Odious.

OF *Beauty, or Agreeableness*, there are *Two Kinds*: the *One* is matter of *Gracefulness*; the *Other*, of *Dignity*: and we may call them *Male, and Female*: It is not for a man to be Trickt out with *Fooleries*: or to have any thing that is *Phantastical, or Effeminate*: no, not so much as in his very *Motion, or Gesture*. How are we disgusted many times, at the Conceited actions of *Stage-Players*? and the more *Odious, and affected Motions* of *Wrestlers*? And yet we Commend that which is *Natural, and Simple*, both in the *One, and in the Other*. The *dignity of the Countenance* is Maintain'd by a good *Colour*: and that *Colour* by the *Exercise of the Body*: and to all This we should keep our selves *Neat and Cleanly*: not to the degree of *Niceness, and Affectation*, but only so, as not to incur the censure of *Rudeness, Sluttishness, and Neglect*. And the same Rule we should observe in our *Garments*: In which particular, as well as in other

other things, a *mediocrity* does best. In our *walking* we must neither march so *Slow*, as if we were officiating at a solemnity : nor yet make such *post-hast*, as to run our selves out of breath, and put the Mouth, or the Countenance into disorder : which is a sign of a *Light*, and *Unsteady* humour. But we must take more pains, yet, to keep the *Mind* in a temper of *Conformity* to *Nature* : which we may easily compass, if we can but preserve our selves from *Falling* into *Transports*, and *Perturbations*, and diligently attend to a *Conservation* of the *Decorum* here prescribed. The *Motions* of the *Mind* are *Two-fold*. Some are of *Thought*, and others of *Appetite*. Those of *Thought* are chiefly employed in the finding out of *The Truth*. Those of *Appetite* push a man forward to the *doing* of something. We must be careful therefore, *First*, to apply our *Thoughts* to That which is most *worthy* of them : and, *Secondly*, to keep the *Appetite* in subjection to *Reason*.

The Moti-
ons of the
Mind are
Thought
and Appe-
tite.

AS to the matter of *Speech*, the Power of it is *Great* ; and it is also *Two-fold*. The *One* is a *Speech* of *Contention* ; the *Other*, of *Common discourse*. The *Former* is for the *Barre*, for *Publicque Assemblies*, and for the *Senate* ; the *Other*, is for *Ordinary Conversation*, *Casual disputes*, *private meetings* of *Company* or *Friends* at the *Table*. The *Masters* of *Rhetorique* have given *Precepts* for the *Former*, but we have none for the *Latter* ; altho' perhaps, that might be done too. But there's no body that addict's himself That way. For if men would but apply themselves to the *Study* of it, they would never want *Masters to Teach* it. And yet we are all of us

Of Rhetor-
ique, and
Ordinary
Discourse.

Mad

The Voice
should be
Clear and
Sweet.

Instances of
Excellent
Speakers.

Mad upon *Rhetorique*, altho', for what concerns words, and *Periods*, the same Rules would serve Both. It is by the help of the *Voice*, that we *discourse*; and the *Two great advantages* of it, are to be *Clear*, and *Sweet*; We must stand indebted to *Nature* for them *Both*. And yet *Exercise*, and *Prattice*, will help us in the *One*: and the *Imitation* of *Smooth* and *gentle Speakers*, may be of use to us in the *Other*. What was it but This, that gave the *Catuli* so fair a Reputation, both for Judgment and Language? They were *Learned men*, 'tis true, and so were *Others*; but These yet were lookt upon as the great Masters of the *Latin Tongue*: They had a wonderful Sweetness of Voice, and their Pronunciation neither too loud, and open, nor yet muffled betwixt the Teeth. So that it was both Audible, and Agreeable; and without any Affectation: The Tone, without any Force, and neither too faint, nor too shrill. *L. Crassus*, 'tis true, was a word-flowing Speaker, and no less Ingenious: but for well speaking, the *Catuli* were no less esteem'd. Now for sharpness, and pleasure of Wit, *Cesar*, the Brother of the *Elder Catulus*, went beyond them all. Insomuch that in his ordinary Discourses, he surpass'd the best Pleaders of his Time. All these things, severally, must be diligently heeded, to make us understand what it is that may best become us in every thing.

Of Familiar
Discourse.

IN *Familiar Speech*, the Followers of *Socrates* are most worthy of Imitation. It should be *Gentle*, without being too pressing, or tedious: and I would have it *pleasant*, and *entertaining*, in all Cases. Nor would I have any man take possession of a *Common Right*, in such sort as

to Talk all himself, to the Exclusion of Others : but in Discourse, as in Other things, every man to take his Turn. The First thing to be heeded, is the subject Matter of the Discourse. If serious, it must be seriously handled : if Matter of Mirth, a Freedom of Raillery, and Lightness, does well enough with it. But above all things, we must be Careful in the government of our Speech, not to discover any Vice, or Defect in our Manners ; wherein a man is most liable to betray himself, when he talks spitefully of the Absent ; and either in Jest, or in earnest, maliciously exposes them to Contumely, and Reproach. The Ordinary matter of *Familiar Discourse*, is either about *Domestique Affairs*, the *Republique*, or matter of *Studies and Learning*. If at any time we pass These Bounds, we must as soon as may be take up again. But be it as it will, it must be thought upon, how far our Discourse may be Grateful to the Company : For we are not Equally pleased with the same things, at all times. And then, as we begin a discourse upon Reason, we must not continue it beyond Measure. But as it is laid down upon very good Grounds, and as a general Rule, that we should keep our selves Clear from Perturbations, or violent Motions of the Mind, that rebel against Reason, so should we in our Speech keep a guard upon our selves against Those Intemperate Motions ; and that we do not lay open our Distempers of Anger, Appetite, Laziness, Heartlessness, or the like. We should be very Careful also in our Conversation, to possess the Company with an Opinion of the Reverence, and Good will that we have for them. There are many Occasions wherein we cannot avoid Chiding :

Cautious.

The Subject of it.

Seasonable and not Tedious.

Nor Passionate.

Respectful.

Chiding : and we may be allow'd sometime, a
Let reproof be without Anger. more than ordinary Contention of Voice ; and a
 sharper severity of Words : but yet This is not
 to be done neither, as if we were Angry ; but
 we are to proceed to this kind of Reproof, as
 we do to *Laming*, and *Scarifying*, rarely, and
unwillingly ; nor ever at all, but upon *Necessity*,
 and for want of some other way of Remedy,
 but not in Anger still upon any Terms : for it ne-
 ver does any thing either well or wisely : And
 yet it may do well enough to use a Temperate,
 and a mild way of Rebuke ; but still accompany'd
 with Gravity, that the reprehension may be ap-
 ply'd without Reproach : It must be also signi-
 fi'd that the Only thing intended by the Reproof,
 was the Amendment of him that suffers it. Nay,
 it will become us in our differences, even with
 our greatest Enemies ; in despite of all Indigni-
 ties yet, to preserve a Gravity ; to keep our
 selves free from Passion ; for whatsoever we do
 in distemper, can neither be well done in it self,
 nor approved by those that are Witnesses to the
 doing it. It is a lewd thing likewise for a man
Ostentation is Odious. to talk much of himself : especially with *Thraso*,
 to brag of things that are false, and to make Sport
 for the Company.

Of Building and Palaces. BEING now to go through all the Points
 of *Decency* and *Duty* (as That is my design) I
 shall say something what kind of House I should
 think fit for a Person of Honour, or a Prince, so
 as to have it accommodate for use ; for That's the
 Intent of Building it : and there must yet be had a
 regard to the State and Dignity of the Person that
 Inhabits it. I have been told of *Cn. Octavius*
 (the first Consul of *That Family*) that he was
 highly

highly reverenc'd for a Magnificent Pile that he built upon the *Palatine-Hill*; and that the Reputation he got by so many peoples coming to see it, open'd his way (being but a new man) to the *Consulship*. *Scannus* afterward caused That to be demolish'd, for the Enlargment of his Own. The former brought the Consulship first into his Family: and the latter, (tho' the Son of an Eminent, and Famous person, and the House enlarged) brought into it, not only a Repulse, but Misery and Shame. It does well to have the Dignity of the Master yet further adorned by the House, but not that Dignity to be fetch'd altogether from it. The House should be grac'd by the Master, and not the Master by the House; and it is in a House, as it is in Other Cases: a man must have a respect, not only to himself, but also to others. In the House of a Person of Eminent Condition, where many Guests, are to be received, and men of all sorts to be admitted, there must great Care be taken that it be large enough: but a large house, without People, disparages the Master of it; and especially if it has been more frequented under a Former Possessor: for 'tis an Odious Thing to have Passengers reflect upon it, and say (as in these Times there's too much Occasion) *Here's the Old House, but where's the Old Master?* I would have him that sets upon Building, take special Care not to lash out into Magnificence, and Expence, as a thing of Ill Consequence, even in the Example; for there are too many Imitators in This Kind, of the doings of Princes. How many have we that Emulate the Splendor of *Lucullus's Villa's* (his Country-houses:) but where is the man that Emulates his Virtue? There must

Fit the House to the Master,

Keep the Expence within Compass.

be a *Meane* observ'd in These things, and that Moderation must be transferr'd, in all Cases, to the Use, Ornament, and Convenience of Life. But enough of This.

*Three Rules
for all Un-
dertakings.*

IN all Undertakings there are three things to be observ'd. *First*, That we govern our Appetites by *Reason*, which is a sure way to keep us to our Duties. *Secondly*, That we take a right Estimate of our Enterprizes, and allow Time, and Pains, neither more nor less than the matter requires. *Thirdly*, That we keep a 'Measure, even in those things that are matter of Dignity, and Reputation. We cannot do better, than to observe the *Decorum* already spoken of, without moving one step beyond it. But the First point is the most Excellent of the Three.

*The Deco-
rum of
Place and
Time.*

*Order de-
fin'd.*

WE come now to the *Order of Things*, and the *Opportunity of Seasons*. Under this Science is comprehended that which the *Greeks* call 'Eutaξία, by which we understand the *Harmony of Order*: and not *That Modesty* that regards *Temperament*, and *Measure*. Now to take it as *Modesty*; the *Stoical Definition* of it is This, *It is the skill of disposing all our Words, and Actions, in their Proper Place*. So that the *Ordering* of things, and the *placing* of them, are much one and the same: for they define *Order* to be only the *laying together of things in their due, and fitting places*. But they tell us, that the *Place of Action* respects the *Opportunity of Time*: Now That *seasonable Time of Action*, the *Greeks* call 'Euxaξία, the *Latins*, *Occasio*. So that *This Modesty*, taken in the sense aforesaid, is the *Knowledge of the Opportunities of Times fit for Action*. Which is

a definition that may as well agree with the *Prudence* which we have treated of in the beginning. But in this place we are discoursing of *Moderation*, *Temperance*, and Virtues of that quality. Wherefore having lodg'd these matters which particularly belong to *Prudence*, in their Right places; we come now to those Virtues that refer to *Modesty*, and the Gaining of a Good opinion, and Esteem in the World: of which we have spoken largely.

IT should be in the *Order of Life*, as in That *Indecencies*
of an *Artificial*, and well govern'd *Discourse*. *in respect of*
All the *Parts* of it should be *Equal*, and *Cor-* *Time and*
respondent one to another. Many things do well *Place.*
enough over a Glasse of Wine, that would be most
ridiculous and shameful, upon a Debate. There
should be no fooling in serious matters. It was
well said of *Pericles*, at a Council of War, to
his Colleague *Sophocles*; that was joyned with
him in the Command of the Army. As they were
upon a Consultation, there happened to pass by,
a very fine Youth, *What a delicate Child is there?*
(says *Sophocles*, in the middle of the Debate.)
Brother, (says *Pericles*) *a Generals Eyes, should*
be as Temperate as his Fingers. But if the same
thing had been spoken at a publique Spectacle,
nothing could have been said against it; so power-
ful is the Consideration of *Time* and *Place*. If a
man were upon a *Journey*, and going to Plead a
Cause, no body would blame him for thinking
of his Bus'ness, and conning of his Lesson, by
the way; but That pensive, musing humour, at
a Jolly Entertainment, would be looked upon,
to be either want of Wit, or Breeding, in the
not distinguishing of Times. Now for things
F 2 which

The Niceties of Conversation.

which are very gross, as for a man to fall a Singing in a Court of Justice; or to do any thing that is notoriously preposterous, or improper: These are absurdities so well understood by all people, that there needs no Precept, or Caution, in the Case. But there are certain Niceties of Conversation, which are indeed so minute, that *some* make slight of them; and *others* do not so much as perceive them. And yet these are the Points that require our most diligent consideration. For as it is in Musical Instruments, let them be never so little out of Tune, a skilful Ear presently takes Cheque at it: and that's the Case in the least disconsonancy of Life. Only the Offence is so much the Greater here, by how much the *Agreement* of our *Actions*, and *Manners* is of greater *value*, and *effect*, than a *Consent* of *Sounds*. Wherefore, as there is no Jarre, or Discord in Musique, so small, as to scape the animadversion of a Critical Ear; no less quick and accurate ought we to be in Censuring, and Detecting the Venial Errors of Life: Being led to the knowledge of the greatest matters, even by the smallest. From the Motion of the Eye, from a Smooth, or a Contracted Brow; from Sadness, Mirth, Laughter, Speech, Silence, nay from the very Tone of Soft, or Loud speaking; and a thousand such Common Circumstances, we gather the understanding of Humane Duties; and of what Naturally becomes us, and what the Contrary.

By Observing others we may Reform our selves.

NOW toward the Erecting of a true Judgment upon things in This Kind, it were not amiss for us to begin our Observations *abroad*: And then to Avoid, or Correct That in our *selves*, which

which we find misbecoming in *Others*. For so it is, (I cannot tell how it comes about) that we are much better at spying out our *Neighbours Faults*, than our *Own*: and therefore it is a good and a Profitable Method, the teaching of Children to do better, by shewing them in imitation how ill it becomes them to do amiss. In Cases doubtful, and hard to be resolv'd upon, it will behove us to consult men of Learning, and Experience, for Direction. Now it is very Natural for men to follow the Byass of their proper Inclinations. So that we are not only to attend to what any body *says*; but likewise to what he *Thinks*; and even to the very Motive that leads him to That Thought. For as it is with Painters, Statuaries; nay, and with Right Poets too; They love to have their Works expos'd, and, as the World finds fault, to mend them. They take advice upon what's amiss, both with Themselves and their Friends, and are induc'd to the doing, or not doing; to the Changing, or Correcting of many things by the Opinion of Others. But for what concerns Customs, and Civil Institutions, there can be no place there for the prescribing, where the matter it self is a Precept. Neither let a man so much deceive himself, as to imagine that the Example of *Socrates*, for the purpose, or *Aristippus*, in the saying, or doing of any ill thing against Rules of Government, must presently authorize him to the same Licence: For This Liberty, in those Great and Divine men, we are to look upon as a privilege purchas'd by their Virtues. Now for the *Cyniques* (those Enemies of *Shame*, and consequently of *Honesty*, and *Virtue*) there's no enduring of them. To Magistrates, and Persons in Authority, we are

*Great Vir-
tues are a
Privilege
to some
Mistakes.*

to pay all Honour, and Reverence, and so likewise to all those worthy Patriots that have spent their Lives in Great, and Honest Actions; and in the service of their Country. We owe a respect also to Grey hairs, and even to Those that are but design'd to any Administration in the Government. We must distinguish betwixt a Citizen and a Stranger, and even in a Stranger, betwixt a Private Person, and a Publique. But to
A General Duty. sum up all in a word, it is our Duty to Cherish, Maintain, and Preserve Unity, Peace, and Good Agreement, in Humane Society.

WE come now to the matter of *Trade*, and *Profit*, which we find to be divided into *Liberal*, (or in *Vulgar English*, *Creditable*) and *Sordid*. There are some *Painful Employments* that carry along with them a *General Odium*; as that of a *Tax gatherer*, or an *Usurer*. These, in the first
Of Trade. which is either for- did. place, I do not like; and I do also look upon all *Mercenary Dealings*, where we pay for the *Work*, and not for the *Art*, to be *Meane*, and *Ignoble*. The very Price of the *Commodity* is a kind of *Covenanting for Slavery*. It is also a *Course Business*, That of a *Retailer*, that only buys in a Lump, to sell again in Parcels: For they get their very Bread commonly by Lying; which is a most Unmanly submission. And to for all *Mechaniques*, they are men of Low, and *Vulgar business*, and we are not to expect any thing that is Clear, and Generous, from the Shop. I am likewise with *Terence*, no friend to those Trades that Minister to Luxury; as *Fishermen*, *Butchers*, *Cooks*, *Pudding-makers*, *Fishmongers*; nor to the *Voluptuous Arts*, as *Perfumers*, *Dancing-masters*, and the whole *Mystery of Gaming*. But
And Voluptuary. for

for those Professions that require a greater measure of *Prudence*, and Minister *Advantage* in proportion; as *Physique*, *Architecture*, the furnishing of *Good Instructions*; These are commendable Employments, where they suit with the Condition of him that uses them. And then for *Merchandizing*, the driving of a *petty Trade*, That way, is little better than *Pedling*. But when it comes to be *Large*, and *General*, and to be menag'd back and forward, with *Candor*, and *Credit*: it is no contemptible Application. Nay, on the Contrary, This way of Commerce is highly to be esteem'd; when he that has made his Fortune by it, sits down (not sariated, but) contented; and retires as well from his *Port*, to the *Country*, as he has done many a time from the *Sea* to the *Port*, and there quietly enjoys himself, and his Possessions. Of all *Beneficial Industry*, Certainly there is not any thing more Agreeable, or more Worthy of a Man of *Honour*, and *Reason*, than the *Culture* and *Emprovement* of the *Earth*; which being a Subject handled at large in our *Cato Major*, we shall refer you thither for your satisfaction.

Or of *Candour* and *Credit*.

HERE is enough said already upon the *several* parts of *Virtue*, and our Duties arising from thence. It remains now to consider in a Case of *two Duties* before us, *which to chuse*: (a thing that often happens) and of *Two honest Propositions*, which is the *Honester*, is the Question: (a Point omitted by *Panatinus*.) For since there is *no Virtue*, but what issues from One of these *four Fountains*, and has a respect either to *Knowledge*, *Society*, *Courage*, or *Moderation*; it must necessarily be, that upon a *Complication* of these

Of *Two Duties*, which to *Chuse*.

Virtues, there must likewise ensue a *Competition* of *Duties*. Now it is my *Opinion*, that Mankind is *Naturally* more concerned in *Offices* that relate to the *Community*, than in matters that only affect the *Understanding*; which may be thus made out. Take a wise man, that has the *World* at Will, both for *Fortune*, and *Leisure*; let him consider with himself, and contemplate all things whatsoever, that are worth the *Knowing*. He would be yet sick of his *Life*, for all this, if he were to spend his time wholly in *solitude*, and without a *Companion*.

Wisdom is
the principal
Virtue.

THE Principal Virtue is (as I have said) That, which the *Greeks* call σοφία, and *We*, *Wisdom*. But their φρόνησις (or *Prudence*) is quite Another thing; being the skill of *Judging* what we are to do, and what not: Or of distinguishing betwixt Good and Evil. Whereas *Wisdom* (which we call the Principal) is the *Knowledge* of things *Divine* and *Humane*: wherein is comprehended a certain Correspondence betwixt the *Gods*, and *Men*, and a *Society* among Themselves. Now if This be the most Eminent *Virtue*, as Certainly it is: So must that likewise be the most Eminent *Duty*, which refers to *Community*. For the *Speculation* and *Perception* of things, is but lame and imperfect, if it be not follow'd with *Action*; which *Action* is best seen, in providing for the *Common Benefits* of *Mankind*: And must therefore be reduced to the Subject of *Humane Society*; in preference to the naked *Understanding* of things. And this does every Good man find to be True, upon his Own *Practice*, and *Observation*. For where's the man, that is so transported with a *Thirst* of *Knowledge*; or a desire of

of piercing into the Nature of things, that if he should be call'd upon the suddain, to the Relief of his Country, his Father, or his Friend, that were in danger : Where is the Man (I say) that in the heat and rapture of his most Divine Contemplations, would not quit All, to attend this Duty, even supposing him to be in his Thoughts already numbring the Stars, and taking measure of the Universe ? This gives us to understand, that the Offices of *Justice*, conducing to the Common Utility of Mankind (than which nothing ought to be dearer to us) are of so much greater importance, than these of *Study*, and *Science* ; and never was any man so taken up in his Life, and Application, with the search of Knowledge, as not yet to have an Eye to his Duty to the Publicque ; and to Consult the well-being of Sociable Nature : As we see in the Instance of *Lycias* the *Pythagorean*, to the *Theban Epaminondas* ; and in That of *Pluto*, to *Dion of Syracuse* ; and divers others that train'd up their Disciples to the Love, Knowledge, and Exercise of Civil Duties. And for the service, (if any at all) which I my self have render'd to the *Republique*, I must ascribe it to my Masters, and to my Books, that instructed, and fitted Me for my Function. For great men do not only teach the Lovers of Learning during their *Lives* ; but in their very *Graves* too : Transmitting their Precepts down to after times, for the Use of Posterity. Now to shew how much Their Leisures contributed to our Business ; These Eminent men have not slippt so much as any one point appertaining to the Laws, Manners, and Discipline of the Commonwealth ; but have still, with all their Faculties, applyed the Fruits of their Labours and Studies,

Justice
more va-
luable than
Science.

*Our Coun-
try in the
first place.*

to the well-being of the publique. So that a Copious Eloquence, joyned with Prudence, is much more profitable, than the most refin'd subtilty of *Thought*, without *speaking*. For *Meditation* does only *Circulate* within it self; Whereas *Eloquence* works upon *Others*, and Insinuates it self into the Affections of all that hear it. We must not imagine that *Bees* gather into Swarms, upon a design to make their *Cells*, but it is in their Nature to *Congregate*, and then they work their *Combs*. And so it is with *Men*, who are much more Sociable by Nature; when they are gotten together, they Consult their Common business. Now for That Virtue (of *Justice*) which provides for the Defence, and Conversation of Men in Society; if it be not accompanied with the *Understanding* of Things, it is but *solitary*, and *Fruitless*. And what is *Courage*, without the softness of Humane *Courtesie*, and *Candour*, but a *Savage*, and *Outragious Brutality*? From hence we may infer the Excellency of a *Practical Justice*, in the Ordering of *Mankind*; above the force, and effect of a *Speculative Notion*. There are some people that Phansie all Leagues and Associations amongst men, to arise from the need that one man has for another, toward the supplying of our Natural, and Common Necessities: because (say They) if Providence had deliver'd us from This Care of Looking after Food, and Cloathing, by appointing some Extraordinary way for the furnishing of it; no man, of either Brains, or Virtue, would ever trouble his head about Business; but wholly deliver himself up to the attaining of Wisdom. But This is a mistake: For even in That Condition, a man would fly Solitude, and wish for a Companion in his very Studies:

*Leagues
are more
for Society
than De-
fence.*

Studies: he would be willing to Teach, and to Learn; to Hear, and to Speak. So that beyond question, the Duties that defend, and support men in Society, are more to be esteem'd than those, that barely relate to Learning, and Knowledge.

IT may be another Question whether *This* *Justice and Temperance compar'd.* Community which is so Consonant to Nature, be in all Cases to be preferr'd to *Modesty*, and *Moderation*. Now I think Not. For there are some things, partly so foul, and in part so flagitious, that a wise man (even if it were to save his Country) would not be guilty of them. *Po-fidonius* has made a large Collection of such Cases: But so filthy, so obscene, that a man cannot honestly repeat them. Now why should any man do that for the saving of his Country, which his Country it self would rather perish, than any member of it should do? But however, this is the best on't; that it can never be for the Interest of the *publique*, to have a wise man do any such thing. Let it be therefore concluded, that of All Duties we are to prefer those that tend toward the Maintaining of Society. For a *Considerate Action* presumes an *Antecedent Cognition*, and *Wisdom*. So that it is more to *Do Considerately*, than to *Think Wisely*. But let This suffice; for the matter is made so plain, that there will be no difficulty to resolve upon *Two Duties in question*, which to *Chuse*. But then in the Community it self, there are several *Degrees of Duties.* Degrees of Duties, in subordination one to another. The *First* is what we owe to the Immortal Gods; the *Second*, to our Country; the *Third*, to our Parents, and so in Order, successively,

Tully's Offices.

cessively, to Others. Upon a Brief Disquisition of This matter, it will appear that the point in debate, is not only which is *honest*, and which the *Contrary* : but of *Two honest propositions* ; which is the *Honestest* ; and then, which is the *Honestest of All*. This (as I have said) was slipst by *Panatius* ; but let us now proceed.

The End of the First Book.

TULLY's

TULLY's OFFICES.

The Second BOOK.

IN What manner Duties arise from Virtue, and from every distinct Branch of it, is sufficiently explained, (as I conceive) in the Former Book. It remains now (my Son *Marcus*) that we proceed upon some certain sorts of Duty, that have a regard to the Splendor and Ornament of Life: As to Riches, Power; and a Competent provision of things Commodious for the Use of Man. The matter in question was, (as I told you) *First* what is Profitable, and what not. *Secondly*, What is more Profitable, Comparatively with that which is Less: And *Lastly*, What's most Profitable of All things, without Comparison. You have here the Subject of This Treatise: But before I enter upon the Discourse it self, I must give you a word or two of my Purpose, and Intention.

The Subject of This Book,

THERE are a great many I know that have been excited, by my Books, to the Love of Letters: And to the love, not only of Reading, but of Writing also: And yet Philosophy has gotten

The Introduction.

so

so Ill a Name in the World, (verily with some good men too) that I am afraid sometimes, of hazzarding my Credit with them ; for bestowing so much Time, and Labour upon This Study. But truly, for my Own part, so long as the Management of Publique Affairs pass through those hands, to which the Commonwealth had deliver'd up it self : All my Thoughts, and Cares were directed That way, But when One man came to Grasp all, and that there was no longer Any place for Authority, or Counsel, (those Publique-spirited men being gone too, that had been my Partners in the Charge of the Government) It was not for me, either on the One hand, to abandon my self to an Anxious, and irksome Melancholy ; or, on the other, to plunge my self into Pleasures, below the Dignity of my Profession. Oh ! that the Republique might have continu'd still in the Former state, without falling into those hands ; that sought, not so much the Change of Affairs, as the Total Ruine of them. For if the Commonwealth were Now standing, I should be doing at this instant just as I did before. First, my Bus'ness would lie more at the Bar, than in my Study ; and Secondly, I should now be setting down my Pleadings, as formerly, instead of these Morals : But since the Dissolution of the Government, that took up all my Cares, my Thoughts, my Studies ; There's no more Law, or Senate-Employment. Matters being brought to This Pass, (and 'tis not for any man that has a Soul, to sit still, and do nothing) What could I better do, than to betake my self to my Philosophy ; My First Study, and the most Innocent, the Honestest Diversion of my Troubles ? It was the Institution

tion of my Youth ; and I spent a great deal of Time upon't : Till I came afterward to push my Fortune in the World, for Offices, and Preferments ; and then I dedicated my self wholly to the Government : But still reserving Those hours for philosophy, which I had to spare from the Publique, and my Friends ; and Those very hours were spent in Reading too ; for I had no Leisure to Write. The Calamity of those Times was Extreme : and yet we have drawn This Benefit from it, that we are now at Liberty to commit those things to Letters, which our Countrymen were very little acquainted with, tho' in themselves infinitely worth the Knowing. For (*in the name of all the Gods !*) *What is more desirable than Wisdom ? more Excellent ; more useful to a man ? or what more worthy of him ?* We call the Lovers of it, *Philosophers*, from the very *Etymon* of the word : For *Philosophy*, by Interpretation, is only *the Love of wisdom*. The Antients defin'd it to be *the Science of things Divine and Humane ; and of their Causes*. What will any man speak well of, I wonder, that reproaches this Study ? if he seeks either the Delight of his Mind, or the allaying of his cares, this is the Study that does it Incomparably above all others : For it furnishes him, every day, with something or other, toward Attaining, and Enjoying a Virtuous, and a Happy Life. If Virtue, or an Unshaken constancy, be his Business, it is either to be compassed This way, or not at all. There is not any thing so small, but there goes Art, and Application toward the acquiring of it : And shall any man be so mad then, as to think that there needs none toward the most Important Acquisition of our Lives ? But if there
be

*The Praise
of Philo-
sophy.*

An Objection
on answer-
ed.

be any Discipline of Virtue, where shall we look for it ; if we depart from This way of finding it out ? This Question, as it falls properly under another *Topique*, So we have handled it in another place ; and more accurately too ; That is to say, in our Exhortations to Philosophy. My present purpose is only to set forth, that having nothing any longer to do, in the Government, I made choice of This Subject for my private Entertainment. But I must expect to be here encounter'd, and that by some of the Learned too, with a charge of contradicting my self. For how does it consist, say they, the entring upon *Disputes*, and delivering *Precepts of Duty*, as things *Certain* ; and yet at the same time, to maintain that we have *no certain Knowledge of any thing* ? I should be glad to be a little better understood ; For I am none of those Roving, Wandring heads, that Live, and Live on ; without proposing to themselves any Scope, or Design. How Miserable were That mans mind, or rather his Life, that should be debarr'd the Use of his Reason, not only in the matter of Argument, but in the main End of his Being ? Now for those Points which Others Divide, into *Certain*, and *Uncertain* ; it pleases me better, that they should be distinguished by calling them *Probable*, or *Improbable*. And what should hinder me now from Embracing the One, and disallowing the Other ? provided that I keep my self from being either Arrogantly positive ; or Rash and Inconsiderate ; Two qualities that hold no fellowship with Wisdom. But our people, on the Other side, will dispute every thing : For (say they) without comparing *Both parts*, how shall any man know which is the *Right* ? But This
matter

matter (I suppose) is sufficiently clear'd, in our *Academical Questions*. Now for You, (my Son) tho' you have been train'd up in the most Ancient, and Noble sort of Philosophy, and under the Institution of *Cratippus*; (an Author not inferiour to the most Venerable Founders of it) I would not have you a Stranger yet to your Fathers Writings, which you will not find much differing from your Own. But now to the Point.

WE have, for methods sake, made a Distribution of *Humane Duties* into *Five Parts*; *Two*, upon the Points of *Decency*, and *Virtue*; *Two* more, with a respect to the *Commodiousness of Life*; as *Power*, *Wealth*, &c. And a *Fifth*, with a regard to our *Election*, rather of *One*, than *Another*, when *several things*, either *Good*, or *Profitable*, meet in *Competition*. We have already gone through the First Branch of this Division, which I must recommend to your particular Attention, and Study. The Point now in hand is That which we call *Profitable*: A word, which by the Corruption of *Time*, and *Custom*, is perverted insensibly to the signification of somewhat that may be separated from *Honesty*: as if any thing could be *Profitable*; that were not *Honest*, or any thing *Honest*, without being *Profitable*; an Error of the most pernicious consequence imaginable to the Life of man. These Three Points, how confused soever they may appear to be, are yet by Philosophers of great Authority, very judiciously, and ingenuously distinguished in the Imagination: concluding in This, that *whatsoever is Profitable, is Honest, and whatsoever is Honest, is Profitable*: And

The Distribution of the whole Work.

The Word Profitable is Corrupted.

Profitable and Honest are Con-
verrible
Terms.

Craft mis-
taken for
Wisdom.

consequently that whatsoever is *either* of them, is the *Other*. From the not understanding of this matter aright, it comes often to pass, that we have a Cunning, Artificial sort of People, in great Admiration: mistaking *Craft*, for *Wisdom*. This Opinion is by all means to be rooted out from among men; and this following persuasion erected in the stead of that, there is no compassing the end we aim at, by Fraudulent, and Indirect Courses, but only by just Dealings; and honest Counsels.

Things In-
animate.

Animate.

Unreason-
able.

Reasonable

One man is
the greatest
Benefit or
Mischief
to another.

The Neces-
sity of Mu-
tual Help
and Society.

NOW the things appertaining to Conveniencies for the Life of man, are either *Inanimate*, as *Gold*, *Silver*, *Minerals*, and the productions of the *Earth*; or *Animated*, and indu'd with *Impulse*, and *Appetite*; And those again are divided, into *Unreasonable*, and *Reasonable*. Of the former kind, we may reckon *Horses*, *Oxen*, and other sorts of *Cattle*; *Bees*, &c. whose labour Contributes in some measure, to the Use and Necessities of Life: and then for *Reasonable*, we may account the *Gods*, and *Men*. By Piety and Holiness, we make our selves acceptable to the *Gods*; but in the next place to the *Gods* themselves, it is in the power of Men to render themselves most Beneficial to one another. And those things which may be hurtful, or Injurious to us, do fall likewise under the same Division. But in This Case the *Gods* are excepted; as presuming that they will do us no harm. So that the greatest mischief that we are liable to, is from one another. For the very *Inanimate* things we spake of, are most of them, the Effects of Humane Industry and Labour. There goes a great deal of Work, and Art, to the very preparing of

of them ; and then there must be Humane Application to the *Using* of them : For neither Physique, Navigation, Tillage, the Reaping and Gathering of our Corn, and Fruits, or the Conservation of them, could be effected without the labour of *Man*. There would be no Exporting what we have to spare, or Importing what we want, without the mutual Help one of another. How should we fetch up Stones out of the Quarries for our necessary use : or Iron, Brasses, Gold, Silver, out of the Bowels of the Earth, without Labour, and the Hands of men ? whence came our Houses, at First, to defend us from the Injuries of Heat and Cold ? or How should we afterward have Repaired, or Rebuilt them, when they come to be laid in Ruines, either by Tempest, Earthquakes, or even by Age it self : If the Obligations and Necessities of Humane Societies, had not mov'd us to call for Help, one of another ? Our *Aquaducts*, our *Canals* for the turning of Rivers, and flowing of our Grounds, our Sea Banks, our forced Ports, and Harbours, are they not all of them the Effect of Manual Operation and Industry ? From these Instances, and a thousand more, it appears undeniably that the very advantages which we receive even from Inanimate things would be totally lost to us ; but for That Labour and Endeavor that gives us Profit of them : and to which we are likewise indebted for the Benefits that we receive even from Beasts themselves. It was undoubtedly the Invention of man too ; the Application of them to the Use of Mankind ; nor can we at this day either Feed, Reclaim, or Preserve, what we have occasion for, or make our Best of their Service, without the Assistance of one another.

other. Is it not by the help of Men, that we destroy those Creatures that are hurtful to us ; and take others, that we may be the better for ? What should I speak of those Innumerable Arts, without which we are little better than *Dead, Living* ? What *Cure* for the *Sick* ? What delight for the *Sound* ? What *Food*, or *Clothing*, without the help of *Arts*, and *Trades*, to supply us ? This is it that furnishes, and Sweetens Humane Life ; and in our manner of Feeding, and Covering, raises us above the Condition of Beasts. How should *Cities* have been either *built*, or *peopled* without *Correspondence*, and *Commerce* ? And hence come *Laws*, and *Customs*, the *Equal* and *Universal Bounds* of *Common Right*, for the *Comfort*, and *Regulation* of our *Lives*. And this Communication produces *Gentleness* of *Manners*, and *Modesty*, and This is it that supports us in a State of Security, and furnishes us in all our Wants, by the Intercourse of Giving, and Receiving, and by the Exchange of Good Offices, and Conveniences. A great deal of this might have been spar'd ; For it is clear to every man, That which *Panatus* has so much enlarg'd upon ; Which is, that never any Prince or General, either in War, or in Peace, achiev'd any Great, and profitable Exploit, without the Concurrence of Humane Aid. He makes his Instances in *Themistocles*, *Pericles*, *Cyrus*, *Agessilaus*, *Alexander* ; who could never have done those mighty things (he says) without the help of Others. But there was no necessity of Witnesses in so evident a matter. Now as the Advantages are very Great, which we receive by Communication, and Agreement ; So there is no Mischief so detestable, which one man

does

The great
Mischiefs
are from
one man to
another.

does not bring upon another. *Dicaearchus*, a Famous, and an Eloquent *Peripatetique*, has written an express Tract of the Destruction of Men. He summs up all the Fatalities of Mankind; as *Inundations*, *Plagues*, *Desolations*; the sudden *Inursions* of *Wild Beasts*, and *Serpents*, which, according to his Relation, have sometimes devour'd whole Nations: and all This, (he says) is as nothing, to the Calamities, that by *War*, and *Seditions*, we have brought one upon another. Now since it is without dispute, that we are the Authors both of great Good, and of great Evil, among our selves, it must be the Business, as it is the Property of Virtue, so to mould and fashion mens minds, as to Create in them, Inclinations of Contributing toward the Common good of Mankind. Now for those Benefits, that we receive from things without Life, or in what kind soever, in the use and ordering of Beasts; they are properly *Mechanical*: and the Works of the *Body*, rather than of the *Mind*. But those Studies, that fit, and dispose us for the Improvement of our Fortunes, are excited by the Prudence and Virtue of excellent Men: For almost all Virtue moves upon These *Three Points*. First, the *Accurate Perception* of every thing in its *Naked Truth* and *Simplicity*; in the Correspondence of Circumstances, and the Consequences of things, with the Rise and Causes of them. Secondly, the Moderating of our *Passions*, and *Appetites*, (which the *Greeks* call *πάθος*, and *ἐπιθυμία*) and subjecting them to the Government of Reason. The *Third*, is, the Skill of managing our *Conversation* with so much *Courtesie*, and *Discretion*, as to gain the kindness and assistance of our Acquaintance, toward the

Of Prudence and Virtue.

furnishing of us with all things that our Nature requires, in competency and plenty; Defending and Protecting us from Violence, revenging our selves upon those that affront us, by inflicting such punishments only as may stand with Humanity, and Justice. As to the Means, and Faculty both of Making Friends, and Keeping them, (which we shall speak of in due Time, and Place) only a word, in passage.

*The Power
of Fortune.*

*Unhappy
Casualties.*

WE are all of us sensible of the Power of *Fortune*, in the matter of *Prosperity*, and *Adversity*: When she gives us a Fair Gale, our Course is smooth, and gentle; till we arrive at our desired Port. But when the Wind blows strong against us, we are fain to beat it out, under a thousand hazards. Now there are some Casualties, less frequent than Others: which are commonly ranged under the Dominion of *Fortune*. First, from things *Inanimate*, as *Storms*, *Tempests*, *Shipwracks*, *Ruines*, *Conflagrations*; from *Beasts*, as *Stroaks*, *Bitings*, *Trampling under foot*, &c. These are *Accidents*, as I said, that fall not out often. But the Routing of *Armies*; (as of no less than Three lately:) the Loss of *Brave Commanders*, (one Incomparable Person but the other day) the *Envy* of the *Multitude*, and a World of Gallant, and Deserving Men, by *Prescriptions*, *Imprisonments*, and forced *Escapes*, sacrific'd to *Popular Malice*: And on the *Other Side*, *Honours*, *Empire*, *Victory*; tho' these things are All look'd upon as *Fortuitous*; yet neither the *One*, nor the *Other* come to pass, without the Interposition of Labour and Industry. Now since thus it is; let us consider by what fair Means we may make such Interests, and

and Friendships in the World, as may turn to our Advantage. If you shall think the Discourse over-long; compare it with the Dignity of the Subject, and perhaps you'll come to wish there had been more on't.

WHAT good Office soever one Man does for Another, whether in the matter of Fortune, or Credit, he does it either upon the Account of *Good Will*, and *Personal Affection*; or of *Respect*, as wishing well to the Advancement of his Fortune, out of a Veneration for his *Virtue*: Or *else*, upon the score of *Trust*, and *Confidence* in him: as one that is able to give us good *Advice*: Or *otherwise*, out of *fear*, perchance, of his *Power*. Or in hope of a *Reward*: (as it is common for Princes, and Popular pretenders, to scatter their *Donatives*.) Or *Lastly*; Many Men are mov'd by the bare Obligation of *Money*, and *Reward*. The *foulest*, and the *basest* of all *Considerations*, both to Him that *entertains* the Address, and to the Other, that *makes* it. For Matters are at an Ill pass, when that which should be obtain'd by *Virtue*, is attempted by *Money*. But since there is, many times, a *Necessity* of *That Provision*, we will give some Directions for the *Using* of it. Only something must be said in the First place, of Those Things that have a Nearer Affinity with *Virtue*. There are several Reasons for which One Man puts himself under the *Power*, and *Government* of Another; Either *Affection*, *Obligations*, *Excellency* of *Endowments*, *Hope* of *Profit*; *Fear* of being *forc'd* to't: Or Men are Inveigled by *Liberal Promises*; or in fine, by *Corruption*, and *Reward*, which we find to be a common case in our *Republique*.

The Grounds of Honor and Esteem in the World.

Mercenary Natures.

*Love is the
best Security of
Power.*

*Hatred is
the certain
effect of
Fear.*

THERE is nothing that *secures Power*, and *Greatness*, like *Love*; Nothing that *endangers* it, like *Fear*. Wherefore *Ennius* says very well, *He that is Fear'd, is Hated; and they that hate a Man, wish him Dead*. But when it comes once to a *General Hatred*, there is no force that is able to encounter it: As we have found by late, and dear Experience, even if the thing had been unknown to us before. And it is not only in the Violent Death of that *Tyrant, Caesar*, (whom this Oppressed City was forc'd to bear, for want of Power to make Resistance: But we may read it also in the common fate of other Oppressours; scarce any of them coming to a Natural End. *Fear* is a *False, and short-liv'd Security*; but *Love* on the contrary, and *Benevolence*, are Firm, even to the *Death*. In the Case of a *Conquer'd People*, I must confess, if nothing else will keep them in Order; I should advise the same Rigour, and Authority to be exercis'd over them, that a *Master* uses over his *Servants*. But for any Man to pursue the same course in a *Free City*, of making himself *Fear'd*, were a direct Madness. For let the Laws be never so much Opprest, by *Might*, and *Faction*, and the very Foundations of the Common Liberty shaken, there will be secret contrivances yet, private Consultations, and Inrolling of Parties; that will some time or other put Life again into the Government. For Men are more sensible of the Want of Liberty, than of the Enjoyment of it. Let us therefore imbrace that which most conduces, not only to our *Security*, but also to *Wealth*, and *Power*. The Ready way to the attaining of our Desires, either in *Publicque Affairs*, or in *Private*, is, to
cast

cast out Fear, and to preserve and maintain Charity. For whosoever would be Fear'd, must necessarily be afraid himself of all that are afraid of him. What shall we think of the condition of the *First Dionysius*, under the horrour and the torture of his Terroures? that singed his very Beard, because he would not venture his Throat under the hand of a Barber? Or of *Alexander the Pheraan*; that durst not trust himself with his beloved *Thebe*, without a *Barbarian*, a branded Slave, with his drawn Sword, for his Conductor; and his Guards sent before him to search all the Womens Boxes, even to their very Clothes and Linnen, for conceal'd Poyards, or other dangerous Weapons; before he durst venture himself only from his Table, into his Bedchamber? O miserable wretch, that could put more confidence in a *Stigmatiz'd Barbarian*, than in his own Wife! But his Fears fell upon him, for she kill'd him with her Own Hand, upon the jealousy of a private *Amour*. Nor is there any Power under Heaven that can long maintain it self against a pressing, and an Universal Fear. And this we may see in the Example of *Phalaris*; a Tyrant celebrated for his Cruelty: who was cut off, not like the *Pheraan Alexander*, by secret Treachery; nor yet like *Our Caesar*, by a particular band of Conspirators: But he was put to Death, by the Unanimous Outrage of the Citizens of *Agrigentum*; in the very Market-place. Did not the *Macedonians* abandon *Demetrius*, and go over as one Man, to *Pyrrhus*? Were not the *Lacedaemonians*, for their Iniquity, and Mis-government, almost totally deserted by their *Allies*, at that fatal Battle of *Leutra*? where they stood looking on, as Idle Specta-

The Condition and Fate of Tyrants.

The End of Phalaris.

Rome was
formerly
the Sanctu-
ary of the
Oppressed.

The Mis-
eries that be-
fel Rome
for Cruelty
and Inju-
stice.

Spectators, till the *Lacedamonians* were wholly routed, and cut to pieces. I had rather make use of Foreign Instances, than Domestique upon This Subject : But This however let me say, so long as the Government of *Rome* was influenc'd by Principles of *Gentleness*, more than of *Violence* : so long as they fought only for their *Friends*, or for *Empire* ; the Issue of the War was either a Generous Mercy, or at worst, no manner of Unnecessary Rigour. The Senate of *Rome* was in those days the Haven, the Sanctuary of Oppressed Kings, people, and Nations : And the Magistrates and Captains of Those Times, had no Other Ambition, no Other Pique of Glory in prospect, than to defend their Provinces, and to support their Associates with Truth and Equity : so that *Rome* did rather affect the *Patronage* of the whole World, than the *Empire* of it. This custom, and Discipline began sometimes since by little and little to decline ; but after the Victory of *Sylla*, it was totally extinct : And in Truth, it would not have lookt well after such Barbarities exercis'd upon the *Citizens Themselves*, to have kept Touch in any point of Faith and Justice, with their *Allies*. Here was a Glorious Cause attended with a most Impious, and Shameful *Victory*. The Goods of so many Honest, Worthy, and Eminent Citizens expos'd to Sale in the Market-place : And to heighten the Affront ; under the very Title of *Sylla's Booty*. There was another that came after him ; whose Cause it self was bad , and yet made fouler by the Victory. For not only the Goods of particular Citizens, but whole Nations and Countries, by One common Act of Calamity, were here upon *Auction* ; and after infinite Vexations,
and

and Ruines wrought abroad, we liv'd to see the Image of *Marseilles* born in Triumph: *Marseilles*, I say, without which, we our selves could never have carry'd a Triumph beyond the *Alps*; and This was the condition too of the lost Empire. I might reckon up Histories without end, of our perfidious dealings with our *Allies*: but This One shall suffice; being the basest perhaps that ever the Sun look'd upon. Now this Judgment upon us is Just: For the Sufferance of many *Criminals* made way to the boundless Licence of *This One*; who has left a great many Heirs of his *Ambition*, tho' but few of his *Fortune*. And there shall never want either Disposition, or Matter, for a Civil War, so long as *Sylla's* Successes shall stand upon Record, for an Encouragement to desperate Wretches to enrich themselves by his Example. Those bloody, and prosperous Usurpations of *Sylla*; which, as they were formerly Acted in the *Dictatorship* of his near Kinsman, so they were now renew'd six and thirty years after, with more Outrage, and horror. He that had been but a *Clerk* under the former *Dictatorship*, was now prefer'd, in the *Latter*, to be *City-Treasurer*. Why should we expect now, ever to be quiet, when Sedition meets with such Rewards? 'Tis true, the Walls of the City are yet standing, and in Being, tho' in continual dread of the utmost of Extremities: But the Government it self is absolutely sunk already. And to return to my Subject, all these Calamities are fallen upon us, for making it our bus'ness rather to be Fear'd, than Belov'd. Now if the Power of *Rome* could not support it self under *Tyranny*, and *Oppression*; how should any particular person expect to escape? It is

*Prosperous
Cruelties
are dangerous
Presidents.*

suffici-

How to
gain a fair
Reputation
in the
World.

sufficiently made already appear, that the Bonds of *Love* are much stronger than those of *Fear*. We shall now debate upon the Fairest means of obtaining that Affection, which we so earnestly desire, with Honour and Justice. But we do not all of us stand in need of it alike: so that we must accommodate the Matter to every Mans condition, and course of Life; to see whether it be necessary to procure a General Esteem, or that the kindness of some few may do the business. We may however conclude upon This, as the First, and principal point: That we contract Faithful Friendships; and make acquaintances with those that Truly Love, and value us. And this is a *Common Medium*, almost indifferently, betwixt Great, and Small. And a Rule that holds with Both alike; not as if all men stood equally in need of Glory, and Reputation, but they are good Helps yet (whoever has them) toward the Gaining of Other advantages, and the making of Friendships: which in my *Lalius* I have expressly handled. And I have written two Books also upon the Subject of *Glory*; which yet I must touch over again, as a thing of great moment in the Conduct even of our most Important affairs.

What is
perfect
Glory.

WE are then arrived at the highest pitch of Glory, when we have gained These Three Points: The *Love*, the *Trust*, and the *Reverence* of the *People*: When we can hear them say; *That Man is worthy of Honour*. Now to speak Short, and plain; The Method is well nigh the same, of Ingratiating our selves with a *Single Person*, or with the *Multitude*. But yet there is another manner of address also, toward

toward the Influencing of the Minds, and good Will of the People, in our Favour.

TO speak in Order now, to the three Points before mentioned; Nothing works so much upon the Affections of the People, as *Liberality* or *Bounty*. And next to That, is a *Benevolent*, and *Generous Inclination*: even without the Means of expressing it in *Effects*. For the very *Fame* and *Opinion* of a Mans Frankness, Bounty, Justice, Faith: and briefly of all those Virtues that Contribute to the Sweetning, and Smoothing of our Manners, has a wonderful power over the hearts of the people. There is such a Charm in That *Gracefulness* and *Decorum*, which we have already Treated of, that the very Nature, and bare Appearance of it does move us strangely. Beside that as it receives its Lustre from the aforesaid Virtues; wherever we find those Virtues, we cannot but naturally have a good Inclination for the person that possesses them. These are the most powerful attractives of Love. Not but that there may be other motives also, tho' of less moment.

Bounty and Gentleness, work much upon the People.

AS to the Matter of *Trust* and *Credit*; if we can but get the Reputation of being *Prudent* and *Just*, our Business is done: For we have naturally a confidence in those that we think Wiser than our selves; In men of *Providence*, and *Fore-sight*, upon whom we may depend for our seasonable direction, and advice; as those that in Case of any difficulty, are able to help us out. This is the True, and Profitable *Wisdom*: As to the *Trust* now which we repose in *Just*, *Good*, and *Faithful* Men; we must

The Power of Justice and Prudence.

must not entertain so much as the least Suspicion in it, of Fraud, or Injury: These being the men into whose hands we do reasonably commit our Lives, our Children, and our Fortunes: But it is *Justice* yet, that creates the greater Confidence of the Two: For *Justice* may beget *Confidence*, without *Wisdom*; but *Wisdom* can do nothing without *Justice*. For take away the Opinion of a mans *Integrity*, and the more *Crafty*, and *Subtle* he is, by so much is he the more *Hateful*, and *Suspected*. *Justice*, and *Prudence* in *Conjunction*, will give a man what *Credit* he pleases; but taking them *Apart*, *Justice*, even without *Wisdom*, may do very much; but *Wisdom*, without *Justice*, is nothing Worth. Let not any man wonder now at my dividing for a man to be *Just*, and yet not *Prudent*; when the Philosophers are all agreed upon't (and my self too for one) that he that has one Virtue, has All. For it is One thing, the Nicety of hitting a Truth in a Philosophical Decision; and another thing to make a Discourse in Words accommodated to Vulgar acception: And that's my Intent in this place, when I say that one is *Valiant*, another *Good*, a third *Wise*. For these are popular Opinions, and must be clothed in Common and Popular Terms; which was also *Panatinus's* way of expressing himself. But to resume my purpose.

*Wisdom
without
Justice, is
Craft.*

THE Third point recommended toward the acquiring of Glory, is This: So to behave ourselves that people may hold us in Admiration, and account us Worthy of all honour. The Common people are Generally admirers of all things that

*Admiration
produces
Esteem.*

that are Great, and beyond their Understanding : And so they are in particular Cases too : Where they find more Good in a man than they expected. But where they phantasie any Virtues peculiar, and Extraordinary, they extol men to the Skies, and behold them with a kind of Veneration, despising, and villifying such, on the other side, as they find wanting either in Virtue, Strength, or Courage. But they cannot yet be said to *Despise* all that they have an *Ill Opinion* of. For there is a Lewd, Backbiting, Couzening, Quarrellsom Generation of men, which tho' they do exceedingly *Dislike*, they do not yet *Contemn* : For those Only are properly to be taken for *Contemptible*, that lead a *Lazy, Droning, Heedless Life* ; without any Benefit, either to Themselves, or Others. The Admirable Spirits are such as have the Repute of a Preeminence in Virtue ; and keep themselves not only from doing Mean and Dishonourable things, but clear even of those Vices, which others cannot easily resist. For by the Charms of pleasures, our Minds are Dissolv'd, and withdrawn from Virtue ; and we are as much discomposed and shaken, on the other hand, with the Burnings, and Tortures of Pain. It is a prodigious power that the Consideration of Life and Death, Riches and Poverty, has over the Weakness of Flesh and Bloud. But how Glorious then, and how Admirable must That Virtue be, that takes so absolute a possession of the Soul of man, in the Contemplation of Great and Honorable things ? As in that elevated state of mind, to make him look down upon all the Circumstances of Fortune, with *Indifference*, and *Scorn*. This Bravery of mind never fails of moving great Admiration : Especially

Great Virtue produces great Admiration.

As Magnanimity.

Justice.

Contempt
of money.

Especially accompany'd with *Justice*; which single Virtue constitutes the very Character of a *Good man*; and makes him wonderful in the Eyes of the people; and not without reason neither: For no man can be *Just*, that either Fears *Death*, *Pain*, *Banishment*, or *Poverty*; Or that Values before *Equity*, the Comforts that stand opposed to these Calamities. But the highest Veneration of all is paid to him that holds out against *Money*: And wheresoever they find such a man, they think they can never do enough for him. So that by *Justice* we gain all those points that lead to *Reputation*; As *Benevolence* by Obliging as many as we can; *Repute* and *Admiration*, by the *Contempt* and *Neglect* of those things which the greater part of the World pursues with *Greediness* and *Passion*.

The very
Opinion of
Justice
gives a man
ReputationJustice is
sacred, even
among
Thieves &
Pirates.

NOW in my Opinion, there is not any Design or Condition of Life wherein one man does not stand in need of Another; and especially, as to the matter of *Familiar Discourse*, and *Conversation*: which a body shall hardly find to his satisfaction, but under the appearance of an *honest man*. Nay, the very *Opinion* of *Justice* will stand a man in great stead, even in the strictest solitude, and retirement imaginable; and more perhaps in that State, than in any other, as living, in some sort, out of Protection; and more exposed to affronts; which, under the Notion of an Impious person, people will be forward enough to put upon him: And then for men of *Business* and *Commerce*, as Buying, Selling, Hiring, Letting, there can be no dealing without *Justice*. Nay so great is the force of it, that common Highway-men, and those that support themselves only

only upon Rapine, and Violence, cannot yet subſiſt without it. Inſomuch that if one Thief does but Steal from another of the ſame Troop, he's expell'd the Society, as a man of no Faith. And if the Captain of the Band ſhews but any partiality in the Diſtribution of the Booty, he is at leaſt deſerted by his Party, if it does not alſo coſt him his Life; For there is a Diſcipline even among Pirates themſelves: And their Laws are duly executed, and obey'd. *Theopompus* writes of an *Illyrian Robber*, (one *Bargulus*) that was celebrated for his Juſtice to his Partners, and made himſelf a great Fortune by't; but not ſo great a one yet as *Viriatius* the *Portugneſe*; of whoſe Power, and Courage ſome of our Armies, and Generals felt the ſad Effects; till the *Praetor Lalius* (ſurnamed the *Wiſe*) defeated and ſcattered his Forces; and finally put ſuch a *Cheque* to his Undertakings, that he left but little work for Thoſe to do that came after him. How great now muſt the force of Juſtice be in a Regular, and well order'd Government, which of it ſelf alone is able to Advance, and Eſtabliſh even a *Piratic Power*, without any other ſupport?

HERODOTUS tells us that the *Medians* Kings choſe for their Virtues. choſe their Kings Originally, for the Probity of their *Manners*, and in hope of enjoying the Benefits of *Common Juſtice*: Which I am perſuaded was the End, and Practice likewise of our Predeceſſors. For when in old time, the Weaker were Oppreſſed by the Stronger, the people preſently betook themſelves to one more Excellent than the reſt, for their Protector: And it was his part to relieve the diſtreſſed, and to make ſuch Proviſions, that common right might

be done Indifferently betwixt all Parties. And in the making of their *Laws*, they had the same Prospect, as in the choice of their *Kings*. The thing propounded, was an *Equal*, and a *Common Right*; and in Truth, it could be no Right, without being so qualify'd. If under the Administration of some *One man* that was *Just*, and *Good*, they attained that End, they were well contented There to rest: But in Case of failing, there were *Laws* Invented, which to all, under them, and at all times, should still pronounce one and the same sentence. This now is clear, that in all Elections, the people have still had a Care to pitch upon him for their *Governour*, that was most reverenc'd for his *Justice*: Always provided, that he were a Man of *Prudence* too. And what is it that a Nation would not believe it self able to compass, under so Auspicious a Conduct? We are therefore obliged to cherish, and to preserve *Justice*, by all manner of Means. *First*, for its Own sake, (for otherwise it were not *Justice* ;) And *Secondly*, for the Augmentation of our *Honour*, and *Glory*. But it is in *Glory*, as it is in *Money*; there must care be taken, both in the *Getting* of it, and in the *Laying of it out*; for we shall have perpetual Occasions for it; and we must provide for Uses of *Dignity*, as well as those of *Necessity*. It was a great thing said, That of *Socrates*; *The nearest way to Honour* (says he) *is for a Man so to live, that he may be found to be That in Truth, which he would be Thought to be.* 'Tis a gross mistake, for any Man to think of getting a lasting Reputation in the World, by false Appearances of Things. Vain Ostentation, or study'd Forms of Looks, and Words. *True Glory* is rooted in the very *Soul*, and brings forth fruit in

A Notable
Saying of
Socrates.

in our *Actions*. All Disguises pass away, and shed like Flowers; and nothing can be durable, that is Counterfeit. This might be confirm'd by Instances in abundance; but for Brevity sake, I shall content my self with an Observation only upon One Family. The Name of *Tiberius Gracchus* the Son of *Publius*, shall be famous to Posterity, so long as there shall be any Memorial left of *Rome* it self: But for his *Sons*, they were neither beloved, *Living*, nor Lamented, *Dead*; All good Men agreeing in a Detestation of their Lives; and approving the Justice of their Executions: He that would make himself truly Eminent for the Love of *Justice*, must discharge the *Duties* of it; of which Duties, we have treated in the former Book. But how easily soever we may make our selves known to Others for what we are, (tho' in truth the main point rests in being such Men, as we would be thought to be) it will not be amiss yet to lay down some certain Precepts concerning this Matter. He that comes into the World under any Remarkable Circumstance to make him taken notice of, either in respect of Fortune, or Family; as the Son for the purpose of such or such a Father, (which I take (my *Cicero*) to be your Own Case:) All Mens Eyes are presently upon him, and every body enquiring into his Life, and Manners: He lives, as it were, in Open View, and all his Words and Doings are made Publique. Now for Those, who by reason of their Obscure Extraction, are in their tender age not so much known in the World, I would have them prompted Early toward great Undertakings; and bend their Endeavours directly That way; which they will do the more Vigorously, in regard that Young Men

*Some are
Born re-
markable.*

*Others
make them-
selves so.*

are so far from being *Envy'd*, that they are rather cherished, and Encourag'd in Virtuous, and Generous Inclinations.

*Let a Young
Man study
the Use of
his Arms.*

THE First Lesson that I would give to a Young man for the advance of his Credit with the people; should be to addict himself to the Study, and Practice of *Arms*; at least where there were any *Glory* to be gotten by *Military Virtues*. Our Predecessors, that were almost Continually in War, made themselves Famous by This Profession: But it has been Your Lot (my Son) to come into the World amid the Broils of a Divided State, where the One side was Extremely Wicked, and the Other as Unfortunate. And yet in the Command you had under *Pompey*; even in This very War, you acquitted your self as a *Man at Arms* to all purposes; an Excellent Horseman; a person of Indefatigable Industry: and all This to the Common Satisfaction both of the Glorious General, and the Whole Army. But the Commonwealth is self sunk here, and so did your *Glory*. It is not upon your particular, but a general account, that I have taken up this Discourse: Wherefore I shall now proceed to that which remains.

*The Virtues
of the Mind
are more
Noble than
those of the
Body.*

*Of Modesty
and Piety.*

AS the Operations of the *Mind*, are in all Cases much more Noble than those of the *Body*; so are the things that we compass by the Faculties of our *Reason*, and *Understanding*, of much greater value than those things that we bring to pass by *Corporal Force*. The First point that recommends us to a good Esteem in the World, is *Modesty*; after that, comes *Piety*, and *Reverence to our Parents*; and then follows a *Tenderness*

derness of *Affection* to our *Relations*, and *Friends*.

It is a promising Sign, when a Young Man applies himself to persons of Eminence for Wisdom, Authority, and Good affection to their Country: For it Creates an *Opinion*, and *Expectation* of *Great Matters* from him that proposes to himself the Imitation of *Great Examples*. It was every Bodies Judgment, upon *Publius Rutilius*, that if he liv'd, he would make a *Famous Civilian*, and an *Honest Man*. And what was This grounded upon, but the frequent Conversation that he had in his Youth with *Publius Mucius*? But *Lucius Crassus*, I must confess, without the help of any borrow'd Reputation, advanced his own Fame, and dignifi'd himself in that Generous and Memorable accusation of his. He was at That time, of an age to be rather held by Flatteries and fair Words to his very Exercises, than left to himself. And yet at That age, with *Demosthenes*, the things which he had so happily conceiv'd at Home, he did with no less Honour Execute in Publique.

It is a good Sign when a man loves good Company.

WE may divide *Speech* into *Familiar Discourse*, and matter of *Argument*, or *Pleading*.

The *Latter* undoubtedly is of the greater Efficacy toward the purchasing of *Glory*: And this is it which we call *Eloquence*. And yet there is a certain *Affability*, and *Gentleness* of Fashion too, that does wonderfully work upon the Affections of all People. There are yet extant some Epistles of *Philip* to *Alexander*; of *Antipater* to *Cassander*; and of *Antigonius* to *Philip*; (Three persons highly esteemed for their Wisdom:) And they do all of them prescribe

Affability.

Eloquence
the Power
of it.

The Subject
of it.

the Use of *Courtesie*, and *Fair Language* to him that would Ingratiate himself with the *Multitude*; and only the Carefs of some Frank and Familiar Name, or *Compellation*; (as *Fellow-Souldier*, or *Comarade*) to the *Commander* that would endear himself to the *Souldiery*. But then it has another kind of force, the Faculty of *Haranguing* the *Multitude*; when with *One Speech* sometimes a Man gets an *Eternal Fame*. It is wonderful, the Transports that are wrought by the Power of *Eloquence*, and *Wisdom*: And the Veneration that is paid by the Auditory to a Person whom they take to be so much Wiser, and Intelligent, than other Mortals. And yet there is a *Mixt way of speaking*, that does wonders too; Especially with a Concurrence in it of both *Weight* and *Modesty*; which, in a Young Man, makes it still the more admirable. There are many Occasions that require *Eloquence*; and many of our Country-men, (and Young Men too) that are highly esteemed for it, both at the *Bar*, and in the *Senate*. But that which I look upon to be the most *Effectual*, and *praise-worthy*, is the *Eloquence* of the *Bar*; and the Subject of it is either *Accusation*, or *Defence*: the *Defence* is the more *Laudable* of the Two, and yet in many Cases, the *Other* is likewise to be *Approved*. As in what I said just now of *Crassus*; and *Anthony* also, when he was a Young Man, did the same thing. *Publius Sulpitius* raised the Glory of his *Eloquence* by his Charge against *C. Norbanus*, a Seditious and an Unprofitable Citizen. But this is not a thing to be done often; nor, in Truth, is it to be done at all, unless on the behalf of the *Government*, as the *Two Luculluses*: or in favour of the *Oppressed*, as I my self did for the *Sicilians*:

Julius

Julius Caesar did as much for the *Sardinians*; and *Fufius* shew'd his Skill too against *Marcus Aquilius*: so that it may be once done, but no more; unless a Man be call'd to it by his Duty to the Commonwealth. And in the very Case of *Publique Enemies*, there may be an excuse for *Frequent Accusations*: But even There too, we must keep within the Bounds of Moderation: For it is the part of an Ill-natur'd Man, (or I might rather say, scarce of a Man) to make a Trade of hunting People to death. And beside the danger that it brings upon the Persecutor, it is an Infamous, and a Rascally Character, that of an *Informers*. It was the *Nick-name* that was given to *Marcus Brutus*, (the Son I mean of the Eminent Civilian) and it cast a blemish upon the very Lustre of his Family. And moreover, be sure to observe this Duty, as Inviolable, and Sacred; *Never to have any thing to do in the Exposing of Innocent Blood*. For it is a Crime, that no Colour in the World can justify; for what can be so Inhumane, as to turn the Faculties of Reason, and Eloquence, that were given us for the Benefit, and Conservation of Mankind, to the Ruine, and Destruction of Honest Men? But it does not follow yet, because we must not upon any terms persecute the Innocent, that therefore we may not in some Case defend the Wicked, and the Guilty: For it is a thing many times agreeable to the Will of the People; to Custom, and to Humanity, so to do. It is the part of the *Judge*, constantly to follow the *Truth*; but the *Advocate* is not so strictly ty'd up to the *Precise Truth*, as not to make his best sometimes of that which carries some near *Resemblance* of it. I should not take This Freedom upon This

It is a busie
Office that
of an In-
former.

Have a
Care of In-
nocent
Blood.

Subject, if I had not the Authority of *Parasius*, (one of the soundest of the *Stoiques*) to support me in it. The greatest Favour and Renown is gotten by a *Defensive Eloquence*; and it is so much the Greater, as the Power, and Opposition of the Adversary is the Stronger; and according to the Straits, and Exigencies of the Party reliev'd. We have brought off many, and particularly, in our younger days, we defended *Sextus Roscius Amerinus* against the Force and Authority of *L. Sylla* himself: The Oration you know is still Extant.

*Liberality
is Twofold,
Labour and
Money.*

HAVING already set forth the Methods by which a Young man may advance his Reputation in the World; we shall now discourse the matter of *Liberality*, and *Bounty*, which is *Twofold*; For we oblige those that stand in need of our Help, either by our *Labour*, or by our *Money*. The *Latter* is the *Easier* way; especially where the *Benefactor* is Master of an *Estate*; but the *Other* is the more *Honorable* and *Splendid*, and better becoming a Clear and Generous Mind. For tho' the Will may be Frank enough in Both, yet the one Obligation is rather a Debt to his *Fortune*, but the other to his *Virtue*. And then by These Pecuniary Bounties, the very Fountain is drawn dry, and one Bounty is destroy'd by another; and in the very act, we lose the Means of Obliging. But he that is Liberal of his *Pains*, that is to say, of his *Industry*, and *Virtue*, the more Good he has done already, the more Friends will he find to assist him toward the doing of more: and then by the Custom and Practice of doing good Offices a man does not only learn the *Way* of Obliging, but gets the very

very *Habit* of it. It is a Noble Reprehension, that of *Philip*, in a Letter to his Son *Alexander*; *A generous* for endeavouring to ingratiate himself with the *Reproof*. *Macedonians* by the Force of *Money*. What is it, (with a mischief) says he, that should make you expect Faith from those People whom you your self have Corrupted? Is it that instead of their Prince, you would be lookt upon only as their Servant or Purse-bearer? An Office so much below the Dignity of a Monarch! Such a Bounty could not have been better express'd, than by calling it a Corruption: For the very Receiver is the worse for't, and the more he gets, the more he looks for. This Epistle was written only to his Son; but it may serve as a Precept to Mankind.

NOW as there is no question, but that the *The Bounty* Bounty which consists in *Labour*, and *Industry* is of *Labour* the *Fairer* of the two, and the more *Extensive*, is the fair-
 est of the
 two.
 because more men are the better for't; we meet with several Occasions yet, and many proper Objects for the Exercise also of the *Other sort* of *Bounty*, which in some Cases must be put in Practice, but with Choice, and within Compass: Give with-
 in compass.
 For there are many people that squander away their whole Estates upon Inconsiderate Gratuities. Nor can any thing be more senseless, than for a man to take pains to put himself out of condition to do the thing that he loves to do. And these undadvised Liberalities are commonly follow'd with Extortion too; for when men are brought to Want, by Over-giving, they fall to the repairing of their Profusions upon Some, by Violence upon Others: and the Friends they get by Giving, on the *One* side, will not ballance the Enemies they raise, by taking away on the *Other*.
 Where-

Wherefore, as I would not lay my Fortune in Common, so neither would I refuse a part of it to my Friend, but still in proportion to the whole. We have a common saying which is grown by use into a Proverb, *Bounty has no Bottom*, and it is worth remembering. For what Mean can be There expected, where by the Custom of *Giving*, and of *Receiving*, both the *Giver* and the *Receiver* come to desire the *same thing*.

Prodigality.

True Liberality.

OF *large Givers* there are *Two sorts*; the *Liberal*, and the *Prodigal*: The *Prodigal*, they lash out upon Treats, Popular Doales, Prizes, Publique Sports, and Spectacles, and other Entertainments, which are no sooner past, than forgotten. The *Liberal*, they employ their Expences upon Redeeming of Slaves, setting a Friend out of Debt, or helping him out in the bestowing of a Daughter, in the Getting of a Fortune, or in the Encreasing of it. I cannot but wonder what put it into *Theophrastus's* head, in his Book of *Riches*, that among so many Excellent things, he should be guilty of one so very gross and absurdity. His Discourse runs much upon the Honour, and Magnificence of Popular Shews, and Presents; and he makes this to be the great advantage of an Ample Fortune, that it Furnishes a man with means to be at That Expence. Now in my Opinion, the Fruit of Liberality is much more certain, and Considerable, in the few Instances I have before mentioned. It is a Grave, and a Pertinent Reproof, that of *Aristotle's*, upon This Subject: *We make nothing* (says he) *of our Profusions upon the Humouring of the Common People, but to hear of Ten Crowns given in a Siege for a Bottle of water, what a wonderment is made of it,*

it, as a thing Incredible: till upon second Thoughts, we find the price excus'd by the Necessity? But in the Other Extravagant Spoil, and Excessive Prodigality, where there is neither Honour, nor Necessity consulted in it, and the very pleasure passes with the Spectacle; we can find nothing there to wonder at. And who are they but the weakest of the people that stand affected with this Vanity? and no sooner are they satiated, than the Delight it self is forgotten. And who are they that are so much taken with these Fooleries, but Women, Children, and Slaves; that is to say, people either of servile Condition, or of servile Minds, scarce any man of Sense, Judgment, or Consideration, approving of them? I know very well that it is an Ancient Custom in This City, for the *Edile* to exhibit Shews to the People, upon entering his Office; and that very good men expect it from him. *P. Crassus* the Rich (as well in his Fortune, as in his Name) made a very Magnificent Entry; and so did *L. Crassus*, after him; tho' joyned with *Q. Marcius* too, a man of singular Moderation. And then *C. Claudius*, the Son of *Appianus*, with a great many more; as *Lucullus*, *Hortensius*, *Silanus*; which were all outdone by *P. Lentulus*, in my Consulship, and *Scarnus* Emulated him. But the most Pompous, and Expensive Solemnity of all, was that of our Friend *Pompey*, in his Second Consulship; This is enough to shew you my opinion in all these Cases. But yet however, we must have a Care on the other hand, not to incur a suspicion of Avarice. *Mamercus*, (a very Rich man) was repulsed when he stood for Consul, because he had refused the Charge of *Edile*. Wherefore, if the people

Fine shews are only for Women and Children.

In what Case Pro-fusion may be allowed.

call

call for it, on the One side, and wise men be not against it, (tho' they do not desire it) on the Other ; the thing ought to be done : But according to our Abilities, as it has been my own Case : or otherwise, where we may reap some advantage by it, that will more than Countervail the Charge. As it turn'd much to the reputation of *Orestes*, not long since, the publique Diners that he expos'd in the Streets, to the Multitude, under Colour of Dedicating his Tenthsto *Hercules*. Neither did any man blame *M. Seius*, for supplying the people in a great Searcity with Corn, at about a Groat a Bushel ; when by so doing, he delivered himself from the great and inveterate hatred of the Multitude ; and (being *Edile* too) by a Liberality, that was neither Dishonourable nor Burthensome. But it was a most Glorious, and Memorable action my Friend *Milo's* engaging of the *Sword-players* for the *Publique safety*, which in my own particular I was not a little concern'd in : and by means whereof, all the attempts and outrages of *Claudius* were Crusht and disappointed. So that Bounties should be grounded either upon Necessity or Profit ; and even in These Cases too the best Rule is Mediocrity. *L. Philip* the Son of *Quintus*, (a person of great Worth, and Understanding) was wont to make it his Vaunt, that it never cost him one penny of Mony to the people, the obtaining of all the Favours that were ever conferr'd upon him. *Cotta* said the same thing, and without Vanity, so might we our selves too, in some degree ; for the expence of my *Edileship* was so small, that it could not signifie any thing toward the gaining of those Offices which were afterward conferr'd upon

But still
within
Bounds.

upon me as by a Common Consent; and That in my own year 100: which is more than any of those beforenamed, can boast of. I take that money to be best laid out which is employed upon Common Walls, and Ramparts, Docks, Havens, Aquaducts, and other works, for the good of the Publique. Those Bounties give more of present satisfaction, I must confess, that are laid down upon the Nail, as I may say; but the Other will find better acceptance with Posterity: as for Theatres, Walks, Galleries, Temples, I shall speak the more Favourably of them, for *Pompey's* sake: But Learned men, I perceive, do not approve of them; and *Panatinus*, for one, whom in this Discourse I have rather Followed, than Interpreted: and then there is *Phalerens Demetrius*, who was very sharp upon the famous *Pericles*, for his Extravagant Profusion upon the Porch of the Temple of *Pallas*. But I have handled this Subject at large in my Discourse of a *Common-wealth*. Now for a Conclusion; This kind of *Liberality*, upon the whole matter, is stark naught; and yet by the Circumstances of Times, and the like, it may be render'd Necessary; But in all Cases there must be observ'd a *Mediocrity*, and a *Proportion*.

A S to the Other sort of a *Bounty* that arises from *Liberality*, we must accommodate ourselves to the Occasion, and in Differing Cases use Differing Methods. One man lies under the pinch of a pressing Calamity: another man's Condition is not much amiss perhaps already, but yet he would be glad to make it better. My Charity binds me in the First place, to assist the Miserable person; at least if he did not make himself

Of Private
Liberality.

How to
bestow
them.

himself so by his own fault. And yet I would not be so hard neither as not to help him also, that is Well already, in order to his Further advantage : but this is a point that requires singular Care and Judgment in the Choice. It was well said of *Ennius*, *A Benefit misplaced turns to a Crime*. But in that which is bestow'd upon a good and a Grateful man, there's, First, the Conscientious Comfort of the Virtue it self; and then the Satisfaction that it brings us in other respects : For the most acceptable thing in the World is a discreet Liberality, and the Reputation of it must needs be great, when the Goodness of every man in Power is the Common Sanctuary of Mankind.

*A Regard
to the Be-
nefit as well
as to the
Person.*

WE must have a regard also to the Benefit, as well as to the person; and that it may be of such a Quality as to Descend in the memory of it to the Children and Posterity of the person Obligated, that there may be no place left for Ingratitude. For all Mortals have a Detestation for it; and every man looks upon himself as Injur'd in the discouragement of Bounty : And the Guilty in this Case, are reputed the Common Enemies of the Needy. Beside the Benefit that this piety of Disposition brings to the publique, in the Enriching of the poor, and the Redeeming of Captives, which, as *Crassus* delivers at large in One of his Orations, was many times the Work of the Senate it self. And is not this now a Nobler way of Obliging than the Casting of our money away upon *Pageantries*, and *Popular Spectacles* ? This is an Expence for a man of Sense, and Honour; whereas the other is only a Fawning application by Chargeable Fopperies to tickle the phantasies of the Common people,

AS we are to Oblige with Frankness; so we are not to Exact any thing again with Rigour, but in all our Dealings, as buying, selling, letting, hiring, &c. to behave our selves toward our Neighbor and acquaintance, with Candor, and Respect: tho' to the prejudice sometime of our Own Right: avoiding Law-suits as much as may be, and a little more perhaps than needs; for it is not only Generous, but profitable too, for a man in some Cases to remit somewhat of the straitness of his just due: but in so doing he must have an Eye yet to his Family, or Estate, which it were Impious not to defend: but in such a manner too, that there appear nothing of Harshness, or Greediness in the Dispute. For a man cannot employ his Mony better, than to do others good with it, with a regard still to the maintaining of his Own.

Our Obligations should be Frank,

IT is with great Reason that *Theophrastus* recommends *Hospitality*: for in my Opinion it is a very Honourable fashion for the Houses of Noblemen to be ever Open to Illustrious Guests: and it gives no small Reputation to our Commonwealth, that Strangers can never want That sort of Beneficence in This City. But then for those that would make an Honest Interest abroad in the World, it is a very great advantage, the Favour, and Recommendation which they get among Foreign Nations through the friendship of those they meet with upon This Occasion. *Theophrastus* writing of the Hospitality of *Cimon of Athen* tells us that he gave strict Order to his Servants in the Country that his House should be still Open, to whatever *Lacian* (or *Townsmen* of his) pass that way.

Of Hospitality.

NOW

Obligations of Care and Industry.

The Reputation of the Civil Law.

NOW for Those Obligations that are only the Effect of *Care*, and *Industry*, without *mony*, they are both *Publique*, and *Private*: Extending from the *Commonwealth* it self, to every *Particular Member* of it: For what readier way can there be in This World to Eminent *Wealth*, and *Preferment*, than the Skill of Directing, and Advising in Difficulties of *Law*: together with the Power of Obliging so many upon That Score? Wherefore, among the Excellent Qualities of our Fore-fathers, the Knowledge, and Interpretation, as well as the Constitution of the *Civil Law*, was ever had in great Esteem: and reserved (until this Confusion of Affairs) as a Matter Sacred, in the Possession of Men of Highest Authority and Wisdom. But the Glory of This Science, as well as That of our Ancient Nobility and Virtue, is now quite Extinct: and to aggravate the Indignity, this fell out in the time of a person not inferiour in *Honour* to all that went before him, but in *Letters* much their Superiour. So that This is a Study generally acceptable, beside that it puts us in the way of doing a thousand Good Turns.

Some Affinity betwixt a Civilian and an Orator.

The Force of Eloquence.

AND there is some Affinity or Resemblance too betwixt the Art of a *Civilian*, and that of an *Oratour*: Only the *Latter* has more in it of *Vigour*, *Agreeableness*, and *Elevation of Spirit*. There is not any thing that moves the Soul, like *Eloquence*: It fills the Hearers with *Admiration*: it gives *Hope* to the *Miserable*: it creates as many *Friendships* as there are Persons that it Defends, and our Predecessors accounted of it as the most Honourable of all Professions. It is a General, and Publique Blessing, when men of Eloquence, and

favourable Occasion, to make him some favourable amends.

In Benefits
consider
the Man,
not the
Fortune.

The Pride
and Vanity
of Great
Men.

IN the Conferring of *Good Offices* we have usually a regard either to peoples *Manners*, or to their *Fortunes*; and therefore we have the Common saying ready at our Tongues end, that *'tis the Man only that we consider, and not the Estate*. This is a handsom flourish, but where is the Man yet that does not more willingly bestow his Time and his Pains, upon the service of a powerful, and a Wealthy person, than in the support and protection of the best Poor man that ever was born? For we are naturally inclined to lay out our services where we may reasonably hope for the speediest, and the most Certain Return. And This proceeds from a Mistaken Estimate of the Nature of Things. For what if *That Honest Poor man* cannot requite us in Kind, He may do it yet in *Thankfulness of Heart*, and in *Just Acknowledgments*? It was well enough said, (whoever said it) *He that Has my Mony, has not Restor'd it; and he that has Restor'd it, Has it no longer. But in the Case of Good Will, he that has Paid it Has it still; And he that Has it still, has Paid it.* Now for those men that value themselves upon their Titles, or Possessions, and have the World at Will; they are so far from accounting themselves under any Obligation for a Benefit Received, that they look upon the very acceptance of it, (let it be never so great) as an Obligation laid upon the other side. Nay they will not stick to be Suspicious, and Jealous of it, as a prologue to some petition, or further Design. But to tell them, that ever they stood in need

need of, or were Beholden to any man, is to strike them to the very Heart. Whereas the Poor man, that takes all Friendly Offices to himself, *The Poor mans Gratitude:* without any respect to his Condition; This Poor man (I say) makes it his Business, not only to express his Gratitude to those that have already obliged him, but to ingratiate himself likewise to those which he hopes hereafter may be Kind to him; as having Occasion for many Friends. And if it be his Good Hap to render his Patron a profitable service, his Humility makes the Value of it to be Less than it is, rather than Greater. And it is further to be Observed, that upon the Defence of a Great man, the Acknowledgment terminates either in Himself alone, or, at the Utmost, in the Effect it may have upon his Children, and Family. But in the protection of a poor Creature, that is yet Virtuous, and Modest, a man makes to himself an interest in all the poor honest men in Nature; which is no Inconsiderable party out of the Body of the Common people. So that it turns to a better account to oblige the Good, than the Fortunate. We should do our best however to leave no sort of men unsatisfied; and if This point should come in question, let *Themistocles* decide the Controversie. *A wise saying of Themistocles;* It was put to him *Whether a man should rather bestow his Daughter upon a Poor man that were Honest, or upon a man that had More Wealth, but Less Integrity.* And his Answer was This; *I had rather bestow her upon a Man that wants Money than upon Money that wants a Man.* But our Minds and Manners are now-adays corrupted and depraved with the Love of Money: and yet, as to the matter of Superstuity, what is any man

Justice is
the Founda-
tion of a
Lasting
Fame.

the Better for't ? It may be of some use perhaps to him that has it ; but that is only at *Some Times*, and in *Some Cases* too. Or taking the advantage of it for Granted, it serves only to make a man the more powerful, but not one jot the more Honest. Not that I would serve a good man ever the less, for being *Rich* over and above. But I would still serve him for his *Virtue*, and not because of his *Wealth* : and govern my self by the Judgment I make upon the Qualities of his *Mind*, without Calculating upon his *Fortune*. Now with one Precept more I shall Conclude : We must never Employ our Faculties and Endeavours, either to uphold Iniquity, or to overthrow Justice. For *Justice is the Foundation of an Everlasting Fame*, and there can be nothing Commendable without it.

Of Publick
Bounties.

HAVING already treated of Benefits with a regard to *Particular Persons* ; we shall now Discourse of That sort of Bounty, which respects the *Universality* or the *Commonwealth*. Of This Bounty there are Two Kinds. The One concerns the whole *Body* of a City, or the *Community* ; the Other, the *Particular Members* of it : And the Latter is the more acceptable of the Two. It is our Duty, as much as in us lies, to consult the Common Satisfaction of Both : Or however, to take Care of particulars : but in such manner that the whole may be the Better for it ; Or at least not the Worse. *Caius Gracchus's Excessive Largesse* of Corn to the people, was *Mischievous* ; for it exhausted the *Treasury* ; but the *Moderate Donative* of *M. Octavius* was both *Tolerable* to the *Government*, and *Necessary* to the *People* ; and consequently both the

Republicque

Republique it self, and the Citizens were the Better for't,

I T should be the Principal Care of him that has the Administration of Publique Affairs, to see that every Individual be protected in his Property; and that private men may not be dispos-
 sels'd of their Rights and Estates, under the pre-
 text of a Publick Good. It was a pestilent
 proposition, That of *Philip's*, in his *Tribune-
 ship*, about an *Equal Partition of Lands*; But
 then it was a great Instance of his Modesty, the
 letting of it fall so Easily again. He did many
 Ill things, to curry favour with the people; and
 he dropt one lewd speech too, *that there were*
not Two thousand men of Estates in the whole City.
 What a desperate Hint was That toward the
 bringing of all things to a Level, and all Con-
 ditions of men to a Parity: One of the greatest
 Plagues that can befall a State? For it was the
 main End of the Founding and Establishing of
 Cities and publick bodies, that particulars might
 be secur'd in their Possessions, and every man
 safe in the Enjoyment of his Own. For though
 men Associate by an Impulse of Nature, it was
 Desire and Hope yet of keeping what they had
 gotten, that made them Build Cities, for their
 Protection. It has been a Great Inconvenience
 that our Fore-fathers have been often put upon, the
 charging of the people with Extraordinary Tax-
 es: which happened either through the Lowness
 of the Treasury, or the Expence and Burthen of
 a Continual War. This is a Course by all means
 possible to be avoided, by laying in of Provisions
 beforehand; but if ever any Commonwealth
 should fall under This Necessity (for I had rather
 foretel

*The Propri-
 ety of Par-
 ticulars
 must be
 protected.*

*The danger
 of Level-
 ling Prin-
 ciples.*

*No Extra-
 ordinary
 Taxes.*

foretel it of any Other, than Ours; as I speak This only by way of General Discourse) it will be highly necessary that the people be punctually enformed of the Exigent; and that there is no way for them to subsist, but by complying with such a Necessity. It behoves all Governors to furnish the Publique Stores with Necessaries, before the Danger presses them; in what Proportion and of what Kind, is a matter so well known, that it is sufficient the bare mention of the thing thus by the By.

Corrupt
Magi-
strates are
the Bane of
any Go-
vernment.

BUT above all things, let all men in Publique Administration keep themselves clear from the least suspicion of *Avarice*. I would to the Heavens (sayes C. Pontius the Samnite) that Fortune had reserved me for another Age, and kept me from coming into the World, till the Romans had begun to take Bribes. If this had been, I should quickly have put an end to their Empire. Truly he must have staid a good while then; for 'tis but of late that Rome has been tainted with This Evil. Now if Pontius was a man of such a Resolution as he appears to have been, it is well for us that he came into the World when he did. The first Law that ever we had against the Corruption of Magistrates, is not as yet of a hundred and ten years standing? and That was Piso's. But we have had a great many Others since That time; and every One still more severe than the Other. How many Criminals have we had? How many Condemn'd? What a Confusion upon the Social War in Italy? And That War excited too merely by the Guilty, to save themselves from Punishment? There was no longer any Course of Law, or Justice; but our Friends and Allies, lay

lay exposed to Seifure and Pillage, without Relief : And if we are not totally ruin'd, it proceeds more from the Weakness of Others, than from our own Virtue.

PANÆTIUS extols *Africanus* for his Abstinence in the matter of Money : And why not ? But still he might have found greater Virtues in him than That : For That Abstinence of his was not the Virtue of the Man only, but of the Times. *Paulus Æmilius*, upon his Victory over *Persus*, made himself Master of all the *Macedonian Wealth*, to an Infinite value ; and brought so much Money into the publique Treasury, that One Captains Booty deliver'd the People from any further need of Taxes. And This he did without any other Advantage to his Family, than the Honourable, and Immortal Memory of his Name and Action. *Africanus* the Younger (in imitation of his Father) got as little by the Destruction of *Carthage* ; and his Fellow-Censor, *L. Mummius*, as little as either of them, by the Ruines of the Magnificent City of *Corinth*. But his Bus'ness was rather the Ornament, and Lustre of his Country, than That of his House : Although in giving Reputation to the One, he could not fail of doing the like to the Other. But to go on where I left.

The Abstinence of Africanus.

THERE is not certainly a more Detestable Vice (especially in Princes, and Publique Magistrates) than Covetousness : And it is not only a Mean thing, but an Impious, to make a Prey of the Commonwealth. That which the *Pythian Oracle* deliver'd in the Case of *Sparta*, looks

Avarice a Detestable Vice.

The Power
of Frugali-
ty in Pub-
lique Ad-
ministrations.

like a Prediction, not only Applicable to the *Lacedamonians*, but to all Opulent Nations also whatsoever: To wit, that it was not in the Power of any thing in the World, but *Avarice*, to Destroy That Commonwealth. There is no surer way in Nature for men in Power to gain upon the affections of the multitude, than by *Frugality* and *Moderation*. But yet when out of an affectation of Popularity they come to propound such a *Levelling Division of Lands* as is above-mentioned; and either to Force the Right Owners out of their possessions, or to the remitting of Just Debts, these people shake the very Foundations of Government; In the first place Dissolving the Bonds of Concord and Agreement, which can never consist with This way of taking Moneys from some, and Discharging others. And what's become of common Equity then, when no Man is left the Master of his own? For it is a Privilege Essential to a Community, that it be Free, and every Man secur'd in the Enjoyment of what belongs to him. Neither does This way of Confounding all things create that Interest and Reputation among the People, which the Projectors may Imagine: for it makes the Loser still your Enemy; and the very Receiver will hardly thank you for't neither: Or at best, so coldly, as if it were a thing he had no great mind to: Especially dissembling the Inward satisfaction of being forgiven a Debt; for fear of being thought unable to pay it. Whereas the Injur'd party will never forget it, but carry the purpose of a Revenge in his Heart. Or what if there should be more to whom we Unjustly Give, than there are from whom we do as Unjustly take away? This does not mend the matter

matter one jot : for we are not to judge in This case by Number, but Weight. What colour of Equity is there for a Man that never had an Estate, to dispossess another of an Estate that has been many Years (nay Ages perhaps) in the Possession of it, himself and Family ; and that he that has an Estate, should have it taken from him ? It was for this way of proceeding that the *Lacedaemonians* Banish'd *Lysander*, and put their King *Agis* to Death, beyond all President of former times. And there follow'd such Broils upon it, that their Best men were Banish'd, a *Tyranny* introduced in the place of an *Aristocracy*, even to the utter dissolution of one of the best Constituted Republicques upon the Face of the Earth. And *Sparta* did not fall alone neither ; but the Contagion of Those Tumults spread it self so far, that the rest of *Greece* was wholly Ruin'd by That Example. What shall we say of our *Gracchi* ? (the Sons of the famous *Tiberius Gracchus*, and Grandchildren of the *Elder Africanus*) It was this very point of Controversie about *Lands*, that destroy'd them too. But on the contrary, how much Honour has *Aratus* worthily acquired to himself, by his Exploit upon *Sicyon* ? It had been Fifty Years under the Dominion, and in the Possession of *Usurpers*, when he recover'd it by a surprize from *Argos*, suppress'd *Nicocles* the Tyrant, Restor'd six hundred of the Wealthiest Citizens that had been Banish'd, and set the City it self at Liberty. But finding great difficulty at last how to accommodate the bus'ness of *Lands* and possessions ; and considering that it would be hard on the One side for those that he restor'd to their Town to live still in want, while Others enjoy'd Their Estates ; and little Better, on the

The danger
of Inva-
ding Pro-
prieties.

A Generous
account of
Aratus.

Other

Other side, to break in upon, and take away Possessions of Fifty Years standing ; wherein so many several Interests were concern'd, by Purchases, Portions, Settlements, and the like, and without any Injury by Them done to the Right Owners : He concluded it Unreasonable either to take from the One what they were possess'd of, or not to satisfy the Other, in some degree, for their Just Pretensions. Wherefore he be-
 thought himself, and resolv'd upon a Journey to *Alexandria* ; giving Orders that all things should continue in the same state he left them, until his Return : So that he presently posted away to his Old Friend, and Acquaintance, *Ptolomy the Second King of Alexandria* ; He had no sooner informed that Generous Prince of his Bus'ness, with the Design he had, and in what Manner, to Deliver his Country ; but without any difficulty, this Illustrious person prevail'd upon him for a large Sum of money. This Treasure he carry'd with him back to *Sicyon*, and then pick'd out Fifteen of the Principal persons of that place, to advise with upon This Affair, and to take a strict account, as well of those that were possess'd of Other Mens Estates, as of those that had Lost their Own. The matter was so handled, that, upon a reasonable Estimate of the Lands, some were perswaded to content themselves with the value in Money, and to yield the Land ; and Others chose rather to take Money for their Land, than to contest for the Recovery of it. So that in the Conclusion, the Controversie was Compounded, and Both parts abundantly satisf'd with the Accord. What Pity was it that this Great Man was not born a Citizen of *Rome* ! This is the right way of proceeding in
 such

such Cases; without exposing the persons and goods of Citizens (as it has been Twice in our days) to *Proscriptions*, and *Ontcries*. This *Grecian*, like a Brave, and a Wise man, consulted the Common welfare : And it is the highest point of a Good, and a prudent Magistrate, to Maintain the Properties of the people, and not to Invade them ; but keeping all within the Bounds of common equity. Why should any Man dwell *Gratis* in my house? as if I were to purchase, Build, Repair, and Defend it, for Another (in despite of my heart) to reap the Fruits of my Labour, and Expence? For This is the Case in taking away from me That which is my Own, and giving to another That which does not Belong to him. And what's the End of these *Letters of Protection*, (if I may so call them) but that you shall buy Land with my Money; you keep the Land, and I lose my Money?

IT is a matter therefore of great Moment, that no Debts be permitted, which may endanger the publique. And This may be several ways prevented, if such a Course be taken, that Prodighals and Debtors may not raise their Fortunes upon Defrauding their Creditors; the One losing their Own, and the other getting what belongs to another Man. There is nothing that upholds a Commonwealth like Faith, and Credit : which can never be expected where people do not lie under a Necessity of paying their due Debts; a thing which was never so violently preſt, as when I was Consul : All Sorts and Degrees of Men were even in Arms about it : And yet I resisted all Motions tending That way, to the very Rooting of This Evil out of the Common-
No Debts
to be per-
mitted, that
may endan-
ger the
Publique.

monwealth. There was never more money stirring, nor ever was there surer, or better Payment : For where the Hope of Deceiving is cut off, Men must necessarily keep Touch. It is true, that *Cæsar*, (who was in Those days subdu'd, tho' now a Conqueror) that *Cæsar*, I say, did put his former purposes in Execution, even when he had no need so to do : His very Appetite being so Vicious, that he took pleasure in the Evil it self, without any other Inducement. It is the Duty then of all good patriots to keep themselves clear of this same perverse sort of Liberality, that takes from one, and gives to another : and in the first place, to provide that all men may be equally supported in the Enjoyment of their own, by Law, and Common Justice. And that the poor, and simple may not be Circumvented, or Oppress'd by Power, nor the Wealthy obstructed in the holding or receiving of their Dues, by the Envy and Malignity of the people. And moreover, they should by all means endeavour both in War, and Peace, to advance the Republique, in Empire, Possessions, and Revenue : These are the proper Offices and Achievements of Great men, and this was the Study, and the Exercise of our Forefathers. Those that addict themselves to these Duties, gain great Glory and Good-will to their Own particulars, beside the profit that they bring to the Publique. *Antipater* the *Tyrian* (and a *Stoique*) that lately deceased at *Athens*, charges *Panatinus* with leaving out Two Branches touching Health, and Money in these Precepts concerning Benefits. But I suppose that they were rather pass'd over by That famous Philosopher, as things well enough understood, and needless

lels to be further inculcated, how advantageous
fever.

IT is a good means of preserving *Health*, *A Caution*
for every man to understand his own Constitution; and to observe what agrees with him, *in matter*
and what not. To live Temperately in all respects, as well in our Diet, and the care of our *of Health*
Bodies, as in our pleasures: Using the common *and Estate.*
helps of Physique also, in case of need. In the
gathering of an Estate, we must do nothing but
what is warrantable, and honest: And when it
is fairly gotten, it may be preserv'd, and im-
prov'd by Parsimony, and caution. This Point
is excellently well handled by *Xenophon* (the *Se-*
cratist) in his *OEconomiques*; which I my self,
at about your Age turned out of *Greek* into
Latin.

THE Concurrence of Two Profitable Things *Two Profi-*
in comparison, (which was the Fourth Consideration, omitted by *Panetius*) is a case which *table things*
very often happens: For sometimes *Bodily* *meeting in*
Goods fall in Competition with the Goods of *comparison*
Fortune: Sometime *Outward Goods* with Those
of the *Body*: And sometime again, One of ei-
ther of them is compar'd with Another of the
same Kind. As in the *First* instance, I had ra-
ther have *Health*, than *Money*: In the *Second*,
I had rather have a *Great Estate*, than a *Robust*
strength of Body. And so forward: I had ra-
ther enjoy *Health*, than *Pleasure*; I had rather
be *Strong*, than *Nimble*. And then in the Colla-
tion of *External things*, I had rather have *Ho-*
nour, than *Wealth*; and a Fortune in the *City*,
rather than in the Country. The Comparison
that

that we find in the *Elder Cato*, was of This Quality. The Question was put to him, What he look't upon as the greatest convenience in a *Country Life*? His answer was, in the *First place*, *Good Pasturage*. What next then? *Pasturage* that was *Indifferently Good*. And what then? *Pasturage* still, tho' a Degree worse than the Other. And what again? *Tillage*. What do you think of *Usury*? (say the *Enquirer*.) And what do you think of *Murther*? (says *Cato*.) By This and abundantly more, we cannot but understand that Things Profitable came often in Competition: And that This Fourth enquiry was not at all Impertinent. But as to the matter of Getting, Disposing, or Using of moneys, it is a Subject fitter for a Scrivener than a Philosopher; and better understood by the Good Men upon the *Bourse*, than by the Learned Men in the *Schools*. It is a thing needful however to be known, as appertaining to the Business of *Profit*: of which having discoursed sufficiently in This Book, we shall now proceed to what remains.

The End of the Second Book.

TULLY's OFFICES.

The Third BOOK.

IT was the saying (my Son *Marcus*) of *Scipio Africanus* the Elder, (as we have it from *Cato*, his Cotemporary) that *he* *A famous saying of Scipio Africanus:* *was never Less Idle, or Alone, than when he most appeared so to be.* It was a Noble thing said, and worthy of a Great, and of a Wise man; to shew that in all his Leisures, his Thoughts were still taken up with Business; his Solitudes, in Discourses to himself, without any Loss of Time: and without need some whiles of any other Company. Insomuch, that the Two things which commonly make Other people Listless, and Heavy, did even set an Edge upon him: That is to say, *Solitude*, and *Leisure*. Now tho' I cannot come up to the Imitation of that Illustrious person, I am not much behind him yet in my *Good Will* (I would I could say as much of my self, as he does in *Effect*.) For since I have been driven by the Force of Impious Arms from my Station in the Government, and the Business of the Bar; I have apply'd my self to a Life of *Leisure* too: upon That very Consideration, *Cicero's Retreat.* *quitting*

quitting the Town, and betaking my self to the Privacy and Solitude of a Country Life. Not that I compare either This Leisure, or Solitude with that of *Africanus*. For his was only a Voluntary Retirement from the Importunities of Company, when he had a mind to give himself some Respite from the Honourable Charges he sustained in the Commonwealth, by withdrawing into a Recess, as a man sometimes puts into a Port : But my Leisures proceeded not from a desire of Respite, but from want of Employment. For since the Dissolution of the Senate, what is there to be done, either in the Palace, or in the Hall, that is worthy of us? The world swarms every where with Criminals; and after a life spent in so Eminent a Post, and in the Open View of the people, I am e'en forc'd to hide my head, and live (in a manner) quite alone to avoid the very sight of them. I have heard Wise men say that we are not only to chuse the least of necessary *Evils*, but out of all Evils themselves to extract somewhat of *Good*. I shall therefore make the best of my Repose, tho' not such perhaps as he has deserv'd from his Country, who hath formerly contributed so much to Their Quiet. And though this be a Solitude wholly of Necessity, not Choice; I would not yet have it absolutely Fruitless. *Africanus* (I must confess) gained to himself a Fairer Reputation, but we have no Monuments of his Thoughts, committed to Writing: No Remains of his Leisures, and Solitude that we find extant. But we may conclude however, that he was neither Idle nor Alone, from his Glorious Actions, which were only the Product of Deliberation and Thought. But Alas! I have not that strength of Mind to

Think

Cicero
compares
himself
with *Afri-*
canus.

Think away my Solitudes, and supply the want of Company with bare Meditation. So that My whole Diversion is to pass away my Time, and my Cares upon Writing: and I have done more that way now, in a little while, since the overturning of the Government, than I did in many years before, while it was in a flourishing Estate.

NOW (my Son) tho' Philosophy be Profitable and Fruitful from one end of it to the other, without any Waste, or Desert: there is not any place yet in the whole Extent of it that yields greater advantage, and benefit, than that part of it which treats of *Civil Duties*, and the Rules of a Steady, and a Virtuous Life. Wherefore, tho' I doubt not either, of the Great and Excellent *Cratippus's* care in the inculcating of this Lesson daily to you; or of your own Diligence, and Attention in the receiving of it; it is not amiss yet to be often minded of so necessary a point; and (which way soever you turn your self) to have this voice still sounding in your Ear, even, if it were possible, without hearing any thing else. This is a thing for every man to do, that propounds to himself an Honest Course of Life; and it is your Interest perhaps as much as any bodies; because the world expects it from you, that you should succeed to the Industry, the Honours, and (if I may so say) in some measure to the Reputation of your Father. And you have a great deal to answer for upon the score of *Athens*, and *Cratippus*. For what could be more Dishonourable than after so ample a Commission granted you to the famous Staple of the whole World, for good *Manners* and *Letters*, to come back empty; to the Disparagement

*Of Civil
Duties and
a Virtuous
Life.*

agement both of the Master, and the City? Wherefore you must Labour with all the Faculties of your Soul, and Body, to make good This expectation: (if I may call That a Labour, which is so great a Pleasure) and let it never be said that after all other supplies from your Father, you were only wanting to your self: But let this suffice: having written so much, and so often to you already, upon This Subject. We shall now return to the remaining part of the Division propounded.

Panxtius
of Civil
Duties.

PANÆTIUS is the man, without Dispute, that has the most accurately handled This question: and Him have I chiefly follow'd, with some amendment and additions of my Own. He lays down *Three Propositions* that men are wont to deliberate and advise upon, in the Case of *Duty*. *First*, whether the matter in question be *Honest*, or *Dishonest*. *Secondly*, whether it be *Profitable*, or *Unprofitable*. *Thirdly*, where *Two things* meet in *Competition*, the *One* of them appearing *Honest*, and the *Other Profitable*; how to distinguish. He has written *Three Books* upon the *Two* former Heads; and promised a Discourse upon the *Third*; but he has not been so good as his word: which I do the more wonder at, because I find in his Scholar *Posidonius*, that he liv'd *Thirty years* after the Publishing of these Books. And I am in some Admiration too, that *Posidonius*, in his Commentaries, should pass the matter over so slightly; especially making This Remark upon it, that of the whole Body of Philosophy, This is the most necessary part. There are some that will not have This to be an Oversight in *Panæti*; but a point left out

out upon Consideration ; as a thing wholly Impertinent. But I am of another Opinion. The Reason they give, is This. *Honest*, and *Profitable* (they say) are *Convertible Terms* ; and not to be so much as Imagined in Opposition. From hence there may arise another Question, whether the Third Branch of *Panætius's* Division should not have been absolutely rejected, without any mention of it at all. But it is Certain however, that he did at first undertake it, and then let it fall. He that makes a Tripartite Division, and goes thorough with Two parts of it, is undoubtedly answerable for the Third : And he passes his word over and above toward the latter end of his Third Book, that he will go on with it. And we have the Authority of *Posidonius* himself to Witness as much ; writing in a certain Epistle what *Publius Rutilius Rufus* (an Auditor of *Panætius*) was wont to say. As there was never any Painter (says he) that durst venture upon Finishing the Picture of *Venus*, which *Apelles* had begun (such was the Delicacy of the Face, that there was no hope of matching it with a suitable Body) so in the Case of *Panætius*, the Excellency of those things which he did perfect, was so Transcendent, that no man after him durst ever attempt the supplying of what he either Omitted, or left Imperfect. So that of *Panætius's* Intention there can be no longer any doubt. But yet whether he did Well or Ill in adding the Third member of his Division, may perhaps bear a dispute : For taking it either according to the *Stoiques*, that nothing can be *Good* but that which is *Honest* ; or with the *Peripatetiques*, that *Honesty* is the *Sovereign Good*, to such a degree, that all other

Cicero excuses an Omission of Panætius.

Nothing
can be Pro-
fitable, but
what is
Honest.

Goods are as nothing in the Ballance against it ; they do both of them however agree in This, that Profit can never be admitted into a Competition with *Honesty*. How does *Socrates* Curse the First dividers of *Honest*, and *Profitable*, in *Imagination*, which are so *Inseparable* by *Nature* ? And the *Stoiques* go so far along with him too, as to hold that nothing can be the One, without being also the Other. But if *Panatius* were one of those that will have *Virtue* to be *Therefore* Esteem'd for the Profit that she brings us ; measuring things *Desirable*, either by *Pleasure*, or *Freedom* from *Pain* ; he might then be allow'd to erect the Notion of a *Possible Repugnancy* of Profit, to *Honesty*. But being of Another Opinion, and that the *Only Good* is That which is *Honest* : and that whatsoever stands in Opposition to it, under the shew of *Utility*, a mans life is neither the *Better* nor the *Worse* for it, either With it, or Without it : He should not so much as have put the Case, methinks, where Profit and *Virtue* should appear in the *Comparison*. For to Live according to *Nature*, which the *Stoiques* account for the *Sovereign Good* : is nothing else (as I understand it) than to lead a life Congruous to *Virtue* : And in all Cases whatsoever, to follow the direction of *Nature* in a Conformity thereunto. The matter standing Thus ; some men are of opinion that This Comparison was not properly introduced ; and that there was not any need of prescribing in This Kind, at all.

True Ho-
nesty and
True Wis-
dom are In-
separable.

NO man can be *Truly Honest*, but He that is *Truly Wise* ; and there is no separating the One from the Other. There may be an *Imperfect*

perfect Honesty, 'tis True, with an *Imperfect Wisdom*; which is rather the *Resemblance of Honesty*, than the *Thing it self*. And therefore all those Duties that we treat of in this Discourse, the *Stoiques* call *Middle Duties*: which are *Middle Duties*. Common indifferently to Mankind; and of a large extent: and some people attain the knowledge of them by a Felicity of Nature; others by a Progression, and advance upon Study. But those which They call *Right Duties*, are Complete and Consummate in all the parts (or numbers as they express it) and This perfection is only to be found in a Wise man. But he yet that acquits himself in the Discharge of these *Middle Offices*, goes for Current with the *Multitude* for a good and a *Wise man* in the *Abstract*: They not being able to distinguish betwixt what is *Perfect*, and *Defective*. Wherefore so far as They understand the Business, there is nothing wanting. We see many times in Poems, Pictures, and a World of other Instances, how strangely the unskilful are delighted with them, and yet for the most part commending the least masterly stroke in the piece: which arises from This Ground, (I suppose) they find something in the whole that pleases them; but they are not able to judge of the Imperfections of the several parts: But when they come to be better instructed, they are easily brought to change their First Opinion.

THE Duties here Treated of, are with the *Stoiques* a kind of *Second-rate Honesty*; and not peculiar to *wise men*, but *Common to Human Nature*: And therefore they affect all people that have in them the least spark of Good Nature,

No man
Good or
Wise in the
Abstract.

or Virtue. Now when we speak of the *Magnanimity* of the two *Decii*, or the *Scipio's*, or of the *Justice* of *Fabricius*, or *Aristides*; we do not propose their Example as the Standard of that *Courage*, and *Equity* that is required in a *Wise man*. For I do not look upon either of them to have been *Wise* to the Degree of *Wisdom* here intended; no, nor those very Persons upon whom the World has bestowed both the *Reputation*, and the *Name* of *Wise men*. I speak of *Cato*, *Caius Lelius*, or the *Seven Sages* themselves. But by the Frequent exercise of *Middle Offices* they had somewhat of the appearance, and *Resemblance* of *Wise men*. So that we must neither Compare *Profit* in Opposition to that which is *truly Honest*; nor oppose any matter of *Gain* to that which we commonly call *Virtue*; whereupon these people value themselves, that would be accounted *Good men*. And we must as well uphold and preserve That *Practical Honesty* that falls under our Capacities; as that which in *Strictness* and *Truth*, is only the *Honesty* of *Wise men*: For Otherwise, how shall we know what progress we make toward *Virtue*? And so much for those that by doing *Good Offices* get themselves the *Reputation* of being *Good men*.

The Epicu-
reans mea-
sure Hone-
sty by Pro-
fit.

BUT for those that Measure all things by the Common Interest of *Gain* and *Benefit*, and will not allow *Honesty* to take place; it is ordinary for them to put *Money* in the Scale against *Virtue*; which no good man will ever do. I suppose therefore, that *Panætius*, when he says that men are wont to make some doubts upon the comparison, means only (as he says) that they are *Wont* to do so; and not that they *do well* in
so

so doing. For not only the Preference of profit to Honesty, but the very comparing of them, and the making a doubt in the Case, is a shameful Bus'ness. But what is it that we doubt upon? Or what's the Ground of our Consideration? It is (I presume) upon the Quality of the Point in Question: For that which is Dishonourable at one time, may be Warrantable at another. As for Example, upon a supposition more at large; what fouler Villany can be imagined than the Killing not only of a Man, but a Familiar friend? and yet the people of Rome do not only Absolve any man that destroys a Tyrant, tho' his Familiar friend; but they reckon upon it as the most Glorious action of an Honourable Life. Is it in This Case that Profit prevails over Honesty; or rather that the Honesty follow'd the Profit?

Circumstances alter the Case.

THE Certain way to keep us Right in our Judgments upon the Concurrence of Profitable, and Honesty, will be the Establishment of such a Rule as upon the Comparing of things will direct us in our Duty: which Rule I would have to be squar'd to the Reason and Discipline of the Stoiques: And This is the Rule which I shall observe in This Treatise; Because tho' the Ancient Academiques, and the Peripatetiques also, (which were formerly all one) give a Preference to that which is Honest, before that which seems to be Profitable; the matter is yet more Generously handled by the Stoiques, that make Profit and Honesty Reciprocal, than by those that Imagine a thing may be either Honest, and not Profitable, or Profitable, and not Honest. Now our Academy allows great Liberty, and gives us a

A Rule keeps us Right.

*In our
Judgments
of Profitable
and
Honest.*

Right to defend That which appears most *Probable*. But to Return to my Rule, to take away any thing wrongfully from any man, or to make my Own Fortune by the empoverishing of another, is more Contrary to *Nature*, than Death, Beggery, Pain; or whatever else can befall a mans Body, or Estate. For at First Dash it destroys all Neighbourhood and Society: For if we come once to entertain an Opinion that One man for his own advantage may Assault, or make a Prey of another; there follows necessarily an Absolute dissolution of Human Society, and a Violation of the most Certain and powerful Dictate of Nature. Put the Case that one Member should draw to it self the Health, and Good Bloud of the Member next unto it; the whole Body must, of necessity, Consume and Perish: In like manner if every man should take from another what he can get, and apply his Neighbours Goods to his Own Use, this would undoubtedly put an end to all Friendliness, and Fellowship among men. It is natural enough for a man to provide Necessaries for himself, in the First place; But it is yet against Nature for him to furnish himself with Money or Provisions, by Spoil and Rapine: And it is not only by the dictate of Nature, or the Rights of Nations, but by the particular Laws and Constitutions of all States, that it is declared Unlawful for One man to do any Mischief to Another for his proper Benefit. It is the expresse Care, Will, and Intent of all Laws to maintain the Duties of Society, Safe, and Inviolable: and they punish the Transgressors of these Rules with Death, Banishments, Prisons, and Fines: And much more does Nature her self exact this from us:

*Fraud and
Rapine are
against the
Laws of
Nature &
Nations.*

Nature

Nature (I say) which is the *Law Divine* and *Humane*, *Both in one*. Whoever obeys Her Dictate (as all men will, that propose to live in a Conformity to the Principles of a Reasonable Being) will never agree to the Coveting of what is Another mans, or to the taking away from his Neighbor, and Giving to himself. For Greatness of Mind, Gentleness, Justice, and Liberality are, much more Consonant to Nature than Pleasure, Life, or Riches: which, in comparison with the Common good, are by all men of Brave and exalted Minds, neglected and despised. Whereas on the Other side, to Spoil my Neighbor for my Own Advantage is more contrary to Nature, than Death, Torments, and the like. As it is more according to Nature for a man to undergo all sorts of Labours and Troubles for the Service and Conservation, (if it were possible) even of the whole World: After the Example of *Hercules*, whom the Gratitude of *Men* has placed for his Virtues among the *Gods*: All This (I say) is more Agreeable to Nature, than to live in Solitude; and not only free from Cares, but even wallowing in Pleasures, and Plenty; with all the Advantages of Strength and Beauty, over and above. This is it that makes all Great and Glorious Spirits, so much to prefer difficulty and action, before a Life of Idleness and Sloth. From hence it comes to pass, that according to Nature, One man can never hurt another. And besides, he that wrongs another for his Own Advantage, he does either imagine that this is not against Nature; or else he supposes that Death, Poverty, Pain, Loss of Children, Kindred and Friends, are more to be avoided, than the doing of Injuries.

ries. But if he conceives that one man may do an Injury to another without an offence to Nature, there's no disputing with One that has lost his Reason; and in effect, Ejected all that is Man even out of himself. But what if he thinks the *One* to be *Bad*, and yet the *Other*, *Worse*? He is in a Grievous Mistake, to phantasie any Calamity of Body or Fortune comparable to the disorders of his Mind.

The Interest of the Whole, is the interest of every Part.

WE should all of us therefore agree upon this common proposition, That the Interest of the *Whole*, is the Interest of *Every part*; and that whoever draws more to himself than belongs to him, is an Enemy to the Publique. Now if it be the very Prescript of Nature, that for Humanity sake, one Man shall take Care of another; it does necessarily follow, that the Welfare of the Publique, is the Interest of every particular, according to the same Principle. Let but This be admitted, and we are all of us equally under the Government of the same Law: And then taking That for granted; to do an Injury to any Man is against the Law of Nature. The Former is certainly True; and so is the Other, by Consequence. It is a Ridiculous Shift, to say, that I would not take away any thing from my Father, or from my Brother, to put in my Own pocket; but to take from other people, is quite another case: as if every Individual were not concerned in the Protection of the whole: An Opinion utterly Inconsistent with the Rules of Government.

T H E R E are some again will have the *Citizens* provided for, but not *Strangers*: And These

These Men tear up the very Foundations of Human Society. For take away That once, and there will be no longer any Good Nature, Liberality, Honesty, or Justice, to be found upon the Face of the Earth. And whosoever brings Matters to That pass, is to be accounted an Enemy to the *Gods Themselves*, for breaking that Union among men, which was no other than a Constitution of *Divine Appointment*. It is the strongest Band of Society, a General Agreement in This Position, that it is a greater Offence to Nature for me to take any thing from another, for my own Advantage, than to suffer all the Miseries that can possibly befall any Man in his Body or Estate: Nay, that can befall the very Mind it self; saving the single point of Justice, which one Virtue is the Mistress, and the Princess of all the rest. But what? (will some say) Shall a Wise Man rather Perish for want of Bread, than take a Loaf from another Man that's good for nothing, to keep himself from Starving? This must not be done yet; no not upon any Terms: Life is not so dear to me as my Duty; and my Resolution not to wrong any Man for my Own Benefit. Suppose an Honest Man almost frozen to death might save his Life by taking away the Cloak of *Phalaris*; (a Barbarous and a Bloudy Tyrant) should he not do it? This is a Case easily determin'd: For the taking of any thing away from another, for a Man's Own sake, is Inhuman, and against the Law of Nature, let the Man be never so worthless. But in the Case of a Person whose Life may be of Eminent Use and Service to the Commonwealth, to take any thing from such a Worthless person to preserve so necessary an Instrument to the Publique; and

Better suffer any Calamity than do an Injury.

to take it purely upon That Consideration, it is not blame-worthy : But otherwise, I must rather bear my Own Misfortunes, than Relieve my self by what I force from another Man : so that it is not more against Nature to be Sick, or Necessitous, than to Seize upon, or Covet the Goods of another : But the abandoning of the Common Good is an Offence to Nature ; for it is Unjust ; and therefore the Law of Nature, that Regulates and Provides for the Common Welfare of Mankind, does in a manner direct the Translation of Necessaries from a slothful and unprofitable wretch, to the behoof of a Wise, a Good, and a Valiant Man, and whose Loss might be of great damage to the Government : Provided that it be done meerly out of such a respect, without any Vanity, or Self-love, or making use of a Publique Pretext for a Colour to a particular Injustice. In so doing, I keep my self still upon my Duty, consulting the Benefit of Mankind, and (that which I often Inculcate) of Human Society.

AS to the Case of *Phalaris*, the decision is Obvious : For a Tyrant is rather an Enemy, than a Member of Human Society ; and there can be no Crime in the despoiling of an Usurper, whom it is Lawful to Kill ; and it were well if the whole Race of this impious and pestilent sort of men were exterminated from having to do with Mankind. For as we cut off Mortifi'd Limbs, when the Bloud and Spirits have in a manner forsaken them, and that they grow dangerous to the Rest : so should that fierce and outrageous Brutality be separated, if I may so say, from the Common Humanity of the Publique

lique Body. Of this Quality are all those Questions of Duty, whereof the Resolution depends upon the Circumstances of Times : which I presume, *Panætius* would have pursu'd, if somewhat of accident or bus'ness had not taken him off from his purpose. We have said enough in our former Books upon This Matter ; to shew what we are always to shun, as evil and shameful in it self, and what we are not obliged always to avoid, because it is not *always*, either *Misbecoming*, or *Disbonest*.

BUT being now about to Crown the Work we have begun, I must deal with You, (my *Cicero*) as the Mathematicians do with their Disciples. They lay down certain *Postulata*, to be taken before-hand for granted, without the Trouble of discoursing the Points ; to the end that they may make themselves more easily understood. So must I require of You (my *Cicero*) to yield me this point, (if you can afford it) that *Nothing is desirable for it self, but what is Honest*. Now if *Cratippus* will not allow of the Proposition whole as it lies ; This yet, I presume, will not be deny'd, That *Virtue is Chiefly, if not Only to be desired, and for its own sake*. It is all one to me, which of the Two you take, for they are Both of them more probable than any thing else : And First, let me vindicate *Panætius*, in This, that he never suppos'd a *Competition of Utility, and Virtue* ; (nor could he have justifi'd it if he had) but he is to be understood of things that *seem* profitable ; for over and over in all his Discourses he still makes *Utility, and Virtue to be Convertibles*, and represents it to be the most pestilent Error that ever enter'd

into

Certain Principles to be given for granted.

into Human Life, the Opinion that divided them. And therefore he introduced a Repugnancy, betwixt *Appearances*, and *Truths*; not as separating the *Profitable* from the *Honest*; but for our Caution, and Instruction, that we might judge betwixt them. We shall therefore dispatch this remaining part without any help from others; and upon our own account, (as we say:) For since *Panatus* left This Subject, I have seen nothing yet that has given me any sort of satisfaction.

Nothing
can be be-
neficial,
that is dis-
honest.

WE are all of us apt to be moved upon any thing that presents it self unto us, under the appearance of Profit. But if upon looking narrowly into it, we find any thing that is dishonest, or shameful, annexed thereunto; we are not to leave it then, as a thing *Profitable*, but as considering that *Utility*, and *Dishonesty* cannot stand together. For if there be nothing so *Contrary* to *Nature* as the *One*, or so *Agreeable* to it, as the *Other*; (for Nature affects what is Right, Convenient, and Constant, and despises the contrary) it is impossible that they should both meet in the same Subject. Again; If we are born for *Virtue*; either (according to *Zeno*) *Virtue* is to be desired for it self alone, or (according to *Aristotle*) it weighs down all other things: then does it follow, of Necessity, that *Virtue* must be either the *Only*, or the *Supreme Good*. So that whether way soever it be taken, that which is *Good*, is certainly *Profitable*; and that which is *Profitable*, is certainly *Good*. Those Men therefore are very short-sighted, that presently lay hold of that which appears *Profitable*, and consider it apart from that which is *Honest*. From
Hence

Hence come Murthers, Poysonings, Forgeries, Thefts, Publique Cheats, Oppressions, Squeezing of the people, or our Confederates: From Hence come the Intolerable Insolencies of Men of over-grown Fortunes; and finally, Ambition, and the Thirst of Dominion; than which nothing can be more Ruinous, or Pernicious in a Free City. They take false Measures of the *Value* of things, without so much as dreaming of the *Punishment*; not the *Punishment* of the *Laws*, (for That they can with ease break through) but That of the *Conscience*, which is the bitterest of all. Wherefore this sort of men should be excluded Human Conversation, (as most Execrable, and Impious) even for barely deliberating whether they should either follow That which they see to be *Honest*, or knowingly pollute themselves with *Villany*. The very *Doubt* and *Deliberation* is *Criminal*, though without advancing to the Act it self. Wherefore we should never deliberate at all, where the very deliberation it self is Shameful.

The great punishment is that of Conscience.

AND then in all our *Deliberations*, we should not entertain any Hope or Design, of Concealing, or disguising Matters; for we should take up This for a Maxim; (at least, if we be ever the better for our Philosophy) that if we could carry things so Private, as that neither God nor Man should discover us, we should yet have such a Reverence for our Selves, as not to let any thing of *Injustice*, *Uncleanness*, or *Immodesty*, escape us. Plato's Fable of *Gyges*, is not impertinent to our purpose. The Story has it, that a Torrent having eaten a Hollowness in the Ground, *Gyges* went down into it, and there observ'd a Brazen

A Divine Precept.

The Fable and Moral of Gyges's Ring.

Brazen Horse, with doors in his Sides. Upon the Opening of these doors, he discover'd the dead body of a Man, of a prodigious Size, with a Golden Ring upon his Finger. *Gyges* boldly pluckt it off by Force, and put it upon his Own, and being the King's Shepherd, he went his way, and joyn'd himself with Other Shepherds. Finding, that upon turning the Stone of the Ring, Inwards, he became Invisible to Others, and yet saw every thing Himself; and that upon turning it back again he became Visible, as before; by the Advantage of this Ring he made his way to the Enjoyment of the Queen, and by her Assistance, Murther'd the King, his Master; and in a short time remov'd all out of the way that he thought stood betwixt Him, and the Crown. All this Lewdness he Committed by the help of this Ring, and so made himself King of *Lydia*. Now if a Wise Man were the Master of such a Ring, he would reckon himself no more Priviledg'd to do an Ill thing with it, than without it; for an Honest man considers the Goodness of the Action, not the Privacy of it. It is objected by some (that shew themselves to be better Men, than Philosophers) that this Story out of *Plato* is only a Tale; as if any Man would report it for a thing either True, or Possible; but see however the Force and Scope of this Ring, and of this Example. How many things are done out of Avarice, Ambition, Pride, Lust, that nobody knows of, or so much as suspects? Suppose that this Impiety could be kept so secret, that neither God nor Man should come to know it: Would you commit it? 'Tis a thing impossible, (they say, whether it be so or not.) But what would they do (say I) if they could do

do the thing, which they say they cannot? They return you the same senseless Answer over again: they say 'tis *Impossible*; and there they stick: not at all comprehending the Drift, and Import of the Question. For in asking what a Man would do if he could *Conceal* it, I do not ask whether he can *Conceal* it, or no: But I put the Question, as if it were in Case of the *Torture*. If they make answer that *if they were sure to escape Punishment, they would do what they found most Expedient*, they confess themselves to be *Criminals*; and if they deny it, 'tis a Concession that *all evil things are to be avoided, even for Themselves*. But to return now to my purpose.

THERE fall out divers Cases, that under an Appearance of Profit, many times disorder our Thoughts, and trouble us in our Resolutions: not as upon a Deliberation whether a man should strain a Point of *Honesty* in regard of the *Greatness* of the *Benefit* in prospect; (for That were *Mean*, and *Dishonest*) but whether That which seems so *very Profitable* may be done without *Dishonour*. It might look like an unjust thing in *Brutus*, the Deposing of *Collatine*, his *Fellow-Consul*, who in the Expulsion of the Kings, was both his *Partner* in the *Advice*, and his *Assistant* in the Execution: But when the whole Body of the Principals of the City had agreed together to extirpate the whole *Family*, and the *Relations* of that proud Prince, as well as the Name of the *Tarquins*; (which was a Resolution of publique Advantage) This was so *Honest*, and Just an Action, that *Collatine* himself was Obliged to approve of the Proceeding: so

The appearance of Profit oftentimes distrusts us.

that this Utility was valu'd for the Honesty sake, without which, in truth, it had not been Profitable. But This did not hold in the Case of that Prince that Founded our City: For he was so wrought upon by the shew of Profit, that he kill'd his Brother upon the appearing Advantage of rather Governing Alone than with Company. He cast off all Piety and Humanity, for the obtaining of that which seem'd unto him to be Profitable, tho' it proved the clear contrary. The pretended Honesty in the Action, was to punish the Affront of his Brothers leaping in scorn over the Wall; but it was neither Competent, nor likely. Wherefore, under favour of either *Quirinus* or *Romulus*; (no matter whether) it was undoubtedly a Crime.

*How far
we may
look to our
selves.*

AND yet we are not to neglect our own Advantages neither; or part with any thing to Others, when we want it our selves. But every man should attend his own Profit, as far as may be without Injury to Another. *Chrysippus* had many Witty sayings, whereof this was one. *In the running of a Course, (says he) a man may be allow'd to strive, and contend his Utmost: but to trip up his Antagonists Heels, or to lay hands upon him, this is a thing not to be done upon any terms. So for any man to get That which may serve for the use of Life, is very Fair, and allowable; but to take it away from Another, is not Lawful.*

*Many Niceties in
Friendships*

IN Friendship, 'tis true, there are many Niceties as well in the not doing of any good Office which may Honestly be done, as in the doing of any thing for a Friend contrary to Justice.

Justice. But one short Rule will serve upon This whole Matter, and it is no hard one neither. Those things that seem Profitable ; as Honours, Riches, Pleasures, and Other Circumstances of the like Kind ; these things are never to be preferr'd before Friendship : But no Good man will do any thing for a Friend, that is either against the Commonwealth, his Oath, or his Word : No nor if he were himself to be a Judge in his Friends Case ; for he lays down the person of a *Friend*, where he takes up that of a *Judge*. I would have him wish that his Friend may have *Justice* on *his side* ; and I would have him allow him all the Favour in point of *Time*, that the Law will permit ; but when he comes to pass his *Sentence*, let him remember, and consider, that he calls God to Witness ; or (as I suppose) his Own Conscience, the Divinest thing Heaven it self ever bestow'd upon a Mortal. It was therefore a Worthy Practice of our Ancestors ; They never ask'd any thing of a Judge (and I wish we did so at This day) but upon Condition that it might consist with Justice. This Request has relation to those things which (as I said e'en now) a Judge may fairly allow to a Friend ; for if a man must of Necessity do all things that a Friend would have him do, this is no longer a Friendship, but a Confederacy. Let me be understood only of Common Friendships : For among men that are Wise, and Perfect, there can be no such thing. The Story goes of *Damon*, and *Pythias*, (*Pythagoreans*) so great was the Kindness they had for one another, that when *Dionysius* had sentenced one of them to death, the Party Condemned only desired a few days

The Generous friendship of *Damon* and *Pythias*.

respite to put his Affairs in order; and the Other became Surety (Body for Body) for his Appearance. The Prisoner return'd at his day, and the Tyrant fell into such admiration at their *Generosity*, and *Justice*, that he requested them to receive Him as a Third man, into that Friendship. Wherefore in all Friendships, where the Profitable and the Honest meet in Comparison we should never consider the Profit, but square our actions according to the honesty. But wheresoever any thing shall be required in *Friendship*, which does not stand with *Honesty*, in that Case *Religion*, and *Faith*, must take place of *Friendship*. This is the Rule by which we are to make Choice of the Duty here in Question.

*Publique
Mistakes
under the
appearance
of Profit.*

WE are Liable also to many Publique Mistakes under the Appearance of Profit; as our Countrymen were to blame in the Irrecoverable Destruction of *Corinth*. And the *Athenians* did yet worse, in cutting off the Thumbs of the people of *Ægina*, only because they were good Seamen, and they reckon'd that this might turn to their Advantage, and Security, because of the Neighbourhood of *Ægina* to one of their principal Ports. But nothing can be *Profitable* that's *Cruel*; for we are to follow the Dictate of *Nature*, and nothing is more *Contrary* to *Nature*, than *Cruelty*.

*Humanity
to Stran-
gers.*

THEY do very Ill also, that either Prohibit, or Banish Strangers from among them; as *Petronius* did of Old; and *Papins*, not long since. It is well enough not to suffer him that is no
Citizen,

Citizen, to pass for a *Citizen*, (according to the Law of our Consuls *Crassus* and *Scævola*, who were Wise men.) But it is undoubtedly most Inhuman, absolutely to deny the Common Benefit of Protection, and Intercourse in a City, to Strangers. Those are Great and Remarkable Cases wherein the *Shew* or *Colour* of *Publique Utility* is despised, in comparison with *Honesty*. We have in the Story of our Commonwealth, a World of Eminent Examples. How many times have we (and especially in the *Second Punique War*, after that Miserable Disaster at the Battle of *Canna*) shew'd greater Courage in our Distress, than ever we did in our Prosperity ? There was not the least sign of Fear among us, nor any mention of peace ; such is the Power of *Honesty*, that nothing of Profit can appear against it ! The *Athenians*, when they were no longer able to resist the force of the *Persians*, came to a Resolve of putting all their Wives, and Children into *Trazen* ; to abandon the City, and maintain the Liberty of *Greece* with a *Navy*. There was one *Cyrcilus* that advis'd them rather to stay in the City, and receive *Xerxes* into it ; but they Ston'd him to death for his Counsel. He gave them the advice which he took to be most profitable ; but it ceases to be *Profit*, when it stands in opposition to *Honesty*. *Themistocles*, after his Victorious War against the *Persians*, declar'd in Council that he had thought of something that might be of great Advantage to the Commonwealth ; but it was not convenient to be made *Publique*, and therefore desir'd them to appoint some body to whom he might impart the matter in private. They named *Aristides* ; and he

A scrupulous point
of Honour.

told him that the *Lacedæmonian* Fleet, which was laid up at *Gytheon* might easily be Fir'd by surprize, which would very much weaken the *Lacedæmonians*. *Aristides*, when he had heard it, came into the *Senate* where they were all big with Expectation, and made his Report that *Themistocle's* Counsel was very *Profitable*, but not *Honourable*: wherefore the *Athenians* would not allow it to be *Profitable* neither, if it were not likewise *Honest*; and so rejected the proposition, only upon the Report of *Aristides*, even without hearing it. How much did these people go beyond us; that suffer our *Pirates* to go *Free*; while our *Confederates* are *Tributaries*? Let it be taken therefore for granted, that nothing can ever be *Profitable* that is *Dishonourable*; no, not in the very possession of that which we account so to be. Nay it is a great Infelicity of Judgment, to Imagine that any thing can be *Profitable*, that is *Dishonest*.

Some nice
Cases of
Conscience.

BUT there fall out many Occasions (as I have said before) wherein the *Profitable*, and the *Honest* may fall in *Competition*: in which Case we should consider how far they stand in direct Opposition, and wherein they may be fairly reconcil'd: As for Instance, upon these Questions. An *Honest* man sets sail from *Alexandria* to *Rhodes* with a Lading of Corn; the *Rhodians* in great distress for want of it; and the Commodity bearing an Excessive price. This person knows that there are other *Alexandrian* Ships under way, and bound for the same Port, and with the same *Cargo*: whether or no shall he tell the *Rhodians* now, that there are other
Mer-

Merchants coming with Relief, or say nothing of it, and make the best Market of his Corn that he can? We put this Case, supposing him to be a *Good* and a *Wise man*, and the matter to be under Deliberation. If he thinks it an *Ill* thing to Conceal this from the *Rhodians* he will not do it; but he makes some doubt whether it be *Ill*, or *No*. In Difficulties of This Nature, *Diogenes*, the *Babylonian*, (a Grave and Famous *Stoique*) is of One Opinion; and his Disciple *Antipater* (a very acute man) is of another. *Antipater* will have all the Circumstances laid open; so that the Purchaser may not be kept Ignorant of any thing, which the Other knows. *Diogenes* says that the *Vender* is bound to discover all the Faults, so far as he is obliged to it by the *Civil Law*; and to manage his Bargain without Fraud. So that being to sell the Commodity, he may without Deceit make the best on't. Here (says he) *I have brought my Corn; I have run the Risque on't; and I set no higher a rate upon the Commodity than Others do; nay perhaps I offer it Cheaper: If you can have it any where else, where's the Injury?* Now *Antipater*, on the other side, Reasons it thus. How is That? (says he) It is our Duty to Consult the Good of Mankind, and to serve Human Society; and we came into the World under That Obligation. We have Principles of Nature, which we are bound to Follow and Obey; and we are to account nothing Profitable to our selves, that is not so to the *Publique*: And likewise, to account of the *Publique Profit*, as our *Own*. Shall we conceal That then from a *Society* of men, which so much concerns their *Commodity*, and *Supply*? *Diogenes* will

reply (perhaps) that it is one thing to *Conceal* a matter, and another thing not to *Tell* it: Do I tell you (at this instant) what is the Nature of the Gods, or the end of Good men; which are things much more Profitable to be known, than the price of Wheat? And yet you will not say that I *Conceal* This from you. But it is not absolutely necessary for me neither to tell you every thing which may be profitable for you to hear. But the Other will tell you *Yes, it is necessary*; if you remember that men are naturally link'd together in *Society*. Well (says the Other) I do not forget it: But will you have it to be such a Society then, as that no man shall have any thing particular in it of his Own? If it comes to That once, there's no longer any *Buying* and *Selling*, but only *Giving*. You see in this whole Dispute, that it is not said, tho' This or That be *Dis honest*, I will yet Do it, because it is *Expedient*: But it must be so *Expedient*, that there be nothing *Dis honourable* in it. Now (on the Other hand) out of that very Consideration that it is *Dis honourable*, it is therefore *not to be done*. Suppose an Honest man has a mind to put off his House for some fault or inconvenience in it, only known to himself: As a *Contagious Air*; (for the purpose) tho' it may (perhaps) pass for *Healthful*; all the Rooms annoy'd with Vermin, Ill-built, or Ruinous, which is only known (as I say) to the Master of the House. The Question is, if he Conceals these faults to get a better Rate for his House than he could otherwise have done, whether he does *well*, or *ill*, in That *Concealment*? *Antipater* will have it to be very *Ill done*, and near the
 Case

Case of not setting a man Right that's out of his way. A Crime which was punish'd at Athens by a Formal Solemnity of Publique Execrations. Is not This the Suffering of the Purchaser to ruine himself, and to fall into the worst of Snares, by a Mistake? Nay it is worse yet, than the *not shewing of the way*, for one man to lead another knowingly and wilfully into an Errour. *Diogenes* asks, on the Other side, who forc't you to buy it? Nay he did not (says he) so much as Advise you to't. That which did not please the One, he expos'd to sale, and the Other bought that which he had a mind to. If he shall not be taken for a Cheat, that sets up a Bill of a very good Farm to be Let or Sold, and well built, and in repair, tho' it be neither the One, nor the Other, much less shall he be accounted one, that does not so much as Commend his House; for where the Purchaser uses his own Judgment, what Fraud can there be in the Seller? But if we are not oblig'd, in all Cases, to make good every word we say, how should we be oblig'd to make good That which we do not say? Nor can anything be more Ridiculous than for a Merchant to publish the Faults of the Commodity he exposes to Sale. What would be more senseless than to make Proclamation by a Common Cryer, *Here's an Infected House to be Sold?* Now so it falls out, that in some doubtful Cases, the *Honesty* of the Action may be defended, on the One hand, and the *Benefit* of it so qualify'd on the Other; that it may not only be *Honourable*, to do that which appears *Profitable*, but even *Dishonourable*, to Omit it. This is a Point that comes often into question betwixt things *Profitable* and *Honest*.

THESE

Resolutions upon the former Cases.

THESE Difficulties must be set right : for it is not our *Business* to start a question, but to give a Resolution. It is my Opinion, that neither in the Case of the *Rhodian Corn-Merchant*, nor in That of the *House* offer'd to *Sale*, the *Concealment* there suppoed was *Justifiable*. For it is not properly the *Concealing* of a thing, to say nothing of it ; but the keeping of another man; for our own advantage, in Ignorance of that which he is very much concern'd to know. What kind of a *Concealment* This is, and the Quality of the man that uses it, who does not discern? This is not the Practice undoubtedly of an Open, a Frank, a Sincere, a Just or a Good man : but rather of a Shifting, a Close, a Deceitful, a Malicious, a Sly shuffler, and of a very Jugler. How can any man expect to get by the Bargain, that wears these foul Names, and lies under all these Reproaches.

A Pleasant Cheat.

BUT if the saying *Nothing* in this Case be so Blameable ; what shall we think of Them then that speak *False*? *Caius Cannius* (a Knight of *Rome*, and one that wanted neither Wit nor Learning) going sometimes to *Syracuse*, not upon *Business* (as he was wont to say) but for his diversion ; he gave out that he had a great mind to buy some Gardens there, where he might enjoy his Friends when he had a mind to't, without interruption. When this came to be talk'd of, there was one *Pythius*, in *Syracuse*, that drove the Trade of a *Banker*. I have Gardens here (says he) tho' not to be Sold, but however if *Cannius* pleases, he may use them as

his

his Own: And so he invites *Cannius* to those Gardens, the next day, to Supper. Upon *Cannius's* promise to come, *Pythius* (whose business gave him a great Interest there, among all sorts of people) sent for the Fishermen; and directed them to meet next day, and Fish just before his Gardens; and so gave them their Lesson what to do and how to behave themselves. *Cannius* came at his time, where he found a Magnificent Entertainment that *Pythius* had provided for him. There were a great many Boats before the Gardens, and every man brought the Fish he had taken, and laid them at *Pythius's* Feet. What's the meaning of all this (says *Cannius*) so many Fishes, and Boats? *Pythius* told him, there was no great wonder in't; For there is not any Fish (says he) in *Syracuse* which is not to be had in this place. They take in their Water here, and the Town cannot be without This Convenience. This set *Cannius* agog upon the Purchase, and nothing would serve but *Pythius* must sell him the place; He seem'd, at First, very unwilling to part with it; but without more words they came at last to an Agreement: *Cannius* was a Rich man, and presently struck up a Bargain (for the Gardens, and every thing that belong'd to them) with *Pythius*, at his own price: Security was given for the Money, and the business finish'd. *Cannius* invited some of his Familiar Friends thither the next day: and he himself coming betimes, and finding no Boats there, enquir'd of the Neighbourhood whether the Fishermen kept Holy-day that day, because he saw none of them There. Their Answer was, that They knew nothing of any Holy-day, nor of any

any Fishermen that us'd to be There : Insomuch that they wonder'd what brought them thither the day before. This put *Cannius* into a Rage : But what Remedy ? For my Friend and Colleague *Aquilinus* had not as yet made any Provision against *Dolus Malus*, or *Couzenage*. Upon my Demand to *Aquilinus* what was intended by that same *Dolus Malus*, he told me, that it was the pretending of one thing, and doing another. Which truly was a Full and Clear Definition of it, and worthy of a Wise man. Wherefore *Pythius*, and all like him, that Pretend one thing, and do another ; are to be accounted *Perfidious*, *Wicked*, and *Deceitful* ; So that nothing can be *Profitable* to us, that is polluted by so many *Crimes*. But if *Aquilinus*'s Definition be True, there must be no Feigning or Dissembling allow'd of in Human Society : And a Good man will neither do the one nor the other, either to Buy or Sell, to more Advantage. And That Deceit was punishable also by the Laws : As in the Case of *Guardianship* by the *Twelve Tables*. And so was the *Circumvention* of *Minours* punishable by the *Latorian Laws*. And sometimes by *Arbitration*, even without a Law ; where the Question was matter of Faith, and Trust. But of all other Judgments the Words that are used in the *Formulary* of an *Arbitrement* upon a *Marriage-Agreement* are most remarkable : As * *ME-LIUS*, *ÆQUIUS*, the *Better*, the *Juster* : and in matters of *Contract*, or *Confidence*, *INTER BONOS BENE AGIER* ; *Fair Dealing among Good Men*. Can there be any Mixture of *Fraud* now in *BETTER*, and *JUSTER* ? Or what place is there for *Collusion*, or *Iniquity*, in *Fair Dealing among Honest Men* ?

* Words of
Form.

NOW

NOW the *Dolus Malus*, or Deceit appears either in *Simulation*, which is a Pretence of something that is *not* ; or *Disimulation*, that is to say, a *Disguise*, or *Concealment* of somewhat that *Is*. Wherefore there must be no *Lye* admitted in any Business, or Contract ; nor should there be any Underhand substituting of a Buyer, or a Seller, to enhance, or to bring down the price ; but Both parties should say at a Word what they will *Give*, or *Take*. *Q. Scavola*, the Son of *Publius*, being upon a Purchase, bad the Proprietor tell him in One Word what he would have for the Estate : He did so : And *Scavola* told him he had undervalu'd it, and so gave him *Two Thousand Crowns* more than his Bargain. There is not any Man but will confess that This was the part of a *Good man*, tho' in the Opinion perhaps of some People, not of a *Wise Man* : As if the Other had set it lower than he could afford it. This is a mischief therefore, that *Some Men* are accounted *Good*, and *Other men* *Wise*, as if they could be separated. *Ennius* says that a Man's *Wisdom* serves him to little purpose, if it be not *Profitable* to himself. This may be true enough, if it were but agreed with *Ennius* what it is to be *Profitable*. I find *Hecaton* the *Rhodian* (*Panatinus's* Scholar) telling *Q. Tubero* in his Books of *Offices*, that *It is the part of a Wise Man* to do nothing against *Publique Customs, Laws, and Institutions* ; and wishal, to take good heed to his *Fortune, and Family* : For we should not propound to be *Rich*, only to our Selves, but to our *Children, Relations, Friends, and chiefly, for the Service of the Republique* : For the

*Simulation
and Dis-
simulation.*

*AGenerous
Scurple of
Scavola's.*

the Estates and Provisions of particulars, are the Wealth of the City. The proceeding of *Scavola* above-mentioned would never suit with *Hecaton*: For he only says that he would not do any thing for his own Profit that were Unlawful; and truly he deserves little Thanks, or Commendation for his pains. But allowing both *Lying*, and *Dissembling* to be this same *Dolus Malus*, or *Deceit*, there are very few things clear of That Fraud. Or if he be only the Good Man, that obliges as many as he can, and hurts no body; such a Good man will not be easily found. It can never be Profitable to do an *Ill Thing*; because it is always *unallowable*, and *shameful*. And it must ever be *beneficial* to be a *Good Man*, because it is always *Honest*,

Conceal-
ments pu-
nishable in
Bargains
for Estates.

IT is an Ordinance of the *Civil Law* in the Matter of *Estates*, that the *Vender* should still tell the *Purchaser* the *Defects*, or *Inconveniences* of the *Estate*; for it being sufficiently provided by the *Twelve Tables*, that every Man should make good what he promises or declares by *Word of Mouth*, upon the penalty of *Double Damages* for *Denying* it. The *Civilians* have also set a Punishment upon *Concealments* too; by enacting, that if the Seller of an Estate knew any Fault or Error in it, without expressly acquainting the Purchaser with it, he should be obliged to make it good. As in the case of the *Auguri Tower*; where they were to take their Observations from the Flight of Birds. *Titus Claudius Centimalus*, having some Houses upon the Hill *Calius*, the *Augurs* commanded him to pull them down, because they hinder'd their prospect.

spect. *Claudius* expos'd Those Houses to Sale, and so put them off ; and *Publius Calpurnius Lanarius* was the Purchaser. The *Augurs* found the same fault still with the Houses, when they were in His Possession : so that he pull'd them down. And coming afterwards to understand that *Claudius* had made sale of those Houses, after that the *Augurs* had appointed the demolishing of them ; forc'd him upon an Arbitration, what in point of Conscience was to be done in That Case. *Marcus Cato* pass the Sentence, (the Father of This *Cato* of ours) For as we denominate Others from their Fathers, we shall make mention of the person that gave this Light to the World, as accounting from the Son.) The Sentence was This, That since upon the Sale of That Estate, he had not told the Other of the Inconvenience which he knew it was expos'd to ; he should Indemnifie the Buyer of it ; concluding that the Proprietor was bound in Conscience to tell the Purchaser what damage might ensue upon it. Now if This was a Just Judgment, it was not Warrantable either in the *Corn-Merchant*, or in him that sold the *Infect'd Houses*, to conceal as is above supposed. But it is not possible for any Law to reach all the various Cases of these Concealments : And yet however, so far as they go, they are diligently observ'd. *Marcus Marius Gracidianus* sold to *Caius Sergius Orata* those very Houses which he himself had bought of him but a few years before. These Houses paid a Duty to *Sergius* (which was out of his mind.) But *Marius* made no mention of it in the Conveying of his Right. The Cause was brought into the Court ; *Crassus* was for *Orata*, and

and *Anthony* for *Gratidianus*: *Crassus* insisted upon the *Law*, because the Seller knew that he ought to have acquainted the Purchaser with this Incumbrance, but did not do it. *Anthony* insisted upon matter of *Equity*, because That Incumbrance was not unknown to *Sergius*, who sold the Houses, and so there was no need to say any thing of it; neither could he be said to be deceived, that knew what Title he had bought. Now to what End is all This, but to shew, that our Forefathers were not pleas'd with Wiles, and Shifts?

*Laws and
Philoso-
phers pro-
vide several
ways
against
Fraud.*

BUT Laws and Philosophers provide against Frauds several ways: The Laws regarding only matter of *Overt Act*, whereas Philosophers judge according to *Equity*, and *Reason*: which Reason does it self require of us, that we do nothing perfidiously, or with False Pretence, or Deceit. But shall we call it a Treachery to contrive a Pitfall, or set a Toyl, without either driving or hunting any thing into it? Well, but the Beasts many times fall into it, without a Pursuer. He that offers a House to Sale, what is his *Bill*, but a *Snare* laid for the Purchaser? His House is Faulty, and he would fain put it off, and somebody is caught at unawares. Now tho' I understand that according to depraved *Custom*, and *Manners*, this is not accounted *Dishonourable*; and that there is neither *Law*, nor *Civil Right* against it: It is nevertheless yet forbidden by the *Law of Nature*. For, as I have often said already, and must say oftner, *Society*, in the largest *Extent*, is that which is *Common to all men*; next under That is the *Society* of those of the same *Nation*,

Nation, and after That, of the *same City*. Wherefore our Fore-fathers distinguish betwixt the *Law of Nations*, and the *Law Civil*. For the *Civil Law* is not consequently the *Law of Nations*, but the *Law of Nations* does necessarily comprehend the *Civil*. Now to say the Truth, we have not among us any substantial or expresse Image of the *True Law*, or *sincere Justice*: So that we are fain to make use of *Shadows*, and *Figures*; and it were well if we could keep up, even to Them too: For they are Translated out of the *best Originals*, of *Truth*, and *Nature*. How glorious is that Provisional Condition for the making of good Contracts! *Provided that by your means, and depending upon your Honesty, I may not be deceived and brought into a snare.* And then that Golden Sentence, *we must live Honestly among good men, and without Fraud.* But then who are the *Good men*, and what it is to *do well*, is a Great question.

The Law Civil, and the Law of Nations.

Q. *Scævola* the High Priest was wont to ascribe of Good a very great force to all those Arbitrations that Faith. were grounded upon *Good Faith*; Accounting the very *Name* it self to be of a Large Extent: As having a respect to *Guardian-ships*, *Societies*, *Trusts*, *Mandates*, things bought, or sold, hired, or let, relating to the Community, and Enter-course of Life. He must be a great Judge, that in these Cases can determine (especially meeting in most of them with Contrary Opinions) how One man is to behave himself towards Another, under these Circumstances. Wherefore all Tricks and Artifices should be avoided: And That *Craft* also which imposes upon the World for *Wisdom*; how far from it soever. For *Prudence* is plac-

No Pest
like Craft
under the
Masque of
Simplicity.

ced in the Choice of Good, or Evil; but Craft prefers Evil before Good; at least if things that are Dishonourable be Evil. And 'tis not only in Lands, and Houses, that the Civil Law, in Conformity to that of Nature, forbids Fraud, and Circumvention; but even in the very dealing for Slaves, the Seller should act as frankly as in Other Cases. For he that is presum'd to know whether the Slave be Healthful, Honest, a Fugitive, or the like; the *Ediles Law* makes That Master answerable for the Servant. But this does not hold in the Case of an Heir that found such a Slave, or Servant in the Family. From hence it may appear, since Nature is the Fountain of Justice, that it is also according to Nature, that no man should make Advantage to himself of another mans Ignorance. Nor is there any greater Pest in Human Society, than a perverse Craft, under the Masque of Simplicity: And from thence proceed those Innumerable Cases, where the Profitable comes in Concurrence with the Honest. For, where's the man that would stick at any Injustice, if he might but hope for Impunity; or come off, under a pretence of Ignorance? Let us examine the Matter if you please; and in Those Instances where the Common people, perhaps, are scarce sensible that they do amiss: For we do not speak in This place, of Murthers, Poysonings, Forgeries, Robberies, or Embesilments of the Publique Treasure, which should rather be suppress'd by Prisons, and Fetters, than by Words, and Philosophical Precepts: But let us here rather consider what we find commonly to be done, even among those that have the Reputation of Honest men.

men. There were some people that brought out of Greece to Rome a forg'd Will of *Q. Minutius Basilus*, (who was a very wealthy man) and to make the bus'ness pass the better, they put into the Testament, *M. Crassus*, and *Q. Hortensius*, two of the most considerable men of the City; as *Joint-Heirs*, together with *Themselves*. They did, Both of them, suspect it to be a *Counterfeit*; and yet having no hand in it themselves, they were well enough content, to make advantage of Other peoples Wickedness. And what then? Is it sufficient that they *Themselves* had no hand in it? I am of Another Opinion; altho', for the *One* of them, I lov'd him while he was alive, and I do not hate the *Other* now he is Dead. But when *Basilus* had made his Sisters Son (*Marcus Satirius*) his *Heir*, and would have had him take his *Unkles* Name upon him; (I speak of that *Satirius* that to the Shame of the Age had the Patronage of the *Picenians*, and *Sabines*) it was a most unreasonable thing that the Chief men of the City should carry away the *Testators Estate*, and leave nothing to the Right *Heir* but his *Name*. Now if he stands guilty of an *Injustice*, that neither keeps off an Injury from his Friend by way of *Prevention*; nor *Repulses* it when he may, (as we have said in our First Book) what shall we think of him that does not only not Repel an *Injury*, but even Helps it on and promotes it? Nay, for my Own part, let the *Inheritance* be never so *Lawful*; yet if it be gain'd by *Craft*, *Flattery*, *Servile Offices*, or *False Pretences*; even That *Lawful Succession* I cannot approve. But in such Cases men are many times extremely misled, in taking One

A Case of
Conscience
about a
Forgery.

No Divi-
ding of
what Na-
ture has
Coupled.

thing to be *Honest*, and Another *Profitable*; for the same Rule holds in Both; and He that is not sensible of This, lies open to all sorts almost of *Fraud*, and *Iniquity*. For whosoever says thus to himself, *This is Honest*, 'tis true, but the *Other* is *Expedient*; he takes upon him to divide those things by a *Mistake* that are coupled by *Nature*; which opinion is the fountain of all Deceits, Crimes, and Evil Deeds. Wherefore if a Good man, for the very holding up of a Finger, could get himself made Heir to a Considerable Estate, which he has no Title to; he should not do it, tho' upon a Certainty that no man could ever so much as suspect him for it. But if *M. Crassus* could get an Estate upon the same Terms, upon my Credit he would leap out of his skin at it. But a *Just*, and such a one as we can allow for a Good man, will never agree to the taking of any thing away from *Another*, and transferring it to *himself*; and whoever wonders at This, does as good as confess himself Ignorant of what a good man is.

Who is a
Good man.

BUT he that will thoroughly examine the Secrets of his Own Soul, will be able to tell himself that only He is a Good man, who does as much good to *Others* as he can, and harms *no body* without some Injurious provocation. How's That? He that supplants the Right Heir, to get himself into his place, has not that man as much to answer for as if he had remov'd him by Poyson? But what (will some say) *may not a man Do that which is Profitable and Expedient for him?* Yes, yes, If he will take This along with him, that it is not possible for any thing to be *So*, that is

is *Unjust*. He that has not learn'd This Lesson, can never be a *Good* man. I remember, when I was a Boy, I heard my Father speak of *Fimbria* the *Consul*: who was appointed Judge in the Case of *Marcus Lucretius Pythias*, (a Knight of Rome, and a very *Honest* man) who undertook, upon the Forfeiture of a Sum of Money, to prove himself a *Good* man: but *Fimbria* did absolutely refuse to pass Judgment in That matter; lest he should either derogate from the Reputation of a person so much Esteemed, if he gave it against him, or appear on the other side, to pronounce any man to be *Good*, considering the Infinite Circumstances of Qualities, and Offices to make him so. So that neither *Fimbria's* *Good* man, nor *Socrates's*, will allow any thing to be *Profitable* that is not *Honest*: And such a man will not only fear to *Do*, but not dare so much as to *Think* any thing which he would not frankly own in *Publique*. Is it not a Shame now, for *Philosophers* to *Doubt*, where the *Common* people themselves are *Resolv'd*? For the Old Thredbare Proverb is *Their's*; when they would express a man of an exact Sincerity and Justice, *You may play at * Love with him in the dark*, they say; and what is the meaning of This, but to teach us, that nothing can be *Expedient* that is not *Honest*, tho' he might gain it, and the World never the Wiser for't? In the Moral of this Proverb, we are taught, that neither *Gyges's* way is to be endur'd, nor so much as a Finger to be mov'd, (as in the case formerly supposed) tho' a man might make himself Master of the whole World by so doing. For whatsoever is *Shameful*, and *Dis-honourable*, let it be never so *Secret*, nothing can

* A Little
Play with
the Fingers.

make it *Honest*; and that which is *not Honest*, it is as impossible to render it *Profitable*, in a *Repugnancy* and *Opposition* to *Nature*.

A Mean
Action of
C. Marius.

BUT where Criminals find great *Rewards*, there is also a great *Temptation* to offend. When *C. Marius* appeared out of all hope of the *Consulship*, and (having lyen still, for seven years after his *Pratorship*) no man imagin'd that he would ever have offer'd at it: *Q. Metellus* (a great man, and an Eminent Ciuzen) sent *Marius* (being his Lieutenant) to *Rome*. Where *Marius* publicquely charg'd his *Principal* before the People, with prolonging the War, and told them that if they had made Him *Consul*, he would in a very short time have deliver'd up *Ingartha*, either Alive or Dead, into the Power of the people: whereupon they made him *Consul*. But This was a Proceeding contrary to *Faith*, and *Justice*; by a false Suggestion to draw an Envy upon so Brave a man, and so Famous a Citizen: Especially *Marius* being *Metellus's* Lieutenant, and by his order sent to *Rome*. Neither did our Kinsman *Marius Gratidianus* in his *Pratorship* discharge the Office of a Good man. The *Tribunes* of the Common people Consulted the College of *Prators* about some Common Standard for the Valuation of their *Moneys*, which were then sometimes up, sometimes down, at such a rate, that no man knew what he was worth. They joyn'd unanimously in a *Decree*, with a *Penaley* upon any man that should not submit to't; and so they *Adjourn'd* for That *Morning*, resolving to meet again *After noon* for the publishing of it. When they were gone, some, one way,

way, some another; *Gratidianus* stept presently from the *Bench* to the *Tribunal*; and there made *Proclamation* by *Himself* alone of that which was the *Common Act* of the *Court*: which you will find (if you observe the *Story*) to have given him great *Reputation*; the people setting up his *Statues* every where up and down, with *Incense*, and *Tapers*: in one word, no man ever render'd himself more *Popular*. These are Small matters may be of great Importance Points that may puzzle a man sometimes in his *Deliberations*; especially when the *Matter* is but small, wherein any *Violence* is offer'd to *Justice*; but yet the *Consequence* seems to be of great *Importance*. It did not appear to be so very foul, for the *One Marius* to prepossess himself of the *Favour* of the *People*, by preventing his *Colleagues* and the *Tribunes*: And then it was, in appearance, a matter of great *Advantage* to the *Other Marius* to advance himself to the *Consulship* by the *Means* he had propounded. But there is *One General Rule* that I would have you take special *Notice* of; See *First* that what you account *Profitable*, be not *Dishonourable*; and *Then* if it be *Dishonourable*, let nothing persuade you that it is *Profitable*. But what then? Shall we pronounce either the *One Marius* or the *Other* to be an *Honest man*? Set your *Wits* at work, and try, and consider with your self what is the *Image*, the *Character*, and the *Notion* of a *Good man*? Will a *Good man* tell a *Lye*, *Calumniate*, *Supplant*, or *Deceive*? Certainly nothing less. Is there any thing then on the *Other side*, so *Profitable* or so *Desirable*, as that a man would forfeit the *Reputation* and the *Glory* of a *Good* and a *Wise man* to gain it? Can

A Good man will not do an ill thing.

That thing which we call *Profit*, bring us any Advantage to Countervail what it takes from us, in depriving us of the very Name of *Good men*; and divesting us of *Faith*, and *Justice*? What difference is there betwixt the turning of a *Man* into a *Beast*, by a *Real Metamorphosis*, and the bearing the *Figure*, and *Fierceness* of a *Brute* in his *Mind*, under the *Shape* of a *Man*? They that neglect and make light of all things that are *Honest*, for the Acquiring of *Power*, do they not do the same thing with *Pompey* that marry'd *Cesar's* Daughter to make himself *Great*, under the Boldness and Protection of his *Father in Law*? But he lookt upon't as a thing Advantageous to himself to augment his *Own Power* by the envy that was born to the Other: but how *Unjust* This was to his *Countrey*, and how *Dishonourable* to himself, he did not consider. His *Father in Law* had often in his Mouth those *Greek Verses* of the *Phœnicians* out of *Euripides*, which I'll tell you as well as I can, not so gracefully perhaps, but so as to be Understood.

To get a Crown, a man would break a Trust,

If break't at all: everywhere else, be Just.

IT was a Lewd and Horrible thing done of *Etheocles* (or rather of *Euripides*) to make That the *Exception* of a Crime, which of all Crimes is it self the most *Abominable*. But what do we talk of Petty things, as *Inheritances*, *Traffiques*, *Fraudulent Bargains*? What do you think of Him rather, that having the *Ambition* to make himself the *Master* of the *People of Rome*, and the *Empe-*

The Ambition of Julius Caesar.

Emperor of the World it self, accomplish'd his Ends? No man in his Wits will pretend to justify This Ambition: for in so doing he passes an Approbation upon the Subversion of our *Laws* and *Liberties*; and reckons, as a point of *Honour*, that *Ignoble*, and *Detestable Oppression*. But he that confesses the Unlawfulness of any mans Usurping a Dominion over a City that both has been Free, and ought so to be; and yet supposes it a thing Profitable to him that can compass it; I would spare no Reprehension; nor, in truth, any Reproche, to reclaim such a man from his Error: For (I appeal to the Immortal Gods) what Profit can any man find in the Foul and Execrable *Destruction* of his *Country*; albeit he, that is Guilty of it should come afterward to be stild the *Father* of it, by the *oppressed People*? *Utility* should therefore be guided by *Honesty*; *Utility* and in such manner, that tho' the *Words* differ, *should be* the *Thing* should be still the same. I do not find any thing more Profitable, in the Opinion of the *Common People*, than *Power*, and *Empire*: Neither, when I look narrowly into the Matter, do I find any thing more Unprofitable to him that *Unjustly attains it*. For what advantage can it be to any man, to live in *Anxiety*, *Carefulness*, *Fears*, Day and Night; and to lead a Life that is beset with *Snares*, and *Dangers*? There are more treacherous, and unfaithful men in a Kingdom (says *Accius*) than there are good. But of what Kingdom does he speak? even of That which is reported unto us of *Tantalus* and *Pelops*; a Kingdom that proceeded by a Lawful Descent. How much greater then is the Number of the Unfaithful to That Prince, who having oppress

oppress *Rome* it self by a *Roman Army*, and a City, not only *Free* in its own Constitution, but giving Laws to others; brought That City, at last, into subjection to Himself? How ulcerated a Conscience do you think This man must needs have? What wounds in his Soul? Or how is it possible that This mans Life should be Profitable to Himself, when such was the Condition of it, that Posterity will ever have a Veneration, and Esteem for those that took it away?

NOW if those things that carry the Fairest Appearance of *Profit*, fail yet of being what they seem to be, because they are full of Shame and Dishonour; This, methinks, should Convince any man, that nothing can be *Profitable*, that is not likewise *Honest*. Now as This has, in Many Cases, been determin'd; so most remarkably, by the Senate of *Rome*, and by *Caius Fabricius*, in his second *Consulate*: For when King *Pyrrhus* made War upon *Rome*, and the Quarrel was *Empire* too, and That with a *Powerful*, and a *Generous Prince*; there came a *Fugitive* from *Pyrrhus* into the Tents of *Fabricius*; and promised him, upon Condition of a Considerable Reward, that he would convey himself back, as privately as he came; and Poyson the King. *Fabricius* order'd this man to be carry'd back to *Pyrrhus*; and the *Senate* applauded the Resolution. Now if a man should regard the *Appearance*, and *Opinion* of *profit*, This one *Fugitive* might have put a period to That hazardous War, in the removal of the most Considerable Enemy of the Empire. But where the point in Controversie was *Honour*, it would have been a Scandalous and

*Fabricius's
Generosity
to Pyrrhus.*

And an Impious practice to have encountered a Noble Enemy with *Baseness*, and *Treachery*, instead of *Resolution*, and *Virtue*. Now which was the more Profitable, either to *Fabricius* (who was as Eminent in *Rome*, as *Aristides* was in *Athens*) or to our *Senate* (that never separated Profit from Honour) to subdue an Enemy by *Arms*, or by *posson* ? If *Empire* be desirable for *Glories* sake, let there be no *Treachery* or *Injustice* in the Attempt : For therein can be no *Glory*. And we must have a care too how we compass *Wealth it self*; for it can never be *Advantageous* to us with *Infamy*. And therefore it was no Profitable Advice, that of *L. Philippus* (the Son of *Quintus*) to Tax those Cities over again, which *L. Sylla* had discharg'd, for a Sum of Money, by a *Decree* of the *Senate*: And This too, without their Money again, which they had already paid for their *Liberty*. The *Senate* however took his Counsel, to the Scandal of the *Empire*. At this rate, there's more *Faith* to be found among *pyrates* than among *Roman Senators*. Well ! But the Revenue was increas'd, and it was therefore Profitable. But how long shall we dare to call any thing *profitable* that is not *Honest* ? How is it possible that *Hatred*, or *Infamy*, should ever be *profitable* to any Government, that must support it self by its own *Reputation*, and the good will of its *Confederates* ? Nay, I have had many a dispute, upon this Point, with my Friend *Cato* himself, for insisting too rigorously upon the Interest of the *Publique Treasury*, and *Revenue*: He was too hard methought to the *Officers*; for we ought to be Bountiful to the *One*, and treat the *Other* as we were wont to treat our

our Colonies : And so much the rather, because the Connexion of the *parts* did much contribute to the preservation of the *Whole*. And *Curio* did very Ill too ; who, tho' convinced that the *Transpadans* were in the Right, still concluded, *Vincat Utilitas, Let Utility carry it*. Now he should rather have said that it was not *Just*, because it was not profitable to the *Commonwealth*, than allowing it to be profitable, to conclude that it was not *Just*.

Instances
of Good
and Profit-
able in
Competiti-
on.
Their Ser-
vants were
Slaves.

IN *Hecaton's Sixth Book of Offices*, we find a great many Questions to our purpose. As for Instance, he puts the Case, *Whether in a great Scarcity of Corn, a Good man be not oblig'd to maintain his Servants ?* He Reasons it *Pro* and *Con* ; but at last, concludes the *Duty* with a regard rather to *profit*, than to *Humanity*. He puts another Question, *Whether, in the Extremity of a Storm at Sea, a Man should rather throw over a Serviceable Horse, or a Servant of little value*. And here is private *Interest* draws him *One way*, and *Humanity*, *Another*. And again, Suppose that, upon a Shipwreck, a Fool should get hold of a Plank ; whether or no may a Wise man take it from him, if he can ? He's upon the *Negative*, because the thing is *Unjust*. But what if it were the *Master* of the Ship ? Shall not he take his *Own* ? No, by no means : He may as well throw a Man over-board, that is at Sea in his Ship, because the Ship is his *Own* : For till they come to the End of the Voyage, the Ship is rather the *Passengers* than the *Masters*. But what if there should be but One Plank, and Two men equally Wise, and Deserving, in danger to be drown'd ?
Whe-

Whether shall Neither of them take it, or shall Either of them yield it to the Other? I would have it yielded to him that may do most Good; either to the Republique, or in his Own particular, by Living. But what if they be both alike? I would have no Contention; But let the One render to the Other as if the point had been decided by Lot. What if my Father should Ristle a Church, or Dig a passage under ground to Rob the Treasury? Whether or no should the Son give an Information of it to the Magistrate? This were an Unhappy Case; but I would however Defend my Father, if he were Accused. But is not my Duty to my Country above all other Duties? Yes, it is. But then my Country it self is concern'd, that the people in it should bear a Reverence to their Parents. But what if a Father should Design the betraying of his Country; or the getting of the Government into his own hand? Shall the Son Conceal it? I would have him earnestly desire his Father to desist; and if That will not do, he's bound to Accuse him. But I would have him threaten him First; and, in the Conclusion, if he finds his Country in danger, he is to value the safety of it before That of his Father. He puts another Question, if a Wise, and Good man, shall by oversight take False money, whether or no may he put it off again in payment, after he knows it to be Counterfeit? Diogenes says he may: Antipater is against it. With whom I do rather agree of the Two. Suppose a man sells a Piece of Wine, knowing that it will not keep; Is he bound to tell this or no? Diogenes says he needs not; but Antipater says that a Good man will tell it. These are the Propositions

Cases of
Conscience

tions in Controversie, among the *Stoiques*. In the selling of a Slave, whether or no am I bound to discover all his faults? Only those which the Civil Law obliges me to discover, or to take him again. But for discovering him to be a *Lyer*, a *Gamester*, a *Thief*, a *Drunkard*; Some are For the telling of it, and Others not. What if a man should sell Gold, believing it to be Copper? Is a Good man that knoweth it to be Gold, bound to tell him it or no? Or whether can any man justify the buying of That for One Penny which is worth a Thousand? I have now clear'd my own Opinion; And what are the Points in Controversie among the Philosophers before-named.

Conscience
in Con-
tracts.

WE come now to consider how far Those Offices and Contracts are to be observ'd, that are neither Extorted by Force, nor (as the Law has it) *Dolo malo*, or by Circumvention. I have a Remedy given me for the Dropsie, upon This Condition, that if it Cures me, I am never to use that Medicine again: Within a few years, and after I have been once Cur'd of it, I relapse into the same Disease, and the person with whom I contracted will not give me leave to make any further Use of it: What am I to do in This Case? It is an Inhumanity in him to refuse me; beside that my Using of it does Him no Hurt: In this Case, we must Consult the Means of Life, and Health. Well! Suppose a Wise man should be made Heir to a great Estate, upon This Obligation from the Testator, that before he touches one penny of the Profits of it, he should dance publicly before a Court of Justice, or in the Market place? He promises accordingly so to do; and without passing
That

That promise, he could never have been entitl'd to that Estate: Should he do it or no? I could wish he had not promis'd it; and my Opinion is, that it would better have become his Gravity not to have done it; but in regard that he has past his Word, if he accounts it a *Shameful*, and *Dishonourable* thing to discharge That Condition, he may break his word with a better Grace by making *no Benefit* of the Estate, than *Otherwise*; unless peradventure the Benefits of it might be converted to so Great and Publique an Advantage, that it would be no longer *Dishonourable* so to do, as being *Profitable* to his Country.

Neither is a man (*always*) bound to keep those Promises that are of no Advantage to those to whom the Promise is made. *Phœbus* (to come back to Fables) having promis'd his Son *Phaeton* a Grant of whatever he should ask; *Phaeton* demanded the Government of his Father's Chariot; he had his Desire, and in his full Carriere *Jupiter* cast him down with a Thunderbolt. Had not this promise of his Father's now been better broken than kept? And then the Promise that *Theseus* extorted from *Neptune*, what became of it? *Neptune* accorded to him Three wishes: One was the Destruction of his Son *Hippolytus*, upon a suspicion of his Familiarity with his own Mother-in-Law, and the Granting of That Wish was the greatest Affliction that ever came near to *Theseus's* Heart. And what was *Agamemnon's Vow* to *Diana*, in promising her the most beautiful Creature that should be born within his Dominions that year? which proved to be his own Daughter *Iphigenia*; whom he accordingly

Some Promises better broken than kept.

cordingly sacrific'd, as the fairest Creature which That year produc'd. How much better had it been if This Promise had never been made, than so horrible a Crime admitted? Wherefore sometime we should not pass a Promise: Nay a *Depositum* it self is not in all Cases to be restor'd. A man leaves a Sword in Trust with me when he's *Sober*, and calls for't again when he's *Mad*; Now to *Restore* it, in such a Case, were a *Crime*, and the *Refusal* of it, a *Duty*. What if I should lay up *Money* for him, and then find that he's about to make *War* upon his *Country*? Shall I render it? I think not; because it is against the *Republique*, which we ought to prefer. So many things that seem *Honest* enough in *their Own Nature*, are yet made *Unwarrantable* by *Time*, and *Occasion*: to make a good Promise, stand to a Bargain, deliver up a Trust; when it comes to be rather *Hurtful* than *Profitable* becomes *Dishest*. This is enough said of those *Utilities* against *Justice* that are cover'd with a *pretext* of *Reason*. But as we have drawn all *Duties* from the four Fountains of *Duty* in our First Book, we'll keep still to our Subject; and Shew, how those things that seem to be *profitable*, and *Are* not, stand in the greatest Opposition to *Virtue*. Here is enough said of *Prudence*, and of the *Counterfeit* of it, which is *Craft*: and likewise of *Justice*, which can never fail of being *profitable*.

of Forti-
zude.

THE Two remaining parts of *Honesty* follow, the One is seen in the *Greatness* of an *Excellent Mind*, the Other in a *Conformity* and *Moderation* of *Continence*, and *Temper*. It seemed *profitable*

table to *Ulysses*, the Counterfeiting himself mad, to avoid the War, as the *Tragedians* would persuade us. (For there appears no such suspicion of him in *Homer*, who was an Eminent Author.) This was no *Honest* Counsel, but it may be said perhaps, that it was a *Profitable* one, to stay at Home, and Govern, in an Easie, Lazie Life at *Ithaca*, with his Wife, his Son, and his Relations; but do you Imagine, that in *daily Labours*, and *Hazards*, there can be any *Dignity* that is to be compar'd with *This Tranquillity of Life*? And yet I cannot but have a Contempt for such a *Retreat*, because those things that are not *Honourable*, I cannot allow to be *Advantageous*. But what do you think the World would have said of *Ulysses* if he had gone on in that Disguise; who notwithstanding all his *Brave Exploits* in the War, did yet suffer these reproaches from *Ajax*, in the *Tragedy*?

He that contriv'd the Oath, and made us take it:
Was th' only man, Himself, you know, that brake
it:

Playing th' Mad, Driv'ling Fool, under That
Blind

To sleep in a whole skin, and stay behind:
And the bold Cheat had past, without all doubt,
But for sly *Palamede* that found it out.

NOW it was much better for him, to encounter, as he did, not only Enemies, but likewise Seas and Tempests; than to abandon *Greece*, which was then by one Consent carrying a War among the *Barbarians*. But to pass over things Fabulous and Foreign. Let us now come to our

N

own

own Country, and Affairs. *Marcus Attilius* *The Case of Regulus*, in his second *Consulship*, when he was surpris'd, and taken prisoner in *Africa*, by *Xanthippus* the *Lacedemonian*, a Commander under *Hamilcar* the Father of *Hannibal*: (who was then General) he was sent to the Senate, under an Oath of rendring himself again at *Carthage*, unless certain *Carthaginian Noblemen* should be releas'd in exchange. Being come to *Rome*, he had before him a fair Colour of *Profit*, but as the Story makes it out, he found it *Vain*, and *Idle*. The condition of it was, that he might stay in his Country, live at home with his Wife and Children, suffering the Calamity he was fallen into as the Common Fortune of the War, and still retaining the Honour of his *Consulary Dignity*. Will any man deny these things to be *Profitable*? or what shall we say, when *Courage*, and *Magnanimity* oppose it? What Greater Authority or Security would a man desire? For it is the Property of these Virtues not to fear any thing; to despise all accidents; and to reckon nothing Intolerable, that can befall a man.

His Honour and Justice.

BUT what did he do? He came into the Senate; told them his Bus'ness; but refus'd to give his Opinion; for so long as he was under an *Oath*, he was in the Condition of a *Prisoner* to an *Enemy*, and not of a *Senator*: But (like a Fool as he was (as some will say) and one that stood in his own light) that which he did speak was against himself: He would not allow it to be the *Roman Interest* to exchange their Prisoners; for the *Carthaginians* were young men (he said) and good Soldiers, but himself wast'd with Old age.

age. His Authority prevailing, the prisoners were detained, and himself return'd to *Carthage*, without any regard to the Affection he had either for his Country, or for his Friends; He was not Ignorant neither, to how cruel an Enemy, and to what exquisite Torments he expos'd himself, by his Return; only he was resolv'd not to violate his Oath. When they had *Tortur'd*, and *Watch'd* him even to death; his Condition was yet more Honourable, than if he had ended his days in his Own house; a *decrepit Captive*, and a *Forsworn Senator*. But what a Fool was he, not only not to agree to the remitting of their Prisoners, but also to dissuade it? But what? shall we call *That*, *Foolish*, that conduces to the Good of the *Commonwealth*? Or can any thing be *Profitable* to any *Member* of the *Publique*; that is not so to the *Whole*? It is a subversion of the *Fundamentals* of *Nature*, to divide *Profit* and *Honesty*, for we do all of us desire that which is *Profitable*: It is an Attractive that draws us to it, whether we will or no. Is there any man that avoids it; or rather that does not vigorously pursue it? But since *Profit* is not anywhere to be found. but in that which is *Praise-worthy*, *Honourable*, and *Honest*, therefore do we account these Considerations as most Noble, and Excellent; intending under the name of *Profit*, what is rather necessary than Splendid.

BUT what is there, you'll say, in an *Oath*? *The sacredness of an Oath.* are we afraid that *Jupiter* should take offence at us? Now This is a point common to all Philosophers, that *God* is neither *Angry* with us, nor *Hurts* us: and not only to those that take *God*

himself to be *Idle*, and wholly careless of us, but to those also that will have God to be always in *Action*, and doing of something: But what greater harm could even an Angry *Jupiter* do to *Regulus*, than *Regulus* did to *Himself*? So that there was nothing of *Religion* in the perverting so great a profit. Was it lest he should do a mean thing? First, of *Two evils* (we know) we are to chuse the *Least*. But was that Dishonourable Proposition then an Evil Equal to the Torment? And then, That of *Accius*: *Hast thou broken thy Faith? To any man that does not believe me, I neither have given, nor Do give it.* Now, tho' this was spoken by a Wicked King, it was yet well enough said: And moreover, as we say that some things appear profitable, which are not so; so do they say on the Other side, that some things appear *Honest* too, which are not so: As in this case of *Regulus's* returning to the Torment, to save his Oath: For it is rendered *Dishonourable*, because it was done under a Force, and by an *Enemy*, and so ought not to be made good. And they go farther, that whatsoever is very profitable, becomes *Honest* upon That Consideration, tho' it was not so before. This is it which is commonly urg'd against *Regulus*. But let us examin what it amounts to. *Jupiter* was not to be fear'd, lest he should hurt us in his *Anger*; because he does not use to be either *Angry* or *Mischievous*. This Reason lies as strong against all other Oaths, as against This of *Regulus*. But the question is not in an Oath, the fear of being punish'd for breaking it, but the Conscience and the Obligation of keeping it. Now an Oath is a *Religious Affirmation*; and whatsoever

ver

ver we promise positively, as in the presence of God, we must keep it : for this does not concern the Anger of the Gods, which is none at all; but it belongs to *Faith*, and *Justice* ! It is a glorious Exclamation of Ennius.

O Holy Faith ! the Tye o'th' Gods ;
And fit to have thy Mansion in their Blest
Abodes.

HE therefore that violates his *Oath*, profanes the Divinity of *Faith* it self, to which our Forefathers ascribed *Divine Honours* ; placing her in the *Capitol*, as (*Cato* tells us) next unto *Jupiter* himself. But even an Angry *Jupiter* (you say) could not have hurt *Regulus* more than he did himself. That were true, if there were *Pain* is no no evil but *Pain* : But we have the Authority of *Evil*. the greatest Philosophers for it, that Torment is so far from being the *Greatest Evil*, that it is *None at all*. And let me recommend *Regulus* to you upon This point, as no Ordinary Testimony ; Nay, perhaps none more convincing. For what nobler Instance can be desir'd, than to see so Illustrious a *Roman* subject himself voluntarily to the *Torture*, rather than forego his *Duty* ? For in saying the *Least of Evils*, it is meant by suffering rather *Dishonourably*, than *Miserably*. Is there any *Greater Evil* than a *Shameful Dishonesty* ? How offensive is it to the *Eye*, any Deformity of the *Body* ? But how much greater then should we account the *Pravity*, and *Corruption* of a *Polluted Mind* ? Wherefore they that argue these things with the greatest Generosity and Vigour, as the *Stoiques*, pronounce

That Only to be Evil which is Shameful: Nay, the *Peripatetiques* themselves (who are not so Masculine as the other) make no difficulty of unanimously pronouncing it to be the *Greatest Evil*. As for that saying, *I have neither given, nor do I give, my Faith to a Faithless man*: It was well enough said of the Poet, in the Case of *Atreus*; because it was accommodate to the person: But if they take up This once for granted, that a man is not oblig'd to keep Faith with him that has no Faith: let them have a care not to make use of that Shift as a Cover for Perjury.

A Pagan
Dispensa-
tion.

AS to the Rights and Customs of War, and keeping Faith with an *Enemy*, they are points we must be very *Tender of*: For whatsoever we swear, upon a full perswasion in our Minds that it ought to be done, That must be observ'd: But Otherwise, a man may dispense with that Obligation without Perjury. As if a man that lies at the mercy of common *Thieves*, should promise them a certain Sum of Money for the saving of his *Life*: 'Tis no deceit, the receding from it, tho' I had given my Oath for the performance: for we are not to look upon *Pirates* as *Open and Lawful Enemies*; but as the *Common Adversaries of Mankind*. For they are a sort of men with whom we have neither *Trust*, nor *Oath* in Common. For Perjury is not the *Swearing false*, but the not performing of That which we swear, with an *Intention* to do it; as may be gather'd from the very form of our Oath. It was wittily said of *Euripides*, *I swore with my Tongue, but not with my Heart*. But it was not for *Regulus*, however to embroyl
the

the Conditions, and Rules of War, with *Perjury*; having to do with a *Just*, and a *Lawful Enemy*; in which Case, all the Rights and Laws of Arms were admitted betwixt them in Common. For if it were otherwise, the Senate would never have sent and deliver'd up so many famous men in Chains to their Enemies. Which was the Case of *Titus Veturius*, and *Spurius Posthumius*, in their *Second Consulships*: Who when they were beaten at *Caudium*, and our Legions disarm'd, for concluding a Peace with the *Samnites*, were deliver'd up to them as their Prisoners, because they had done it without the *Order*, and *Consent* of the *People*, and *Senate*. And at the same time *T. Numitius*, and *Q. Melius*, who were then *Tribunes* of the *Common people*, were deliver'd up likewise, to Evacuate the Peace concluded, because it was done by Their Authority; and *Posthumius* himself, that was deliver'd up, was the man that advis'd and propounded it. And the same thing was done many years after, by *C. Mancinus*, who having made a League with the *Carthaginians*, without the Authority of the *Senate*, perswaded the representing of it to the *People*, himself, that he might be deliver'd up to the *Enemy*; which proposition being so recommended, by *L. Furius*, and *Sextus Atilius*, was accepted, and he accordingly deliver'd up. This was more Honourable yet, than that of *Q. Pompeius*, who in the same case, upon his supplication that such a *Decree* might not be past against him, prevail'd, and was discharg'd. Here, that which seem'd *Profitable*, was more consider'd than the *Honest*; but in the *Other examples*, the *false Appearance* of *Profit*, was overcome by a

The Rigour
of the Ro-
man Disci-
pline.

Dignity of *Honour*, and *Virtue*. But in the Case of *Regulus*, the Promise was made under a Force, and he was not oblig'd to Perform it. As if any Force could work upon the Mind of a Valiant man: Why did he go to the Senate then, expressly to move against himself, and dissuade the Release of the Prisoners? This is to reprehend the most Generous point in the whole case, he would not rest upon his own Opinion; but undertook the Cause, that the Senate might pass judgment upon it; wherein if he had not interposed, the Prisoners had been certainly restor'd to the *Carthaginians*; and then, *Regulus* might have continu'd safe in his Own Country. But as he did not account that course *Profitable* to his *Countrey*, so he took the *Honest* Part, in chusing rather to suffer, and undergo what he did. Now as to their saying, that when a thing is very *Profitable*, the advantage justifies it, tho' it were not *Honest* otherwise: Let me tell you, that it must *Be* so, and not be *Made* so: For there is nothing *Profitable*, which is not *Honest*, and it is not *Honest*, because it is *Profitable*, but it is *Profitable*, because it is *Honest*. So that out of many Wonderful Examples, a man shall hardly find a greater, or a more laudable Instance than This. For in the whole Character of *Regulus*, the most Worthy and Generous part of it was his Opinion for the detaining of the Prisoners. For as to his Return, tho' we wonder at it now adays, he could not yet at That time do otherwise: So that it was the Glory of the *Age*, rather than of the *Man*: For our Forefathers lookt upon the Tye of an Oath as the most Sacred Obligation in Nature. And this we find in

The Tye of
an Oath.

in the *Twelve Tables*; the Laws which we call *Sacrate*, shew as much: And so do our *Leagues*, by which we are ty'd to keep Faith, even with an Enemy; and so do the *Orders*, and *Penalties* of our *Censors*; who were not so strict in any thing, as in the bus'ness of an *Oath*. *Lucius Manlius* (the Son of *Anlus*) in his *Dictatorship* was summon'd by *M. Pomponius*, the *Tribune* of the *Common people*, for Exercising the Power of a *Dictator*, some days beyond his time; And was further accus'd for Banishing his Son *Titus* (who was afterward called *Torquatus*) out of the Town, and Commanding him to live in the Country. The Young man, hearing that his Father was in trouble about it, is said to have gone presently to *Rome*; and the next morning by day-light, to *Pomponius's* house. To whom it was suggested that *Torquatus* being very Ill us'd, had probably brought him some Complaint against his Father. *Pomponius* presently left his Bed, turn'd all people out of the Room, and so order'd the young man to be brought unto him, He was no sooner in the Chamber, but *Titus* drew his Sword, and swore that he would immediately kill him, if he did not presently give him his *Oath*, that his Father should be discharg'd: *Pomponius*, upon the apprehension of his present danger, past his *Oath*, and afterward reported the matter to the people; telling them he was forced to desist, and the reason of it: Whereupon *Manlius* was let go. Such a Veneration had they in those times for the Tye of an Oath! This *Titus Manlius* is the man, who having kill'd a *Frenchman* in a *Duel* upon a Challenge, at the River *Anien*, and taking from him a *Chain*,
which

which the *Latins* call *Torquis*, took the *Surname* of *Torquatus*. In his *Third Consulship* the *Latins* were routed and dispersed at *Veseris*, near the Mountain *Vesuvius*. He was a man of the highest rank of Brave men, and not more eminently Indulgent to his Father, than he was afterward severe to his Son.

The Severity of the Romans in case of Perfidy.

BUT as *Regulus* was to be commended for keeping of his Oath, so were those *ten men* after the Battle of *Canna* as much to be despised. *Hannibal* sent them to the Senate, upon an Oath to render themselves again in the Camp of the *Carthaginians*, if they could not obtain such an exchange of Prisoners as was propounded. But this Story is variously reported: *Polybius* (an Author of singular Credit) says that *Nine* of the *ten Noblemen* that were sent, delivered themselves up without prevailing for the *Exchanges*, but that *One* of the *Ten* never went back again; Having Returned to the Camp, so soon as he was out of it, upon pretence that he had left something behind him; by which *Return*, he would understand himself to be discharg'd of his Oath: But without reason; For the *Fraud* increases the *Iniquity*, without dissolving the *Perjury*. Wherefore it was a foolish piece of Cunning, and a most perverse Imitation of Prudence. Hereupon the Senate decreed that this shifting Jugler should be sent bound to *Hannibal*. But the most glorious thing of all was This, *Hannibal* had 8000 Prisoners; not taken in the Battle, or that had run any hazard of their lives, but they were only such as were left in the Camp, by the *Two Consuls*, *Paulus* and *Varro*. They might have been

been redeem'd for a small Sum of Money : but the Senate would not agree to't : for a Lesson to the *Roman Soldiers* that they must either *Conquer*, or *Die*. This resolution being made known to *Hannibal*, went more to the heart of him than any thing else (as the same Author has it) to see that the Senate and People of *Rome* in their greatest Adversity, should still uphold so generous a Resolution. So that things *seemingly Profitable* are still overcome by things that are *really honest*. Now *Acilius* that wrote the Story in *Greek*, reports it, that there were more of them went back to *Hannibal's Camp*, under the same Colour, to deliver themselves from their Oath ; and that they were branded for it with all sorts of Ignominy by the *Censors*. We shall now put an end to This matter ; for it is clear, that whatsoever is done with a Timorous, Abject, Mean, and Broken Mind, cannot be Profitable, because it is Flagitious, Dishonourable, and Shameful : as this Action of *Regulus* would have been, if he had rather consulted his *Own Interest*, than that of the *Publique*, in the business of the Prisoners ; or rather chosen to have staid at home.

THE Fourth part yet remains, consisting in *Of Temperance, Moderation, Modesty, Continence, and* *Decency*. Now can any thing be profitable, in opposition to this Catalogue of such Virtues ? But *Aristippus's Cyrenaiques*, and the *Annicerian Philosophers* place all Good in pleasure, and account *Virtue* to be therefore *Landable*, for the pleasure it produces. As these grew out of date, *Epicurus* came on ; the Supporter, Improver, and

Epicurus
places Good
and Ill in
Pleasure
and Pain.

and in a manner, the Author of the same Opinion. With these we must contend (as they say) for Life; If we are resolv'd to defend, and to maintain the Cause of Honesty: For if not only *Utility*, but all *Happiness of Life* rests in a *Sound Constitution of Body*, or in the search and hope of such a Constitution (as *Metrodorus* will have it) This *Utility* certainly (and in the highest degree too (for so they understand it) will be found to clash with *honesty*. For first, what Province shall we assign to *prudence*? If the search and enquiry after Delights; How wretched a thing is *Virtue*, when it comes to serve pleasure? But what is the Office of *prudence*? To judge learnedly of *pleasure*? Suppose that nothing could be more *Delightful* than That: There is nothing yet to be imagin'd, that is more *Dishonourable*. Now for him that pronounces pain to be the greatest of *Evils*; what place is there in such a Mind, for *Magnanimity*, that Exercises it self in the Contempt of *Labours*, and pains? For tho' *Epicurus*, in many places speaks Generously enough (as he does in This) of pain and Affliction; We are not yet so much to consider what he says, as what may be reasonable for him to say, upon the Foundation of Terminating all Good and Ill, in pleasure and pain: As to hear him now speak of *Continence* and *Temperance*; he says many very good things in several places; but yet he's gravell'd; (as we say) for how can any man commend *Temperance*, and yet place our Chiefest Good in pleasure? For *Temperance* is the Enemy of *Sensual pleasures*, and our *Appetites* are the *Servants*, and *Follower*s of them. And yet in these Three kinds, they

they shuffle as well as they can, and their Evasions are not without some Colour. They make *prudence* to be the skill of supplying or procuring pleasures, and keeping away pains: And then they make a shift too, to acquit themselves in the point of *Fortitude*: which they say enables us to contemn *Death*, and to endure *pain*. And in speaking of *Temperance*; tho' they are not clear, yet they extricate themselves after a fashion; for they say that the *Greatness* of pleasure arises only from an *Absence* or *Detraction* of pain. And as for *Justice*, it is with Them, either *Tottering*, or rather *Groveling* upon the *Ground*; and so are all those Virtues that are exercis'd in *Common*, and in the *Society* of Mankind. For there can neither be any *Goodness*, *Liberality*, or *Gentleness* (any more than *Friendship*) if these things be not desirable for *Themselves*: or else desirable only in relation to *pleasure* and *profit*. But let us bring the matter into a *Narrow Compass*: For as we have laid it down, that nothing can be *profitable*, in *Opposition* to *honesty*, so we do here affirm that all *Pleasure* is directly contrary to it. Concerning which point, I reckon *Calliphon*, and *Diomachus* to be the more to blame, in thinking to put an end to this Controversie, by coupling *pleasure*, with *honesty*, as if it were a *Man*, with a *Beast*. Whereas *Virtue* does not admit of that *Conjunction*, but despises and rejects it. And then for the end of *Good* and *Evil* men, which must be *Simple*: it cannot be *Temper'd*, and *Compound'd* of *disagreeing things*. But of this elsewhere more at large: And it is a weighty business. But to my purpose now in hand. Concerning

cerning any matter to be determin'd in the Case of a *Concurrent Opposition* betwixt *profit*, and *honesty*, we have said enough already. But if *pleasure* shall be said to carry some shew of *profit* also, there can be no *Conjunction* of it with *Honesty*. For allowing the most we can to *pleasure*, it does but serve us for *Sauce*, without any profit in it at all.

IN This Book (my Son *Marcus*) your Father makes you a *Present* : in *My Opinion* a *Great* one : but it is to *You* according as you *Take* it. And yet however, you may allow These Three Books of Mine, an *Entertainment* in your Study, among the *Commentaries* of *Cratippus*. If I my self had come to *Athens* (as I had done, if my Country had not Commanded me back, even when I was half way thorough) you should sometimes have been your Fathers *Disciple* too. So that I am now fain to speak to you in these *Writings*. Bestow as much of your time upon them as you can : and what you have a mind to do, you may do. When I shall understand that This Study pleases you, I hope it will not be long before I be with you my self. And however, at this distance, though in absence, I shall still be speaking to you. Wherefore my *Cicero* farewell : And assure your self that you are exceeding dear to me : And yet much dearer you will be, if I shall find that you take delight in these *Memorials*, and *Precepts*.

THE END.

Several TRACTS Printed for
Henry Brome, and Written by
Mr L' Estrange :

Being most } against P O P E R Y,
 } and
 } P R E S B Y T E R Y, Viz.

THe Relapsed Apostate.
Toleration discussed.

The Growth of Knavery.

Tyranny and Popery.

Reformed Catholick,

Free-born Subject.

The Case put for the D. of York.

The Appeal from the Country to the City Answered.

Seasonable Memorials.

*A Dialogue between Cit and Bumpkin, in Two
Parts.*

A further discovery of the Plot.

Discovery on Discovery.

A Narrative of the Plot.

The Committee, or Popery in Masquerade.

Answer to Libellers.

Richard against Baxter.

Ephraim and Zekiel, being his Case.

An Appeal to the King and Parliament.

And besides,

The History of the Plot, in Folio.

Erasmus's Colloquies against Popery.

Seneca's Morals.

The Guide to Eternity.

Cicero's Offices in English.

Five Love-Letters.